Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

SURREY BILL [LORDS]

Order for Third Reading read.

Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified. Amendments made.

Bill, as amended, read the Third time, and passed.

LLOYDS BANK (MERGER) BILL

NATIONAL BANK OF NEW ZEALAND LIMITED BILL

GOSPORT BOROUGH COUNCIL BILL

Read the Third time, and passed.

LEICESTERSHIRE BILL [LORDS]

Read a Second time, and committed.

Oral Answers to Questions — SOCIAL SERVICES

Severe Weather Payments

Mr. Strang: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will estimate how much has been spent up to the latest available date in the current financial year on exceptionally severe weather payments.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security (Mr. Ray Whitney): The information requested is not available centrally, and could be obtained only at disproportionate cost. When the period during which payments can be made is over, local offices will be asked to make a return so that the total number of payments made this winter and the cost can be worked out.

Mr. Strang: Now that the cold weather is, we hope, behind us again, does the Minister admit that the criteria for triggering the payments have been utterly discredited? Does he agree that, in future, any such payments should be based on temperature conditions that are the same throughout the country? Is not the idea that the Scots and others should be denied help with their heating bills because they are either hardier or thriftier nonsense?

Mr. Whitney: I do not agree that the system has been discredited. Certainly, the operation of the system, which is undoubtedly complex, is being examined. The hon. Gentleman, like a number of his hon. Friends, continues

to confuse the operation of this system — which is designed to give budget help in exceptional circumstances —with the quite different question of a cold climate allowance. As Governments of both complexions have understood it, it is generally considered that the arguments in favour of one national benefit scale are stronger.

Mr. Donald Stewart: Is the Minister aware that although the payments recently made south of the border were entirely commendable, great offence was felt in Scotland at missing out, because the temperatures there are usually lower? Will he ensure that, in future, payment of cold climate allowance—such as that contained in a Bill to be proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson), and the principle of which has been contained in other Bills proposed by other hon. Members —is considered by the Department?

Mr. Whitney: Again, the right hon. Gentleman is confusing two separate issues. The criteria for exceptionally severe weather payments are very clear, objective, laid down and are available to the right hon. Gentleman if he consults the Library. The argument for a cold climate allowance has been very carefully considered during our social security reviews and has consistently been rejected by Governments of all complexions.

Mr. Andrew Bowden: Is my hon. Friend aware that many poor pensioners prefer to remain cold rather than get into debt? Will he ensure that before next winter there is in operation a fair and sensible scheme that will ensure that every pensioner is at least able to keep one room at a temperature of not less than 70 deg F?

Mr. Whitney: I repeat that the operation of the system for exceptionally severe weather conditions is under careful examination. I remind my hon. Friend that the major support for heating comes from our supplementary benefit rates, which we have maintained at levels above the rise in the cost of living. I also remind my hon. Friend that the Government are now spending £400 million a year on basic heating additions. This figure is £140 million higher than the amount spent by the Labour Government. I would also point out to him that the level of heating payments is kept significantly ahead of the rise in the cost of energy prices.

Mr. Kirkwood: Twice in my hearing the Minister has said that the severe weather payments system is under review. Will he give the House a guarantee that the review will be completed and a decision taken so that the same nonsense does not occur next winter?

Mr. Whitney: I can certainly give that guarantee to the House.

Mr. Favell: Does my hon. Friend recognise that our weather has an extraordinary propensity to change from day to day? This system must be extraordinarily expensive to administer. It is about time we called it a day. It is plain daft.

Mr. Whitney: I can only assure the House that the system is under review. It has operated for only two years. Every system that has sought to deal with the matter has run into similar problems. I also remind my hon. Friend that the major help for heating, as with other household additions, comes from our supplementary benefit and other social security programmes. It is important not to get this small addition out of perspective.

Mr. Meacher: Is not this bureaucratic obstacle course of a benefit a monumental farce when pensioners often have to wait weeks or months for the payment, and even then sometimes receive only a footling 50p? When will the Government take some real action, such as restoring the £1 cut in heating allowances which they stole from pensioners last November, building up the home insulation programme which they are now running down and scrapping these absurd severe weather payments in favour of a special fuel payment of £5 a week throughout the period from October to March?

Mr. Whitney: I remind the hon. Gentleman that the action taken by the Government lies in the fact that, for example, our heating additions payments of £400 million a year are £140 million a year more than they were when the hon. Gentleman graced the Government Benches. I also remind him that this Government have kept all the supplementary benefit rates higher than the cost of living.

Doctors and Dentists

Mr. Knox: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services how many doctors and dentists undertook National Health Service work at the most recent count; and what was the comparable figure in 1979.

The Secretary of State for Social Services (Mr. Norman Fowler): The most recent figures (September 1984) are of 67,300 doctors and 17,200 dentists in the National Health Service in England. Comparable figures for 1979 were 61,600 and 15,300. Growth is 9 per cent. in the number of doctors in the National Health Service, and 12 per cent. in the number of dentists, over the last five years.

Mr. Knox: Does my right hon. Friend agree that these figures provide further evidence of an improvement in the National Health Service since this Government came to office and that they make nonsense of the remarks by the Opposition about cuts in the National Health Service?

Mr. Fowler: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. The figures established that this Government are devoting more resources to the National Health Service, that they are employing more doctors and dentists and, above all, that they are providing more services for patients.

Mr. Madden: Is the Secretary of State concerned about the fact that consultants regularly appear in court to give evidence during the time that they are employed by the National Health Service and that they pocket fees from the National Health Service and also very substantial fees for giving medical evidence? Does the Secretary of State agree that this is a potential abuse? Will he therefore look into it? Does the Secretary of State agree that if money could be saved in this way there would be less need for the Secretary of State to come to the House, as he did yesterday, and announce an increase in prescription charges?

Mr. Fowler: I shall look at any evidence that the hon. Gentleman can provide, although I hope that he will not persist in making generalised accusations against the medical profession.

Mrs. McCurley: Will my right hon. Friend preserve the freedom of doctors and dentists to help private practice evolve with the Health Service and to stop the accusation of cheating levelled at them by the Opposition?

Mr. Fowler: Yes. Action will clearly be taken on any abuses which are brought to my attention or which my statutory auditors find. That general and dental practitioners should have a right to private practice is clear and is the Government's policy.

Ms. Clare Short: How many people who need dental treatment are failing to turn to the NHS for that treatment because of its high cost, currently £15 for a couple of fillings, going up to £17.50? Many families must now be in need of dental care but are not receiving it from the system.

Mr. Fowler: The hon. Lady should look at the figures. In 1979–80 there were 27 million courses of treatment and today there are 31 million courses of treatment. In other words, the courses of treatment are increasing, not falling.

Lone-Parent Families

Mr. Sedgemore: asked the Secretary of State for Social Security if he has estimated the increase in demand on personal social services which is caused by the increase in the number of lone-parent families.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Services (Mr. John Patten): The Government's plans for expenditure on local authority services take account of pressures on the personal social services, including the effects of increasing numbers of lone-parent families. For individual local authorities the grant related expenditure assessments are calculated using the latest available estimates of numbers of lone-parent families.

Mr. Sedgemore: Does the Minister accept the view of the National Council for One Parent Families that the GREA levels do not reflect the real needs of one-parent families? What extra help will he provide for those 13 inner London boroughs which have the highest proportion of one-parent families in Britain? In particular, what extra help will he give to Hackney, which, in order to get down to the GREA levels for the under-fives, would have to reduce expenditure by 43 per cent?

Mr. Patten: I recognise the particular problems of Hackney, which, I understand, has the highest proportion of lone parents of any London borough or any other part of the country. I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's concern for it, but he must ask himself why other London boroughs with almost as high a number of lone-parent families, such as Hammersmith and Fulham, manage well without rate capping and his authority cannot.

Mr. Fry: In assessing the extra needs of lone-parent families, will my hon. Friend examine the other benefits given to them, particularly milk tokens, which are subject to considerable abuse. Will he consider altering that system? A monetary payment might be the right answer to tokens abuse.

Mr. Patten: We shall certainly be looking at that in the course of my right hon. Friend's social security review. My hon. Friend referred to other sums and benefits available to lone parents. Let me point out that, for example, benefit for one-parent families has gone up by 112 per cent. since the Government took office, well ahead of the rate of inflation.

Ms. Harman: Does the Minister not recognise that it is not only the increasing number of lone parents that


increases demands on social services, but the increasing number of unemployed and the very old? If so, why are the Government using rate capping and other rate penalties to reduce spending to inadequate levels as set by the grant related expenditure assessment? Do they not want provision to be by businesses to those who can afford it, while those who cannot afford it will have to rely on charities or, worse still, have no service?

Mr. Patten: Local authorities throughout Britain have increased their expenditure on personal social services by some 18 per cent. in the past five years. They must set their own priorities. The hon. Lady could better spend her time pointing out good practice to boroughs, such as her own, which sometimes have rather bad practice.

Board and Lodgings Allowance

Mr. James Lamond: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services how many representations he has received concerning the proposals to place a limit on the board and lodgings allowance.

The Minister for Social Security (Mr. Tony Newton): We have received a large number of representations about the proposals directly, and the Social Security Advisory Committee has received over 500.

Mr. Lamond: Is the Minister aware of the disastrous effect that that change would have on organisations such as the Oldham single homeless project, which has now been operating successfully for seven years in Oldham? Is he aware that it would split families in the same way as the old means test did 50 years ago? It would also affect the young unemployed, who, even if they did get on their bikes, would be unable to find work outside their local area.

Mr. Newton: I see no reason why it should have the effects that the hon. Gentleman has described. I hope the House will agree that it is no service whatever to young people to give them undue encouragement to come to the big cities and then to trap them on benefit rates which mean that they cannot possibly afford to take work.

Mr. John Townend: Will my hon. Friend confirm that since 1979–80 the cost of board and lodgings allowance has risen by some 900 per cent? What will be the estimated cost in 1985–86 after the changes, and how does that compare with 1979–80?

Mr. Newton: At the moment I cannot give my hon. Friend an estimate for 1985–86. However, between December 1982 and the estimate for December 1984, the total of those payments, including residential care, has risen from £205 million to £570 million. No responsible Government could allow that rate of increase to continue.

Mr. Kennedy: Why has the Minister decided to make this change when he refuses to contemplate any of the sensible suggestions for improvements to other benefits and allowances, which have been put forward by hon. Members on both sides of the House, on the basis that a full-scale review of social security policies is taking place? Why has the hon. Gentleman gone ahead with this change when he refuses to show the same willingness to make sensible adaptations elsewhere?

Mr. Newton: We have made the change for the reasons that I have already made clear. We are doing no service

to many of those who gain from the increase in benefit, and the increase is proceeding at a rate that makes it more difficult to do what we would wish to do for those in genuine need.

Mr. Meacher: Is the Minister aware that one of the groups to suffer most from this cut in the board and lodgings allowance will be the men who are kicked out of their homes as a result of his proposal to close 21 DHSS resettlement units? Is it not dogmatic privatisation of the worst kind when it is directed against people who, in addition to being homeless, have severe psychiatric problems? Do the Government not care that many of those men will not receive proper care in the community, and will die sleeping rough?

Mr. Newton: The hon. Gentleman has an absolutely relentless tendency to go completely over the top with any argument that he adopts. He referred to the resettlement units, but he should bear in mind that a significant number of those establishments are found in old-fashioned, decrepit, old RAF camps on the outskirts of our big cities.

Mr. Meacher: Not all of them.

Mr. Newton: I accept that not all of them are in that situation, but our declared purpose is to ensure that current resources are used to provide what we regard as more effective services to meet the needs of those people.

Mentally Ill People

Mr. Dubs: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he has received any representations concerning the level of local authority support for the mentally ill.

Mr. John Patten: Yes, Sir, I have received representations from several hon. Members and others since my right hon. Friend answered a similar question from the hon. Gentleman last October. The Social Services Committee has also produced its report on community care which bears on this matter.

Mr. Dubs: Does the Minister agree that, at the very time when it is his policy to discharge people from mental illness hospitals into the community, there is an additional obligation on local authorities to provide adequate care? Will he condemn the decision by Wandsworth council to cease funding the Bolingbroke day centre for the mentally ill, which means that some of the most vulnerable people in our community will be thrown onto the streets?

Mr. Patten: Local authorities are the junior partners in the movement of the mentally ill into the community, because money can be moved with patients into the community. Year on year we are providing better standards of community care, with increased numbers of day hospital places, increased numbers of day centres and, perhaps best of all, a substantial increase in — nay, doubling of — the number of psychiatric community nurses.

Mr. Galley: I am grateful for my hon. Friend's assurance that provision in the community for the mentally ill is not entirely a matter for the local authorities, and that health authorities also have a very major role to play. Will my hon. Friend take steps to ensure that mental illness hospitals are not closed before adequate provision is made in the community for those displaced, and that a flexible system of bridging finance is introduced, on the ground


that the receipts from the sale of hospitals can be several years delayed from the initial capital provision required for the community facilities?

Mr. Patten: These closures of large hospitals are proceeding rather more slowly than many of us might like, because careful discussions have to take place between local authorities and local health authorities. Sometimes the root of the problem has been found to be not lack of finance, but lack of really good joint planning.

Mr. Carter-Jones: Will the Minister promise to investigate the special difficulties faced by the Salford health authority and the Salford city council regarding the discharge of patients from Prestwich hospital?

Mr. Patten: My right hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Health recently considered the problems of the Salford health authority.

Mr. Nicholls: Will my hon. Friend accept that if a policy of caring for the mentally ill in the community is to work, the mentally ill must be absorbed into the community at a rate with which the community can cope? Bearing that in mind, will he stress to local authorities that they must consider the extent to which people can be absorbed into their particular community, instead of, in some cases, issuing planning permission at random for a particular area because the houses there happen to be acceptable?

Mr. Patten: Planning permission is obviously an important part of the matter, and I know that there can be emotive issues, as there are in my hon. Friend's constituency. At the root of getting the relatively small number of the remaining mentally ill into the community, whom we judge can go into the community—there are about 5,000 — is not only money, but good joint planning between the health and local authorities to ensure that those people are well and properly placed.

Mr. Meadowcroft: Although I appreciate what the Minister said about the transfer of resources with patients from health authorities to the local government sector and voluntary bodies, will he accept that local authorities are anxious about the continuation of funds for places after the deaths of the patients with whom those funds come? I noted the comments from both sides of the House about the need to be sensible about the problem. Will he take them on board and examine ways to encourage local authorities to accept their responsibilities in that regard?

Mr. Patten: There are long-term issues to be considered. For the life of a patient, funds are transferred on a named basis with a particular patient.

Mrs. Currie: Is my hon. Friend aware that the Select Committee on Social Services, which recently reported on community care, expressed deep anxiety about the ready availability of rhetoric and principle and in some cases the considerable lack of action and practice? Will he comment on its recommendation that the Department's social work service has an important role to play in the setting and maintenance of standards throughout the country, possibly through an inspectorate?

Mr. Patten: My hon. Friend talks about the readiness of rhetoric, and I listened carefully to what she said about that point. We welcome the report of the Select Committee on Social Services, on which my hon. Friend gives such distinguished and painstaking service. The report has 101

recommendations, and we shall respond in detail to each recommendation, including the reference to rhetoric which my hon. Friend mentioned.

Mr. Alfred Morris: Is the Minister aware that many of the local authorities which want to do more to provide community care for the mentally ill now say that they are in a Catch-22 situation? In seeking to observe the Government's rate laws, they find it increasingly difficult to discharge their mandatory duty to the mentally ill and others under the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970. What are DHSS Ministers doing to persuade Treasury and Environment Ministers of the need to ensure that adequate funds are available for the full implementation of that Act?

Mr. Patten: Bad authorities which cannot run good social services departments should look at the best practice of good social services departments, which are run predominantly by Conservative-controlled local authorities.

Limited List Prescribing

Mr. Beith: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what representations he has received since he announced his revised limited list about a possible appeal mechanism for the prescribing of non-listed medicines.

Mr. Andrew MacKay: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services how many representations he has received concerning the revised final version of his limited list of drugs available on the National Health Service.

Mr. Fowler: We have received 123 letters commenting on the selected list which I announced on 21 February. Ninety-five have been from doctors or patients, of which 11 have been about a mechanism which would enable drugs not available at NHS expense to be prescribed in particular circumstances.

Mr. Beith: As the Minister has conceded that his first attempt at a limited list was unsatisfactory, why is he so self-confident as to believe that his second attempt is absolutely perfect and foresees every possible clinical need, given that some doctors believe that even with the new list they will be unable to prescribe appropriate pain killers for some cancer sufferers? Does he recognise that he may greatly reduce the opposition to the limited list if he provides a mechanism through which special cases could be dealt with and had it in operation as soon as the list comes into operation?

Mr. Fowler: I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. The expert committee that looked at the list of drugs believed unanimously that the selected list would meet all clinical requirements. The vast majority of concern has now been met. Nevertheless, if the profession wishes to propose some appeal mechanism I am ready to discuss it with the profession. That will mean that the profession will have to come and see me and talk about it.

Mr. Andrew MacKay: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many Conservative Members who strongly support his proposals nevertheless believe that it would be in the interests of patients to have an appeals procedure, whereby drugs that are not on the list but are later proven to be essential can be made available? Has he received any communication from the British Medical Association—a


minority of whose members have behaved callously towards elderly and sick patients—as to whether it will assist in the appeals procedure?

Mr. Fowler: We have received independent advice from about 2,000 general practitoners, but regrettably the British Medical Association has said that until the House debates the subject next Monday it will not take part in talks. I regret that, but I hope that after Monday's debate the BMA will come to see me and my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Health as quickly as possible.

Mr. Loyden: Does the Secretary of State agree that the Government's handling of this has been ham-handed, to say the least, and that anxiety among the sick, especially the elderly sick, could have been avoided had the matter been handled differently? Is it not clear that he must do something immediately to remove people's anxiety over whether they will continue to be provided with drugs that have been successful?

Mr. Fowler: I do not accept what the hon. Gentleman says. We have always made it clear that we would consult on our proposals and that the original list was provisional. The result of consultation is the extended list. The vast majority of the public and of the medical profession accept that the list is now good.

Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Does my right hon. Friend agree that, although restricting the variety of prescriptions may be necessary, restricting the quantity of drugs prescribed is vital? Will he require doctors to limit prescriptions to 28 days' supply at a time, which would be cheaper, safer and less wasteful?

Mr. Fowler: I am not sure that I can require them to do that. An advantage of the debate that we have had is that there is now much more concern about prescribing habits, and I hope to be able to follow that with further advice from the Department. In principle, I have great sympathy with my hon. Friend's point.

Mr. Flannery: Does the Minister realise that we have received a heavier postbag on this issue than on almost anything else, which is the real reason why so many Tories are standing up? Does he realise that every week there is a new and developing onslaught on the NHS, which causes more and more people to worry about what the Government will do? Is this the creeping privatisation of the Health Service by 1,000 cuts, of which this cut is a major part?

Mr. Fowler: The hon. Gentleman is being more than usually absurd. He must recognise that we are trying to raise money for the NHS. However, it does not surprise me that he comes to such a conclusion. He and the Labour party want more spending on the Health Service but have not thought about how that money will be raised.

Mr. Latham: Although I welcome the tone of my right hon. Friend's answers this afternoon, especially the feeler that he put out to the medical profession, does he accept that if he met doctors' concern about an appeals procedure in cases where doctors genuinely believe that certain drugs must go to their patients he would do much to defuse all reasonable opposition?

Mr. Fowler: Indeed, and that is why I said that my door is open to listen to representations on that. I am

sympathetic to the principle, but it is reasonable to say that if the BMA wants talks it must come to me and discuss the matter.

Mr. Kennedy: What consultations is the Secretary of State having with his opposite numbers at the Department of Trade and Industry, who commissioned a working paper from the pharmaceutical industry on extending patent life, which would be a way of moving towards generic substitution and thereby forgoing the shambles which this limited list has caused?

Mr. Fowler: The hon. Gentleman's description of the position is not remotely fair or accurate, and I should be sorry if he took that view into the Division Lobby. Clearly, I am consulting my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, but, as the hon. Gentleman will know, I am the sponsor of the pharmaceutical industry, which has made it clear that, despite the controversy over the limited list, it wants the DHSS to continue as a sponsoring Department.

Mr. Sims: Will my right hon. Friend say what representations he has made to the ABPI? Does he agree that its newspaper campaign has not only been misleading, but has caused quite unnecessary concern, particularly to elderly people?

Mr. Fowler: I think that the campaign of the ABPI —and I would say that at times the ABPI has not been speaking for some of the excellent companies in the industry — on occasions has been disgraceful and hypocritical. It must be pointed out that its latest proposal, in which it suggests that old people will be affected, goes ill with its suggestion that exemption should be removed as one of the ways of making money.

Mr. Dobson: Will the Secretary of State tell the House how much of the cost of his estimated saving of £75 million will be borne by pensioners? If he cannot give the House a figure, will he say why not? Surely he does not intend to take some free medicines away from pensioners without knowing first how many will be affected and how much money they will lose?

Mr. Fowler: I do not think that our proposals will affect the pensioners. What we expect this to do is to cut the drugs bill by £75 million immediately. We have always recognised that consultation would mean less saving. The aim is to look for further ways of getting better value for the drugs bill.

Mr. Baldry: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that the savings made under the limited list system will redound to the benefit of the National Health Service and not simply to the benefit of the Treasury?

Mr. Fowler: Yes, that is the whole point of the proposal. The money saved will go to health care. The Opposition have been consistent in pressing me to make economies in the drugs bill. The difference is that the Government are doing something about it. The fact is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Mr. Baldry) says, that the proceeds from that will go into health care.

Care in the Community

Mr. Fatchett: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will make a statement about proposed developments in relation to care in the community.

The Minister for Health (Mr. Kenneth Clarke): We shall continue to encourage the development of services which enable people in need of care to live as normal a life as their condition allows.

Mr. Fatchett: I think that the overwhelming majority of people would acknowledge that as the correct policy in principle, but, will the Minister recognise the widespread anxiety among local authorities about the level of funding for community care? What guarantees can the Minister give that an appropriate and satisfactory level of funding will be made available to local authorities?

Mr. Clarke: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for agreeing with the policy in principle. I can assure him that some very good things are now being achieved in practice by way of placing patients in more suitable care. Local authority social services spending has gone up by 18 per cent. on average ahead of inflation while the Government have been in office. As my hon. Friend was saying, as long as local authorities pay attention to getting the best value for that money, we believe that they can make perfectly adequate provision for this policy.

Mr. Alexander: Are we not in danger of being overhasty over the closure of some hospitals, such as Balderton hospital in my constituency, and Saxondale hospital in his? Can he give the House an assurance that these hospitals will not be closed until firm placings are available for those who will be affected?

Mr. Clarke: As my hon. Friend mentions Saxondale hospital in my constituency, I can tell him that I well remember that being mooted for closure by the right hon. Member for South Down (Mr. Powell) when he was Minister for Health. I am glad to say that we now have a definite date for closure. I agree with my hon. Friend that no closure of any hospital should take place unless and until there is proper provision for better care for the patients. The health authorities concerned are planning to provide just that.

Mr. Campbell-Savours: Why should there be under-funded care in the community when there are perfectly good hospitals for the mentally handicapped available, such as the Dovenby hospital, in Cumbria, in my constituency? Is the Minister aware that the future of that hospital is being threatened only because of the backlog of repairs? Why does the Minister not cough up the money and make sure that the people in that hospital who wish to stay are not forced out into the community to save the Government money?

Mr. Clarke: Many of our mentally handicapped patients would do better and have a better quality of life in good, smaller facilities than they will by being locked away in older hospitals. That is the aim of the policy. I understand the reluctance of many of the patients, which is shared by their families, to emerge from a hospital in which they have lived for a long time. However, only recently I met a man released from a hospital in which he had lived for 44 years, spending most of that time mute and violent, who is now enjoying a reasonable quality of life in a small home in Eastbourne.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that there is a shortage of accommodation for the single homeless? In those circumstances, and in view of what the Minister of State said in answering an earlier question, will he reconsider

the closure of resettlement units? The one in Newbury is a modern building, the costs of which compare favourably with private accommodation. As it has not been asked by the DHSS to trim its costs, why is it being closed?

Mr. Clarke: I assure my hon. Friend that we shall ensure that our policy towards resettlement units does not conflict with our care in the community policy. As my hon. Friend the Minister for Social Security said, we are seeking to make better use of the resources and, in most cases, to make improved provision.

Mr. Ashley: Is the Minister aware that many mentally disabled people are being pushed out of hospital, that health authorities then divest themselves of responsibility, that local authorities refuse to accept responsibility and that the mentally ill are thereby left in a no man's land, with appalling consequences for them? Is he aware that the only answer is for him to guarantee a community place for every mentally ill person who leaves hospital?

Mr. Clarke: I agree that we must ensure that such incidents do not occur and that, when they occur, they do not happen again. It is essential to make a proper assessment of any provision for each patient. We have lifted many restrictions which applied to health authorities and which previously stopped them from providing funds to enable local authorities to make more provision. We are satisfied that, with good joint planning and the good planning of resources, the policy can go forward successfully.

Mr. Rathbone: Will my right hon. and learned Friend accept that many people are thoroughly in favour of the thrust of the new policy—

Mr. Nicholas Winterton: It has been the policy for 25 years.

Mr. Rathbone: —but that there is a need to reassure some patients who are being moved out of old-fashioned hospitals and into the community that they will have the care in the community to which they have become used?

Mr. Clarke: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for those remarks, though, as my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton) pointed out, it is not a new policy in principle. It is, however, being handled with more care and pace than has been the case in the past, and we must reassure people with understandable fears that proper provision will be made for patients.

Ms. Harman: As the Government are prepared to give 100 per cent. disregard from rate capping for all council spending on civil defence, why cannot the right hon. and learned Gentleman persuade his fellow Ministers to give 100 per cent. disregard for all spending under joint finance for care in the community? Does he appreciate that the increased spending on the social services which he has praised is attributable largely to the actions of councils which are now being penalised by the Government by rate capping?

Mr. Clarke: We have just eased the rules on the disregarding of joint finance expenditure and put joint finance in line with the urban programme. I assure the hon. Lady that some councils—such as authorities in Exeter and Devon, which are not remotely threatened by rate capping because they provide good services without breaching the Government's guidelines — are making spectacular progress.

AIDS

Mr. Parry: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what recent representations he has received concerning his guidance about the precautions to be taken concerning acquired immune deficiency syndrome.

Mr. Knowles: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether he is satisfied that reasonable safeguards have now been taken to protect hospital staff from infection by the acquired immune deficiency syndrome virus.

Mr. Kenneth Clarke: I am satisfied that the precautionary measures recently recommended by the advisory committee on dangerous pathogens in its interim guidelines on AIDS for clinical and laboratory staff are adequate. Indeed, in the view of some experienced clinicians, they are too stringent. The interim guidelines were issued on 16 January by Health Ministers and the Health and Safety Commission. We have so far received only a small number of inquiries and comments, mostly relating to the interpretation of wording or specific points of detail. We are learning more about the disease as time goes on and the guidelines will be reviewed in 12 months' time.

Mr. Parry: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware of the concern of the National Union of Public Employees on behalf of its members employed in the National Health Service, such as nurses, ancillary staff and ambulance personnel? Is he also aware of the concern that has been expressed on behalf of other public servants such as police officers, prison warders and firemen? Will he provide clearer guidelines for those people and make a statement to allay the fears that exist among the general public on this issue, so as to avoid any question of panic arising? Is he further aware of the concern of hon. Members, as shown by the fact that early-day motion 374, tabled by me, has been signed by 103 hon. Members?

Mr. Clarke: The guidelines are clear and should be reassuring. I assure the hon. Gentleman that, for example, in the United States, where there have been 8,000 cases of AIDS, there has not been one case of a hospital or laboratory employee contracting the disease as a result of his or her work.

Wrightington Hospital, Lancashire (Children's Ward)

Mr. Robert Atkins: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if revised proposals have yet been received regarding the children's ward at Wrightington hospital, Lancashire.

Mr. John Patten: No, Sir.

Mr. Atkins: Is my hon. Friend aware that this matter has gone on for too long? Can he give any indication when the matter will be resolved, because local people are becoming increasingly concerned about the delay in saving this very important ward?

Mr. Patten: Yes, Sir. Shortly.

Elderly Persons

Mr. Pike: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what is the latest average weekly subsidy per head paid by his Department for the care of the elderly in private residential and nursing homes for the elderly.

Mr. Newton: Our records do not identify separately payments made to the elderly in homes for the elderly. However, the most recent provisional figures indicate that in December 1983 the average weekly payment of supplementary pension—which is paid to people over pension age—in residential care and nursing homes was £75·25.

Mr. Pike: Will the Minister recognise the concern at the large growth in private nursing homes, and will he ensure that adequate resources are given to local authorities to inspect and control these homes? Will he also ensure that local authorities have adequate capital and revenue resources to provide sufficient sheltered and residential accommodation for all our people who should have this provided by local authorities?

Mr. Newton: The hon. Gentleman will know that we are anxious to have a proper balance of provision as between all the providers and that we have recently taken new steps to improve the registration and inspection of homes. I am sure that he will agree with that.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER

Engagements

Mr. Bidwell: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 12 March.

The Prime Minister: This morning I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. After my duties in the House, I shall be leaving to attend the funeral of the late President Chernenko.

Mr. Bidwell: Has the right hon. Lady's attention been drawn to the point raised in the House yesterday about the outrageous remarks of the chairman of the National Coal Board, Mr. Ian MacGregor? Does she think that he is really up to the job when he is capable of saying that the miners—according to the Sunday Telegraph—
are now discovering the price of insubordination and insurrection.—And boy, are we going to make it stick!
What kind of a clown have we in that job? Will the right hon. Lady consider sacking him and thus help to promote peace in the coalfields?

The Prime Minister: I have every confidence in Mr. MacGregor, the chairman of the National Coal Board.

Mr. Shersby: Is my right hon. Friend aware that determined action by the Conservative councillors on the Greater London council has resulted in a saving on the rates of 3p in the pound for each of the London boroughs? Does she agree this is a very significant saving for London ratepayers?

The Prime Minister: Yes. I think that the determined action of this Government, coupled with the determined action of Conservative councillors on the GLC, has been of great benefit to the ratepayers of London.

Mr. Hardy: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 12 March.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave a few moments ago.

Mr. Hardy: Could the right hon. Lady find time today, or very soon, to reflect upon the position of those communities, some of them in my own constituency, where scarcely any teenagers are in normal employment? Does she not even begin to understand the consequences of such a situation, and may we at least have an assurance that Government economic policy will not be maintained until our societies are utterly corroded?

The Prime Minister: As the hon. Gentleman is aware, we have done a great deal, and we hope to continue to do more, under the youth training scheme, the technical education initiative in schools and many of the computer centres to enable young people to get better skills to enable them eventually to get better jobs.

Mr. Warren: When my right hon. Friend goes to Moscow tomorrow, will she make plain to the Soviet people the strong feelings, which I am sure are shared by many of us, that, with the sadness of the death of their leader, we also have high expectations because Mr. Gorbachev, on his visit to this country, opened the doors of peace and friendship, which has given hope to the people of this country that the interests and aspirations of the people of the world can be met and that we can live in peace together?

The Prime Minister: I think that that will be the wish of everyone when we go to the funeral in Moscow. I think that we may take heart from the fact that the negotiations, which were due to begin in Geneva, have begun, and we all wish that they end successfully in agreement.

Mr. Kinnock: May I first agree with every word of that last reply? Today and tomorrow, will the Prime Minister take the opportunity, when she meets representatives of our Western allies in Moscow, to discuss with them the star wars initiative?

The Prime Minister: That would be expected.

Mr. Kinnock: I am grateful for that reply. Will the right hon. Lady be reflecting to them the view expressed today by her predecessor, her right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath), that star wars would be decoupling, destabilising and a diversion of resources? Since that is so obviously true, why must the right hon. Lady still trail along toadying behind the Americans? Why does she not do what a real friend would do and tell them they are wrong, honestly?

The Prime Minister: I believe that the United States is right to do research. It would be very difficult to get an agreement on research only, because there is no way of verifying what research is going on. When it comes to deployment and testing, that is already covered by the antiballistic missile agreement, and that is why I would expect it to be dealt with in that way.

Mr. Latham: Is my right hon. Friend aware that her trip to Moscow should certainly not lead to the decoupling of the West from its allies, as has just been suggested, but she should try to persuade the Russians to negotiate sensibly and then get the peace and disarmament that we are all looking for?

The Prime Minister: Yes, I think that it has been the unity and strength of the West that has brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table at Geneva.

Mr. Steel: While the Prime Minister is in Moscow, will she make it clear that not only does she welcome the restart of the Geneva talks today, but that she is willing to make a contribution to them by indicating in principle that the Polaris deterrent should be counted in in East-West negotiations?

The Prime Minister: No, I do not believe that either our own independent deterrent or the French independent nuclear deterrent should be counted in. Ours amounts to only some 3 per cent. of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. When that is brought down enormously — very substantially indeed — the situation might be changed, and we might be prepared to consider a different course.

Sir Anthony Grant: In all the euphoria over the new Soviet leader and his charming wife, does my right hon. Friend agree that the most welcome sign of a change of attitude would be a halt to the genocide that is still going on in Afghanistan?

The Prime Minister: That would be very welcome indeed. I am reminded, as my hon. Friend suggests, that this year is the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki accord. Doubtless that is a matter for us to reflect about and take action upon.

Mr. Wareing: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 12 March.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Wareing: Will the Prime Minister justify to the House how the Government can cut the real value of the heating allowance to old and disabled people and the housing capital investment programme on the one hand, but allow the cost of Trident to treble on the other hand? Is the right hon. Lady proud of the fact that to millions of our fellow countrymen and women she has become the personification of all that is unjust in our society?

The Prime Minister: The heating allowance has not been cut. It has gone up greatly, ahead of anything that the last Labour Government had and is far ahead of any increase in fuel costs. The cost of Trident will be paid at the time when it falls to be due. We do not know precisely what the dollar-pound exchange rate will be at that time.

Mr. Terlezki: When my right hon. Friend meets Mr. Gorbachev tomorrow or the day after, will she please ask him about the foreign policy that he wishes to implement, knowing that he may well reign over the Soviet Union for the next 20 years? Will my right hon. Friend ask him to ensure, sooner rather than later, that the Soviet Union withdraws Soviet troops from Afghanistan, dismantles the SS20s and adheres to the Helsinki final act? That is the only way to ensure peace and prosperity for all mankind.

The Prime Minister: I think that my hon. Friend has encapsulated the point and I cannot improve on the excellence of his question.

Mr. Tony Banks: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 12 March.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Banks: Will the Prime Minister repeat the exact words that she used during the 1979 general election


campaign when she said that she had no intention of raising prescription charges? Will she tell the House by what percentage they have gone up since 1979?

The Prime Minister: Yes, sir. I have the transcript of the press conference here with me. Word for word I shall say exactly what the hon. Gentleman asked me:
I doubt very much whether any responsible Government could say that over a period of five years, regardless of what happened to the value of money, they would not put up prescription charges. I doubt whether they could.

Mr. Tim Smith: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 12 March.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Smith: Further to the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Shersby), as Ken Livngstone recommended to the GLC the setting of a rate within the legal limit, and as he now appears to be in some difficulty about his nomination in Brent, East, will my right hon. Friennd commend him to those concerned for his new-found respect for the rule of law?

The Prime Minister: I am very pleased that in spite of all the political posturing a legal rate has been set. I am doubly pleased that it has been so, despite the advice of the Labour party conference, which we all saw on television last autumn. I hope that other rate-capped authorities will follow the example and set a legal rate.

Mr. Beggs: Does the Prime Minister share my regret that Cardinal O'Fiaich's remarks in Boston and the speech by Bishop Duffy in London appeared to support the IRA's demand for British withdrawal from Northern Ireland? Would it not be much better if these gentleman were to take the Pope's advice and concentrate on saving souls?

The Prime Minister: The troops are in Northern Ireland to protect the fundamental rights of the people. I believe they do their task excellently and we would wish to congratulate them upon it.

Mr. Tracey: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 12 March.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Tracey: Will my right hon. Friend urge those teachers who are taking selective strike action to go back to work and stop the damage to our children, including some in my constituency of Surbiton? Does she share an interest with me in hearing the attitude of Opposition Members to the action taken by some teachers?

The Prime Minister: I make it clear again that I deplore the action of those teachers who, to pursue a pay claim for themselves, will harm the interests of the children in their care. That is the view taken by most parents and by most people. I applaud the action of the teachers who will not go on strike but who are bearing a particularly heavy burden because some of their colleagues have done so.

Mr. Weetch: Has the Prime Minister's attention been drawn to a report on the front page of The Times today concerning the killing of 34 Lebanese villagers in an Israeli attack, which has been described as inhumanly ferocious? Does the Prime Minister know that there is a motion of censure before the Security Council at this

moment on behalf of the Lebanon, which the United States intends to veto? Can the Prime Minister tell the House what her instructions are to the British representative? Will we, this time, exercise political and moral independence of the United States?

The Prime Minister: We deplore the appalling violence in south Lebanon and Beirut. It underlines the need for an early and complete Israeli withdrawal, co-ordinated as far as possible with the Lebanese authorities. Retaliation and counter-retaliation will solve nothing and will only add to the tragic suffering of civilians. We do not say how we shall vote while the motion is still being considered and the debate continues.

Mr. Amess: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 12 March.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Amess: Is my right hon. Friend aware that Basildon district council managed to set a rate within the limit placed upon it by the House, without cuts in services? Is she further aware that, without that limit, the ratepayers of Basildon would have had to pay double the rate increase?

The Prime Minister: I congratulate Basildon on its action. It is clearly taking the view that we have urged on many councils, that we need to get better value for money out of existing moneys rather than increase them.

Mr. Janner: When the Prime Minister sees President Gorbachev, will she tell him that there are many of us on both sides of the House who have been extremely critical of Soviet policies in the past but who nevertheless remember that it is nearly 40 years since we fought together and won the war against the Nazis? We shall also be commemorating 40 years since the liberation of the concentration camps, and we hope he will, in his regime, usher in a renewed era of goodwill based upon the final act of the Helsinki agreement.

The Prime Minister: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for his message. He will be aware that I also hope that the Helsinki final accord will one day be implemented fully. The 10th year since it was signed is as good a time as any other.

Mr. Corbett: On a point of order, arising out of questions, Mr. Speaker. I seek your guidance because I fear that the Prime Minister inadvertently, in her reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Banks)—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall hear the point of order, but I can already sense that it is an extension of Question Time.

Mr. Corbett: The right hon. Lady may have inadvertently misled the House about an election pledge that she gave on prescription charges in the Health Service in 1979.

Mr. Speaker: Order. There is a perfect opportunity to debate this matter later on. This is not a matter for Question Time.

Home Affairs Select Committee (Report)

Mr. Speaker: I have received a complaint from the hon. and learned Member for Fylde (Sir E. Gardner), Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, about a report in The Times on 6 March which purports to give an account of a draft report that has been circulated to members and staff of that Committee, and was strictly limited to them. I am satisfied that the hon. and learned Gentleman's complaint is entitled to precedence and accordingly, if he tables a motion relating to it, it will stand as first business tomorrow.

BALLOT FOR NOTICES OF MOTIONS FOR FRIDAY 22 MARCH

Members successful in the ballot were:

Mr. Bowen Wells

Mr. James Couchman

Mr. David Amess

Social Security (Cold Climate Allowance)

Mr. Gordon Wilson: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide for more equitable heating allowances to reflect increased costs of domestic heating in colder climates; and for purposes connected therewith.
Spring may have arrived in these southern latitudes, but elsewhere memories remain of the bitter winter weather that we recently had, and the weather forecast for tomorrow suggests that snow and sleet are likely to return. Such weather as we have experienced has affected the south only occasionally, but further north and in higher altitudes blizzards and sub-zero temperatures are all too common; and, of course, on an annual average basis, temperatures are lower.
I first introduced the Bill in January 1984, but, more recently, the issue has been fired afresh by the iniquitous workings of the single payments system, which is supposed to cover the increased heating costs of supplementary benefit beneficiaries when exceptionally severe weather strikes. The fact that that system discriminates against those parts of the United Kingdom which are generally colder, and that the extra payments are usually made only to those living south of the Wash, has released a tide of anger and indignation in other areas the like of which I have never before experienced as an hon. Member.
I wish to make it clear, however, that this Bill is not an attempt to change that weird and wonderful system— as it has been described by the Minister. The system is already an embarassment to the Government and is under review. I earnestly hope that a new and fairer way of dealing with severe weather in all parts of the United Kingdom will emerge, and I am sure that that sentiment will be echoed by all the sponsors of the Bill.
Under present social security arrangements, the amount of money paid to recipients of supplementary benefit to cover their heating costs is the same regardless of whether the recipient lies in Cornwall or Caithness or in other words, regardless of the severity of the climate. There is, however, indisputable scientific evidence which proves that the further north and east one lives in the United Kingdom, the colder is the average annual temperature and consequently the higher one's heating bills. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that, taking two identical houses in Aberdeen and Bristol, it takes 30 per cent. more fuel to heat the house in Aberdeen and to maintain it at a given temperature than the Bristol house. Such climatic differences are not taken into account by the present fuel benefits—neither in the notional fuel element contained within supplementary benefit nor in the heating additions available to claimants over and above the normal rate of supplementary benefit, which can be obtained on the grounds of old age, chronic ill health, having children under five years of age or having a home that is hard to heat.
My Bill seeks to make changes affecting the level of payment of both heating additions and the notional fuel element itself. Using data published by the Meteorological Office, I have, on the basis of average annual temperatures, divided the United Kingdom into four zones. For the exact boundaries of the zones it has been


convenient to utilise regional or, in the case of England, county boundaries. Roughly speaking, the areas with an annual average temperature of less than 8·5 deg. centigrade comprise zone 1, which is the coldest zone. The warmest zone, zone 4, has an annual average temperature of 10·5 deg. or more.
Zone 1 includes the Scottish islands councils and the Highland, Grampian and Tayside areas. Zone 2 includes the rest of Scotland, Northern Ireland, Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Durham and north Yorkshire. Zone 3 includes the remainder of northern England, Wales, the Midlands and East Anglia, and zone 4 includes London and the south-east and south-west of England. The zones are described in greater detail in the Bill.
A basic level of payment with regard to both the notional fuel element and the heating additions should be made to claimants living in zone 4. Those living in zone 3 would receive 10 per cent. more than the basic rate; those in zone 2, 20 per cent. more and those in zone 1, 30 per cent. more; Regional variations in the payment of fuel benefits are nothing new. Until November 1970, they were worked out on the price of coal, which varied from place to place. My scheme calls for variations to be made on the basis of a much more constant factor—climate severity.
The Bill has received a tremendous amount of support. In the wake of the previous introduction of the Bill I secured the full backing of 50 regional and district councils in Scotland, the Scottish electricity consultative councils, Age Concern, several social welfare and pensioners' organisations and many people from all parts of the United Kingdom. A recent motion supporting proposals similar to those in the Bill was signed by 65 hon. Members representing all parties and all parts of the country, and there are hon. Members of all parties who are willing to sppnsor this Bill.
It is now widely recognised that there is an urgent need for radical reform of the system of fuel benefits. Only the DHSS attempts to defend the present arrangements. It has argued that family expenditure surveys do not show that more money is spent on fuel in more northerly areas. I and others dispute that, but even if it is true it may show merely that the elderly and poor in those areas simply cannot afford to pay more for the extra heating that they desperately need.
The correspondence that I have received in the past couple of years shows that there are many cases of need. I recently received a letter detailing the case of an old-age pensioner who has suffered two strokes, was forced to stay in the house all day and had just received an electricity bill

of £203 for the winter quarter. I have received another letter from a pensioner in the Highlands who had suffered hypothermia previously and was understandably worried about what might happen during the winter. The weather had been so bad that she could not get out of the house and had to spend all of her available money on fuel. Those are just two examples of the terrible way in which many of our old and poor people suffer each winter, especially in areas with the harshest weather.
Statistics on hypothermia have recently been published in parliamentary answers. In Scotland, 174 deaths were ascribed or partly ascribed to hypothermia in 1984. The comparable figure for England and Wales was 568. In other words, 23 per cent. of all registered hypothermia deaths in the United Kingdom last year were in Scotland. I would expect the statistics to show a gradual increase in deaths according to the zones that I have described. However, we all know that the figures represent only the tip of the iceberg. Mr. Albert Long, convener of social services in Strathclyde region, has said that possibly about 3,000 people died from cold-related diseases this winter.
I have tried to keep the criteria in my Bill simple and capable of implementation at little administrative cost. The DHSS might want to adapt my proposals or to make them more sophisticated. As the social security system is under review, my sponsors and I, with, we hope, the support of the House, want to establish the principle that the greatest help should be given to those in greatest need and that, for fuel benefits, one of the main criteria of need must be climatic severity.
As Ministers work on the review, I hope that they will heed the express wish of the House and introduce a system of fuel allowances which fully and fairly reflects climatic differences within the United Kingdom.

Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Gordon Wilson, Mr. David Alton, Mr. Robert C. Brown, Mr. Dennis Canavan, Mr. Tom Clarke, Mr. Charles Kennedy, Mr. Archy Kirkwood, Mr. David Knox, Mr. Albert McQuarrie, Mr. James Molyneaux, Mr. James Tinn and Mr. Dafydd Wigley.

SOCIAL SECURITY (COLD CLIMATE ALLOWANCE)

Mr. Gordon Wilson accordingly presented a Bill to provide for more equitable heating allowances to reflect increased costs of domestic heating in colder climates; and for purposes connected therewith: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 26 April and to be printed. [Bill 98.]

Orders of the Day — Interception of Communications Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr. Speaker: I have selected the amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Leon Britain): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
On 7 February I made a statement on the publication of the White Paper setting out the Government's legislative proposals on the interception of communications in the United Kingdom. This Bill gives effect to those proposals. It is neither the purpose nor the effect of the Bill to broaden the scope of present practices governing the use of interception. Those practices have been authorised by successive Governments of both parties.
This Government neither seek nor want any additional powers whatsoever, but there is one important difference between this Government and their predecessors. It is that we are providing, for the first time, a clear and comprehensive statutory framework for the interception of communications. Even more important, we are creating, for the first time, a new criminal offence of unauthorised interception. Most important of all, we are providing, for the first time, a means of redress, and an effective one, for those wishing to complain that interception has been improperly authorised. Former Labour Ministers may protest raucously about the width of the criteria for interception, but their protests are sheer hypocrisy because their Government operated precisely the same criteria but did not dream of introducing any of the protections contained in the Bill.
Governments of varying political complexions have accepted that in defined and carefully controlled circumstances it is right and necessary to intercept communications. The ability to communicate effectively and quickly is essential to the criminal, the terrorist and the spy. The ability to intercept such communications is a legitimate and essential tool in the hands of those whose job it is to defend our society and protect our liberties. How else, for example, would the police or Customs and Excise be able to piece together information on someone operating a drugs syndicate, who takes care not to travel around to meet his contacts and does not allow them to see him? It cannot be right that such a person should be free to use the telephone in the certain knowledge that in that way he can operate without any fear that his dealings will be found out. Nor can it be right that terrorists or spies who strike at the heart of our democracy should be able to operate in that way.
The issue before the House today, therefore, is not whether the use of interception is necessary and legitimate; it is how the use of interception should be limited, regulated and controlled. As I said on 7 February, interception of communications is always highly distasteful; it is a major intrusion of privacy. Interception has, therefore, always been the subject of very stringent controls. Successive Secretaries of State, both Labour and Conservative, have set themselves the highest standards in

operating the present arrangements and have established clear limitations on the circumstances in which the existing powers have been used.
This debate takes place against the background of a number of allegations in the film "MI5's Official Secrets". The allegations fall centrally into four categories—first, that interception has been authorised in circumstances that do not warrant it; secondly, that an unauthorised interception has been carried out; thirdly, that the security service has operated improperly in carrying out investigation and surveillance other than interception in relation to subversive activity; fourthly, that criminal offences may have been committed.
The first allegation covers a period during which both Labour and Conservative Governments were in power. Opposition Members must not be allowed to forget that the bulk of interceptions relate to the period before 1979. Since 1980, there has been an independent monitor of interception arrangements. That safeguard was brought into the system by the present Government. The task of the monitor—currently the distinguished Law Lord, Lord Bridge of Harwich—has been to review on a continuing basis the exercise of the powers of interception covered by the previous White Paper and the associated procedures.
As the House knows, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, with the agreement of former Prime Ministers and other Ministers concerned, asked Lord Bridge to take on the extra and particular task of determining whether the authorisation of interceptions over the whole period covered by the recent allegations named the individuals in question and, if so, whether the authorisations were sought and given in accordance with the procedures and criteria laid down in the Birkett report of 1957 and the Command Paper of April 1980. As hon. Members will know, Lord Bridge has now reported, and in accordance with—

Sir Edward Gardner: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of and has he read the letter in The Times today from the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins)? I do not see him in his place. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that in this letter the most extraordinary and personal attack has been made by the right hon. Gentleman upon Lord Bridge? Does he not also agree that, in accepting the Government's instructions to make an urgent investigation into interceptions, Lord Bridge has acted with unimpeachable judicial propriety?

Mr. Brittan: I entirely agree with my hon. and learned Friend. The attack made on Lord Bridge by the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) was wholly unwarranted. In his letter the right hon. Gentleman totally ignores the fact that Lord Bridge is the judicial monitor. As such, he has knowledge of and access to all aspects of interception. In relation to interception allegations it is therefore wholly natural and appropriate that Lord Bridge should be asked to conduct an inquiry. The allegations—

Mr. Austin Mitchell: rose—

Mr. Brittan: I am answering a question. If the hon. Gentleman will contain himself, I shall give way to him, too.
In relation to interception allegations, it is wholly natural that the judicial monitor should be asked to conduct a special inquiry. The allegations in the film were of a


limited number and the inquiry was therefore of a narrow compass. The inquiry into that matter was far closer to a judicial investigation than many of the things that judges are customarily asked to do by Governments of both parties. Therefore, I do not find it in any way surprising that Lord Bridge should have come to an early conclusion, which he reported to the Prime Minister. I regard it as deplorable that somebody with the experience of the right hon. Member for Hillhead should make a wholly unjustified attack upon Lord Bridge.

Mr. Robert Maclennan: Does not the Home Secretary recognise that the burden of the attack is upon himself for having appointed as an investigator the very man whose work had to be investigated and that, as it was put in the Daily Telegraph, it was like setting Cerberus to investigate hell?

Mr. Brittan: The hon. Gentleman has completely misrepresented what was said by the right hon. Member for Hillhead. If he cares to look at the letter, he will see that there is an attack on Lord Bridge. If the hon. Gentleman wants to make a different point, he is entitled to make it. I would only say to him that it is equally misconceived because there is absolutely nothing surprising in the fact that Lord Bridge, who has experience of these matters as judicial monitor, should be invited to look back to the period when he was not judicial monitor, to consider the material that was put before successive Secretaries of State in support of applications for interception warrants and to consider whether they were well founded. That is what Lord Bridge did.

Mr. Austin Mitchell: rose—

Mr. Brittan: If I may make a little progress, I shall then happily give way to more hon. Gentlemen.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: The Home Secretary has referred constantly to successive Secretaries of State and to previous Governments. May I ask him a factual question about which I have no clue as to the answer. I understood that legislation like this was always agreed on Privy Council terms and that there were discussions between the parties on Privy Council terms. Did that happen in the case of this legislation?

Mr. Brittan: If the hon. Gentleman is referring to matters that are dealt with on Privy Council terms, I believe that he would be best advised to address his question to his own Front Bench.
As hon. Members will know, Lord Bridge has now reported and, in accordance with my right hon. Friend's undertaking, his findings have been made public, in so far as that can be done in a manner consistent with national security. His review covered the period back to 1970. As he says in his report, he had regard to all the relevant criterial and had access to all the documents which he felt could be of any assistance to him. He concluded that he was satisfied, after full examination of all relevant documents, that no warrant for interception had been issued in contravention of the appropriate criteria.
In view of some of the things that have been said since about the narrowness of Lord Bridge's remit, I should make it clear that Lord Bridge's task was not confined to establishing that the necessary formalities had been complied with in respect of any warrant that was issued. He had to consider the merits of any application in order to satisfy himself that it could properly be regarded as

coming within the established criteria for permitting interception. In other words, if the basis of an application were subversion, Lord Bridge's task included satisfying himself that interception could be justified on that ground.
Lord Bridge was not concerned with allegations that interception had taken place without the authorisation of the Secretary of State—

Mr. Austin Mitchell: rose—

Mr. Brittan: If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I shall develop that point and then give way.
Lord Bridge was not concerned with allegations that interception had taken place without the authorisation of the Secretary of State, or with allegations in respect of activities of the security service other than interception. Such allegations relate to the operation of the security service as a whole.
The security service's task and procedures are governed by what is known as the Maxwell Fyfe directive, which requires the director general to
take special care to see that the work of the Security Service is strictly limited to what is necessary for the purposes of this task".
It is an important part of the duty of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and myself to satisfy ourselves that the security service operates entirely within the letter and spirit of its directive. That is a responsibility which has always been taken extremely seriously. It is part of the continuing duty of any Home Secretary. But since these allegations came to the fore I have taken steps to examine the allegations that the security service has operated improperly in carrying out investigations and surveillance in relation to subversive activity.
I have concluded, in the light of the allegations and my inquiries into them, that the security service has carried out no operation, investigation, surveillance or action against any individual otherwise than for the purposes laid clown in its directive and with the propriety which successive Governments have rightly demanded of it, and which this Government will continue to demand.

Mr. Austin Mitchell: The right hon. and learned Gentleman seems to avoid the point of the earlier question, which is that surely he is responsible for the inadequacies of Lord Bridge's report if he did not specify that there should be an investigation into whether there were unauthorised taps by the security service. Is he now telling us in this further amplification that there were no unauthorised taps in defiance of the Maxwell Fyfe directive?

Mr. Brittan: I was right to be reluctant to give way to the hon. Gentleman because I am coming to that point. He will recall that I specified four criticisms that were made in the film and I am dealing with them in order. If he will allow me, I shall come to that precise point.
The hon. Gentleman will recall that Lord Bridge dealt with the question of authorised interception and whether it should have been authorised. I am now dealing with the question of surveillance, investigation operations, and so on, other than interception. I have expressed my conclusion after specifically looking into the allegations.
In regard to allegations about unauthorised interception—

Mr. David Winnick: rose—

Mr. Brittan: No, I shall not give way.
There were no allegations of unauthorised interception in the "MI5's Official Secrets" film. None the less, I have


inquired into that, too, and I can inform the House that I am satisfied that members of the security service did not carry out any interceptions without the authority of the Secretary of State.
Finally, it is important that I should deal with—

Mr. Winnick: rose—

Mr. Brittan: I shall give way in a moment.
It is important that I should deal with all four of the allegations in the film. The Director of Public Prosecutions has asked the Metropolitan police to look into the allegations in the film which suggest that criminal offences may have been committed. When the police have completed their inquiries, they will of course report to the director.

Mr. Winnick: Our difficulty is that the Home Secretary says, in effect, that what has been done has been duly authorised. Perhaps I can refer him to the answer that he gave me yesterday regarding the newspaper report that a former editor of a CND journal had been interviewed by the special branch about the private lives of leading CND officials and the leadership style of the general-secretary of CND. Yesterday the right hon. and learned Gentleman said:
I am assured by the commissioner that no inquiries have been initiated by the Metropolitan police special branch outside the terms of those guidelines."—[Official Report, 11 March 1985; Vol. 75, c. 28.]
I accept that, but it does not deal with the question. If such investigations and questioning took place, thereby infringing the civil liberties of those undoubtedly engaged in perfectly lawful activities, how does the Home Secretary's reply to me take the matter any further?

Mr. Brittan: The hon. Gentleman will know perfectly well that it is not the practice, and has not been of successive Governments, to comment on specific allegations. If those sitting behind him think that that is a very clever or surprising admission, they should look at what the then Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department said, very carefully, in a debate on 28 July 1977 on these very matters. The position is perfectly clear. In relation to the operations of the security service—other than interceptions, which I have already dealt with — the responsibility is that of the Home Secretary. I have given the House a clear statement of the conclusions that I have reached on that point.
What I cannot and will not do is to comment on individual allegations, any more than the Labour Government did. But let me reiterate what I have said on a number of occasions, because I hope that it will be found helpful. No member of CND, no members of a trade union — nor for that matter any individual—need fear that he is the object of surveillance by the security authorities unless his own actions and intentions bring him within the strict criteria set out in the definition of subversion. That definition was first enunciated by a Labour Government. I remind the House that subversion is defined as
Activities which threaten the safety or well-being of the state, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.
I make it clear today, as I have done in the past, that both elements of the definition must be satisfied before an activity can be regarded as subversive. It is not sufficient

for the safety or well-being of the state to be threatened. In addition, there must be an intention to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy. That definition governs the work of both the security service and the special branches in relation to subversion.
It is, therefore, crystal clear that peaceful political campaigning to change the mind of the Government or people generally about political issues cannot constitute subversion. But that does not mean that the security authorities should be prevented from investigating someone whose activities threaten the safety or well-being of the state and are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy, just because that person happens to be a member of a trade union or of a particular pressure group. It would be wrong to investigate legitimate organisations as such, but it would be absurd to regard membership of such bodies as providing immunity from investigation for those who would otherwise legitimately be subject to such inquiries.
As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has reaffirmed, we do not believe there are any grounds for changing the present system of accountability of the security service to Ministers which has been in existence while successive Governments have been in power. The Bill does not alter that general arrangement. What it does do is to deal with the more limited but vitally important issue of authorised interception of communications in public systems.
I am well aware that some hon. Members would like to go further, and I understand why. They wish to see general privacy legislation. The Younger committee considered that possibility but rejected it. It pointed to the difficulty of formulating a sufficiently precise definition of the concept of privacy to form the basis of a legal remedy. Successive Governments have accepted its conclusion that the introduction of a general right of privacy would be likely to introduce uncertainties into the law which could have substantial adverse implications for the free circulation of information. But that does not mean that we should not take firm and constructive action where that is possible. It has been, and is, possible in a wide variety of ways. Like the Younger committee, we believe that the best approach is to deal with practical problems and find the right practical solution in each area. The Data Protection Act and, in a different way, the Broadcasting Complaints Commission are but a couple of examples of that approach.
It is an approach we are also applying to the question of surveillance. It is quite proper for people to be concerned about the use of surveillance or bugging devices. We have responded to that concern. Last December I published strengthened guidelines to the police on the use of such devices. The new guidelines tighten up substantially the previous criteria for the use of listening devices and of certain cases of visual surveillance: they extend the range of cases in which the chief constable's personal authority is required; and they rule out any attempt to use a listening device as a means of circumventing the controls over authorised interception. All that is new, and an extra protection.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Does the Home Secretary agree that the Younger committee recommended that there should be a right of civil action on the part of


individuals who have suffered unwarranted eavesdropping of whatever sort? Why has not a right to go to court been included in the legislation?

Mr. Brittan: The Law Commission has been considering this issue, and has made some extremely important proposals. In its report on the law on breach of confidence in England and Wales, it suggested a very interesting approach. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right in that a civil remedy was suggested. The commission recommends that people who obtain information by "improper means"—which includes the use of surveillance devices, as the hon. Gentleman knows — would he subject to an obligation not to use or disclose that information. If they did so, they would be civilly liable to an action for breach of confidence. That approach has, I believe, the considerable advantage of concentrating on the real mischief—that is, the use to which information obtained by surveillance is put. It provides the victim with a direct means of redress. I am able to announce today that the Government intend to introduce legislation based on the Law Commission's proposals. This will offer people an important and wholly new safeguard in an area of legitimate concern.
But it is not the function of the present Bill to try to deal with these matters. This Bill deals, as I have said, with authorised interception and the means of controlling and regulating that. It lays down in law for the first time expressly the grounds on which the Secretary of State can authorise interception. All of these grounds are set out in the European Convention on Human Rights—and this is important—as are other grounds such as public safety and the protection of health and morals, which have not been included in the Bill because, although they are referred to in the convention, they cover areas where the Government do not consider interception at all appropriate.
The Bill incorporates into the law all the existing stringent controls and limitations, and it also establishes new statutory safeguards and a new means of redress. In the Government's view, it fully meets our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.
Clause 1 is the foundation on which the Bill is constructed. First, it creates for the first time a general offence of unlawful interception. Secondly, it determines the scope of the measure. Those who intentionally interecept communications in the course of their transmission in the post or public telecommunication systems will now be committing a criminal offence.
This provision for an offence of general application is new. There are at present offences in telecommunication and postal legislation applying to the staff of the organisations concerned. In certain circumstances, others might be liable to a penalty for improperly interfering with the mail. But interception as such is not generally an offence. We believe it should be. The clause provides a maximum penalty for the offence of two years imprisonment, or an unlimited fine, or both.
It will be essential that the new law is enforced as rigorously as possible. Advice will accordingly be issued to the police before the legislation comes into effect on how they should proceed if people come forward with information suggesting that such an offence may have been committed. The House will appreciate that such advice is necessary because the provision is wholly new and affords wholly new protection. The significance of the

offence will also be drawn to the attention of the Post Office and public telecommunications operators who people might in practice first approach.
The clause also establishes the exceptions to the offence. Obviously, the first is where a warrant has been properly issued by the Secretary of State. The two other exceptions provide for circumstances where interception may at present take place. They are, first, where it is with the person's consent, for example, in a case where obscene telephone calls have been made, and, secondly, where engineers or operators have to undertake what amounts to interception to establish that a line is functioning, for example, if it has been continuously engaged over a long period. The same exceptions are provided for in the existing legislation which applies to post and telecommunications staff.
Clause 1 also defines the scope of the Bill, that is, to communications in the public system. In telecommunications and the post, people have no option but to entrust information to the care of organisations over which they have no control. The sender and receiver are entitled to believe that the privacy of their communications on these systems will be safeguarded while they are out of their hands.
Clauses 2 to 5 deal with the authorisation of interception. Clause 2 empowers the Secretary of State to issue warrants. The warrants must specify the communications to be intercepted, and impose an obligation on the recipient to carry out the interception. The Secretary of State is empowered to issue a warrant if he is satisfied that it is necessary on one of three stated grounds. That is a central point. It is not sufficient that he feels a warrant might be useful in supplementing other material, or that the information it could produce could be interesting. The Secretary of State must give full consideration to whether interception is really justified to the extent that is "necessary". Moreover, as stated in the 1980 White Paper, warrants will be issued only where other methods have failed or, by the nature of things, are likely to fail.
The first ground on which, if it is necessary, a Secretary of State may issue a warrant is that it is in the interests of national security. That term is widely used elsewhere in the statute book, and occurs in some 50 statutes stretching over a long period. It is also precisely the term used in the European convention. It encompasses the protection of the country and its institutions from internal and external threats and the security of the realm, for example, from terrorists, espionage or major subversive activity.
The second ground on which, if it is necessary, the Secretary of State may issue a warrant is the prevention or detection of serious crime. As I told the House on 7 February, the police assess that in England and Wales in the past 10 years interception has made possible the arrest of some 5,000 people, and the recovery of approaching £100 million pounds worth of stolen goods and drugs. Those figures speak for themselves.
Ministers will continue to authorise such interception only on the basis set out in the 1980 White Paper and repeated in the recent White Paper, that is, only if there is good reason to think an interception would be likely to lead to an arrest and a conviction, and if the offence in question is a serious one. By "serious" is meant an offence for which a man with no previous record could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to three years' imprisonment, or an offence of lesser gravity in which either a large


number of people are involved, or there is reason to apprehend the use of violence, or in which the financial rewards of success are very large.

Mr. Alex Carlile: I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. He has given some limitations which would help to define the meaning of "serious crime". Will he tell the House why the limitations are not contained in the Bill? I would welcome a concession such as that which he made when I intervened a few moments ago.

Mr. Brittan: The reason is perfectly simple. The limitations are difficult to put into statutory form.

Mr. Carlile: "Serious offence" is defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Is the Home Secretary now saying that a "serious arrestable offence" is not serious?

Mr. Brittan: The hon. and learned Gentleman intervenes from a sedentary position having twice made a standing intervention. It is easier to deal with his standing intervention in an orderly fashion. He seems to imply that because there is a definition of "serious arrestable offence" in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act it would be appropriate to transport it into this Bill. I would not imagine that that course would commend itself because the definition of "serious", which is difficult to put into statutory form, although it has been put into the White Paper, is much narrower than "serious arrestable offence". "Serious arrestable offence" would permit interception in many cases in which it is not permitted under this definition.

Mr. Tony Benn: In a written answer in Hansard on 25 February 1982, Lord Whitelaw said that he had placed a copy of the Home Office guidelines to chief constables, which were issued in 1977, in the Library. The Home Secretary authorised chief constables to do surveillance where it was operationally necessary, operationally feasible and justified. There was no mention of a warrant. Will the Home Secretary explain the difference between those guidelines and the continual statements that he has authorised?

Mr. Brittan: The then Home Secretary, now my noble Friend Lord Whitelaw, was talking about surveillance, not the interception of communications. That is a completely different matter.
The third ground on which a warrant may be issued is for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom if, and only if, the information that it is considered necessary to acquire is about matters outside the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. That restriction does not apply in the parallel criterion in the relevant article in the European convention.
As in the case of serious crime or national security, the Secretary of State has to consider that interception is not just desirable. Secondly, interception has to be protective. It must be concerned with safeguarding the country's economic well-being, not with promoting it. That means it relates to threats to that well-being.
Thirdly, it is the economic well-being of the United Kingdom which is at issue. By definition, the matter must be one of national significance and cannot be of a trivial kind which is peripheral to that well-being. It is a crucial

part of our foreign policy to protect the country against adverse developments overseas, which do not necessarily affect our national security so directly as to justify interception on that ground but which may have grave and damaging consequences for our economic well-being, such as a threat to the supply of a commodity on which our economy is particularly dependent.
Fourthly, the purpose of interception must be purely external. A warrant can be issued only in order to obtain information about the acts or intentions of people outside the British Isles. That is fundamental. Purely domestic events cannot give rise to a warrant on the grounds that they might affect the well-being of the economy. I repeat that the provision, like the other two grounds on which interception can be authorised, involves no extension whatsoever to the practices of successive Governments over a long period.

Mr. Tony Baldry: Am I right in thinking that, as a result of the Bill, the Executive will have no authority to intercept communications, either by tapping or bugging, other than by authority given specifically by an Act of Parliament?

Mr. Brittan: No, Sir. That is true for interceptions, but what is known as bugging is not covered by the Bill and comes under surveillance. As I have explained extremely clearly to the House on many occasions, the guidelines for surveillance, which covers bugging, have been published and strengthened by the Government.

Ms. Harriet Harman: rose—

Mr. Brittan: I shall give way in a moment.
During my speech I have explained why it was not possible to have general legislation relating to privacy. I explained why the compass of this legislation was confined to the specific matter of interception, and why in the case of privacy it was necessary to proceed in many different ways, one of which was by the issue of guidelines to the police and another by accepting the recommendations of the Law Commission, to which the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) referred.

Ms. Harman: Is it not the hallmark of a democracy that, unless one is engaged in criminal activities, one should be free to go about one's business without being interfered with by the state? Is not the Bill nothing more than a licence for Governments to snoop on people, including trade unionists, with whom they do not agree?

Mr. Brittan: No. It has been a long-standing view that, unfortunately, there are threats to our society and security represented by people who have not committed criminal offences. The hon. Lady can look back to the findings of the Birkett report as long ago as October 1957. At paragraph 141—no doubt the hon. Lady is familiar with it—Lord Birkett concluded:
We are quite satisfied that the problems of national security are such that no reasonable weapon should be taken from the hands of those whose duty it is to watch over all subversive activities in the safeguarding of British interests. We are further satisfied, from the evidence before us, that the methods of interception hitherto employed are necessary, and have been productive of important results which could not have been obtained in any other way.
Since then the position can hardly be said to have rendered subversion less likely and the methods of dealing with it less necessary. The definition of subversion issued by the Labour Government in 1975, with its careful provision of two limbs, both of which must be met, has


ensured that those responsible in the security services or special branch for dealing with such matters have dealt with them in a narrow compass and in a way that could not have been avoided. All Governments who have been in power during the relevant period have believed it necessary for the powers of interception to exist and for the special branch to operate in relation to subversion in the way that it does.
The only difference is that the present Government have tightened the guidelines on surveillance, have published and put on a statutory basis—as we are doing today—what is done with regard to interception, and will provide an effective remedy against any abuse of such powers of a sort which no other Government have dreamt of.

Mr. Jeremy Hanley: Has the definition of subversion given by Lord Harris been clarified by the entry of the word "economic" in the phrase "economic well-being", with regard to the issue of warrants, and by the fact that warrants will be issued for economic well-being purposes only in cases outside the United Kingdom?

Mr. Brittan: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, whose interest in these matters is well known. The economic well-being criteria as they relate to events overseas have nothing to do with subversion. Subversion is a branch of the national security head and has a separate definition.
Clause 3 deals with the sort of warrants that can be issued. Warrants issued under clause 3(1) will be those directed at the communications of one person or organisation, or at communications to or from premises when it has been impossible to identify the person using the premises in suspicious circumstances. That arrangement is essentially the same as that described in the 1980 White Paper.
Warrants under clause 3(2) will replace those issued under the Official Secrets Act 1920 for the interception of external telecommunications. Those powers, as the Radcliffe report said in 1967, have been regularly exercised by Labour and Conservative Governments since the Act came into operation. The Government believe, like their predecessors, that they should continue to be available. The new provision will, as now, apply only to international telecommunications. However, its scope will be narrowed to bring it into accordance with existing practices. The warrant will be issued only on the same grounds as a clause 3(1) warrant.
Additionally, when the Secretary of State issues such a warrant, he will be obliged personally to issue a certificate describing the intercepted material which, having regard to the three statutory criteria, he considers it is necessary to examine. He will be required by clause 6 to ensure that there are arrangements preventing the examination of material not covered by the certificate. Finally, the certificate will not be capable of specifying communications to or from an address in the United Kingdom or islands unless the Secretary of State considers that their examination is necessary for the purpose of preventing or detecting acts of terrorism, and then only for a period of three months. All those elements constitute a narrowing of the existing provisions.
Clauses 4 and 5 deal with the issue, duration and modification of warrants. The arrangements rest on the requirement that the issue of a warrant is personal to the

Secretary of State. In no circumstances can he delegate the decision. If he did not take the decision, the warrant would not be a warrant and the interception would not he authorised.
Clauses 6 to 8 deal specifically with safeguards and the means of redress. They underpin the definition of the grounds on which interception can be authorised and the warrant powers. Clause 6 deals with the proper handling of communications after they have been intercepted. It obliges the Secretary of State to ensure that there are arrangements to secure two purposes. The first is to limit, in the case of a warrant for the interception of external communications, the examination of intercepted material to that specified in the certificate which he must issue at the time he signs the warrant. The second is to ensure that access to all intercepted material is confined to those who must have it; that only relevant portions are made available and that only the minimum numbers of copies are taken; and that it is kept only for the minimum necessary period.
Those requirements must be judged together. They add up to a comprehensive code for the handling of intercepted communications in all circumstances and by all those concerned. Those arrangements must always be in place, and as he signs warrants the Secretary of State must be satisfied with the existing arrangements or make new ones. It will be a significant part of the task of the commissioner to review the terms and effect of those arrangements.
Clause 7, with schedule 1, is in many ways the most important of the Bill, and its full significance has perhaps until now not been fully appreciated. Therefore, I wish to take this opportunity to underline what clause 7 and the schedule do and what their significance is. They break completely new ground by providing an independent, powerful and effective means of redress if interception has been improperly authorised. A tribunal will be established consisting of five senior lawyers. They will be appointed by the Crown by letters patent for a fixed term. They may be removed from office only on an Address to the Crown from both Houses of Parliament. Those arrangements are, in substance, the same as those which apply to the Ombudsman and they secure the tribunal's complete independence.
Anyone will be able to apply to the tribunal if he believes that his communications have been intercepted. It will be the tribunal's first task to determine whether an authorised interception has been directed against the applicant or the place where he lives or works. The tribunal will not be concerned in cases where there may have been interception without a warrant. Such interceptions would be a criminal offence to be investigated by the police, and prosecuted if there is evidence, in the usual way. The House will recall my explanation of the guidelines that will be given to the police to consider allegations of unauthorised and unwarranted interceptions and their examination.

Mr. John Golding: Will the Minister give way?

Mr. Brittan: I shall complete my explanation of what the tribunal does before I give way.
If an application to the tribunal discloses evidence of an offence—an interception that has not been authorised —the tribunal would, of course, draw that evidence to the attention of the appropriate authorities for investigation as a potential criminal offence. But if the tribunal finds


that an interception has been authorised and directed against the applicant, that is far from the end of the matter, because it will then proceed to determine whether the Secretary of State contravened the provisions of the Act, for example, when he decided to issue the warrant, or in renewing or failing to cancel it. For this purpose, the Bill secures that the tribunal will have access to the same information which was available to the Secretary of State. The tribunal will form its own judgment as to whether the Secretary of State has contravened the Act. For example, it may conclude that the Secretary of State could not properly have considered that the warrant was necessary in the interests of national security or on any of the other grounds specified. If it concludes that there has been a contravention, the applicant will be informed.
The tribunal will then be able to do three things. It could quash the warrant; it could order the destruction of all the material intercepted in this connection; and it could order the Secretary of State to pay whatever sum by way of compensation it thought fit. The Bill will impose no limit on this sum. These are very considerable powers. They enable the tribunal to overturn the Secretary of State's decision if it considers there has been a contravention of the Act.
I hope that this explanation makes it clear that the tribunal will carry out an impartial and independent review of ministerial decisions in some of the most sensitive areas one could imagine, in a way that no tribunal or court of law has ever done before.
It would clearly, however, be ridiculous for somebody to be able to discover whether an interception had been directed against him simply by applying to the tribunal. That is why the tribunal cannot operate in public. But it will have full access to all the facts and arguments. In every case of an adverse conclusion, the tribunal will have to make a full report to the Prime Minister and must make a copy of that report available to the commissioner—to whose role I shall come in a moment—who will then be able to play a full part in ensuring that adequate corrective action is taken.

Mr. A. J. Beith: The Home Secretary has likened these arrangements to those that prevail in the case of the Ombudsman, but he omitted to point out that the Ombudsman reports to a Committee of the House. Therefore, there is an ultimate parliamentary review of the way in which he operates. All that the Home Secretary has said about unauthorised interception is so difficult to enforce that he must also take into account that it is upon his and the Prime Minister's supervision of the security services that that enforcement will depend, and those too in turn have no effective reporting mechanism to the House.

Mr. Brittan: The tribunal is analogous to a court in the sense that it is the individual who complains and if his complaint is upheld he will get proper redress in he form of the quashing of the warrant and the giving of compensation. Therefore, the analogy is not a proper one.
As to the analogy with the Ombudsman, I am sorry if I raced past in describing that part of the Bill, but some hon. Members appeared to want to intervene. The analogy concerns the appointment, and that is the significance.

Sir Philip Goodhart: Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that telephones are tapped

on occasion also by those who are hostile to this country? Does he recognise that some hon. Members are concerned that, as a result of clause 7 and some of the earlier clauses, it will be easier for the IRA and the KGB than for the security services to tap telephones in this country?

Mr. Brittan: I do not think that that is quite the consequence of the Bill, although I understand and respect my hon. Friend's anxiety.

Mr. Golding: Can the Home Secretary tell us whether employees working for public telephone operators will be able to give evidence to the tribunal about unauthorised telephone tapping without risking prosecution under the Official Secrets Act 1911? If employees cannot give such evidence, are we not to depend on official sources only for what are the facts of the situation?

Mr. Brittan: I am perfectly satisfied that the tribunal will have full powers to take whatever evidence is necessary in relation to a particular case. I do not believe that there will be any inhibition of the kind that the hon. Gentleman mentions.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Can my right hon. and learned Friend say whether the work of the tribunal will be entirely retrospective, or will it be in a position to interview and, indeed, perhaps make life difficult for those who are engaged in security matters at the time that they are doing it? Secondly, since there are to be five senior lawyers, quite properly so, and one continuing High Court judge as a monitor, does he really think that a financial memorandum saying that this can all be had for £100,000 is realistic?

Mr. Brittan: I think that the financial provision is realistic.
In answer to the first question, the tribunal will have to deal with a complaint when it is made. In a large number of cases — and this relates partly to the financial question — that will be a not very formidable task because there will be people who think that their telephone calls are intercepted when they are not, and it will be a simple matter to establish that that is the case. The more difficult task will occur when there has been interception, and the tribunal will have to consider whether, on the material available to the Secretary of State, it was justified. That is a task which it will conduct.

Mr. Maclennan: In describing the powers of the tribunal, the Home Secretary made the surprising assertion that, if it considered that the Secretary of State could not properly have exercised his discretion under clause 2, it could provide a remedy. That seems to be a construction of the Bill which has been put upon it by nobody else. Can the Home Secretary give the House his authority for that claim?

Mr. Brittan: I do not understand why the hon. Gentleman is surprised. If he had listened to the various matters that were covered when I made a statement on the White Paper, he would know that there is no doubt that it will be within the power of the tribunal to decide whether the interception was properly authorised — in other words, whether the material placed before the Secretary of State was such that he could properly have come to the conclusion that it came within the criteria specified as being ones which permitted interception. That is the task of the tribunal about which there is no doubt or mystery.
If the hon. Gentleman finds that the redress is wider than he had assumed, I am glad to clarify the situation. There is no doubt about the position.
The post of commissioner, established by clause 8, complements the tribunal. Whereas the tribunal is charged with reviewing the Secretary of State's decisions when it receives an application, the commissioner conducts a continuing review on his own initiative. His responsibilities cover everything to do with the warrant powers in clauses 2 to 5 and all the arrangements for the handling of intercepted material made under clause 6. He is in this way looking not only at the Secretary of State's individual decisions, but at everything to do with applications that are put before the Secretary of State and with the execution of warrants. In short, the commissioner will oversee the whole field of authorised interception at all levels and in all respects.
The commissioner will be a judge of at least High Court standing, and will be the successor to the existing monitor of interception arrangements established following the 1980 White Paper.
As a consequence of his continuing review, the commissioner will be required to take two courses of action. First, if at any time it appears to the commissioner that there has been a contravention of the warrant powers not already reported on by the tribunal he must report that matter to the Prime Minister. Secondly, he is obliged to submit an annual report to the Prime Minister on the general exercise of his functions. The Prime Minister will be obliged to lay that report before Parliament, subject only to the deletion, after consulting the commissioner, of any passages whose publication would prejudice national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime or the safeguarding of the country's economic well-being.
The various safeguards introduced by the Bill need to be judged—

Mr. James Callaghan: I recognise that the commissioner is responsible under the Bill for interception only. With regard to any official of MI5 who felt unhappy or concerned about the work that he or she was being asked to do, which I understand was the case that arose in the recent television documentary, will the Home Secretary consider before the Bill is considered in committee extending the functions of the commissioner so that any officer of MI5 concerned not only about interception but about the nature of the targeting that he or she was asked to do might be able to go to the commissioner rather than to the television studios in order to provide an outlet for somebody who is dissatisfied?

Mr. Brittan: I understand what the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting, but I do not believe that the commissioner is the best route for dealing with the matter. It is the task of the director-general to support and guide the staff of the service in carrying out their functions.
As it happens, I have taken a personal interest in this matter and I have made it clear that I would encourage anyone in the security service who is concerned about any aspect of his work to take up the matter with senior management in the proper way—[Interruption.] I know that the right hon. Gentleman, if not others, is concerned about this issue.
I regard it as an important part of management's function in any organisation to take seriously and to listen

carefully and sympathetically to any anxieties. I would not wish there to be an atmosphere in which any individual felt that it was improper, inconvenient or unwelcome for him to raise his concerns.
That is something which the organisation itself must ensure and which I, as Home Secretary, must be satisfied the organisation is ensuring. I assure the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) that it is an aspect of the task to which I attach considerable importance.
The various safeguards introduced by the Bill need to be judged together. The bedrock of the scheme is the offence of unlawful interception; any interception not expressly provided for, whoever, carries it out, is a criminal offence. There are no exceptions to that. Only a Secretary of State may authorise interception and he may act only on the criteria laid down in the Bill. His decisions may be overturned by the tribunal if it finds that he has acted outside his powers. He is not, therefore, the final arbiter either as a matter of law or in practice. He is required to take steps to ensure the proper handling of material gained from interception. The exercise of all his powers, and all the associated arrangements, are subject to scrutiny by the commissioner, who will report on them. The scheme is, therefore, one of a series of complementary checks. Taken as a whole, as they must be, the provisions add up to a comprehensive series of safeguards.
The Bill raises issues of great importance to the preservation of law and order and of our national security. The Government have been far more open in their approach to these matters than any of their predecessors. The Bill is, I believe, a considerable further step forward. It will reinforce public confidence in the handling of this most sensitive area, providing for the first time a means of redress for the individual. But we must also ensure that nothing we do prevents us from safeguarding our national interests. That is something the public also expects of us, and is fully entitled to. The Bill maintains the right balance, and I commend it to the House.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman: I beg to move, to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
That this House declines to give a Second Reading to a Bill which gives statutory authority to interception of communications on criteria at once so vague and so sweeping as to permit interception on an unacceptably wide basis, and which provides insufficient safeguards for those adversely affected by unlawful interception.
The advance publicity orchestrated by the Home Secretary for his speech in the Daily Telegraph yesterday said:
Mr. Brittan, Home Secretary, is preparing a trenchant counter-attack against the Government's critics of telephone tapping for tomorrow's Commons debate on the issue.
I hope that, if that speech was trenchant, the Home Secretary will never set out to be soporific.
We debate the Bill at a time when there is profound concern about the erosion of civil liberties in Britain and about serious allegations made in connection with the security services. That concern will have been deepened as a result of the 59-minute smug, complacent and insensitive speech that we have just heard from the Home Secretary.

Mr. Brittan: I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman wrote that beforehand.

Mr. Kaufman: Yes, I wrote it beforehand — [interruption.]—in anticipation, knowing the right hon. and learned Gentleman well. He may bore, but he never disappoints.
In recent weeks, particular disquiet has been expressed following the allegations made in the television programme "MI5's Official Secrets", the programme which was cravenly banned by the Independent Broadcasting Authority and which then became widely available and discussed, even though it was banned.
In Soviet Russia, material that is prevented from being officially published but is then illicitly circulated is known as samizdat. It is a sign of the similarity of attitude of this Government and of the Soviet authorities towards disfavoured dissent that, when it was required, a samizadat system instantly sprang up in Britain, its somewhat incongruous parents being The Guardian and Virgin Records.
That programme was finally shown last Friday and, as we know, a film transmitted on Channel 4 normally has an audience that does not compare all that favourably in size with that of a closed circuit television programme. However, the IBA's craven and contemptible ban ensured that the programme "MI5's Official Secrets" was watched by several million people.
The IBA suppressed that programme for fear of being prosecuted under the section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. It must be said that some puzzlement has been aroused by the manner in which the Attorney-General has been operating the Official Secrets Act in the past few months. At best, his conduct has been capricious. At worst—and much more likely—it seems that it has been motivated by concern for the interests of the Conservative party rather than the pursuit of justice.
When Sarah Tisdall leaked information which had not the tiniest impact on national security but simply revealed a characteristically squalid example of news management by the Secretary of State for Defence, she was tried at the Old Bailey and sent to goal. When Clive Ponting leaked information which the prosecution admitted did not breach national security, he too, found himself in the Central Criminal court.
Yet what happens to Cathy Massiter, an employee of MI5 for 14 years, when she comes forward with what she claims are details of MI5 operations entailing serious allegations of malpractice by the special branch, by MI5 and by the Secretary of State for Defence? What happens? Absolutely nothing.
Indeed, it was indicated that the matters involved in Cathy Massiter's allegations were far too secret to be aired in court. Thus, the lesson for public servants who are thinking of leaking is clear: if one wants to reveal something, make sure it is nothing trivial. The more secret one's information, the greater one's chance of staying out of the dock.
One may, however, be sent to see a psychiatrist, as Cathy Massiter was. It seems that the parallels between this country and Soviet Russia are growing, if official reaction to dissidents here is to treat them as candidates for mental hospitals.
Why did the allegations made in the "20:20 Vision" programme arouse such widespread alarm? It was partly because the allegations implied that Ministers might not

have been carrying out their duties according to the rules officially laid down. Even more, it was because a fear had arisen that the security services might have been taking, on their own initiative, actions which had the most alarming implications for civil liberties and the right to engage in free, non-violent, democratic dissent in Great Britain.
The allegations against Ministers are twofold. It is alleged — and so far it has not been denied — that in August 1983 the Home Secretary signed a warrant authorising the tapping of the telephone of Mr. John Cox, a vice-president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, on the grounds that he was a Communist and therefore a subversive, yet that label of subversive violated the definition laid down by Lord Harris, repeated by the Home Secretary this afternoon and explicitly accepted by the Prime Minister.
Miss Massiter claims that Mr. Cox did not meet the test of being a major subversive, terrorist or espionage threat, which alone under the rules would have qualified him for surveillance. He was, she says, simply the best person that MI5 could think of if it was to have an excuse for tapping the telephone of a leading member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
Again, she alleges that secret information obtained by covert and clandestine means for MI5 was passed to the DS19 unit at the Ministry of Defence. She claims that a briefing paper on CND was specifically prepared for MI5 by the Secretary of State for Defence. She claims, further, that this material was then used by the Secretary of State for party political purposes.
If this allegation is true, both MI5 and the Secretary of State are in violation of the Maxwell Fyfe directive of 1952, which has been cited by the Home Secretary this afternoon, because that directive lays down:
It is essential that the security service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence.
Those allegations are disturbing enough, but Miss Massiter has made further charges against the security services. She says that they infiltrated the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament even though that organisation cannot, within the Home Secretary's own rules, be described as subversive. Indeed, the Home Secretary has repeatedly given the CND a clean bill of health. He told me in the House on 10 December:
So far as the legitimacy or otherwise of CND is concerned, I do not think it is for me to legitimise it or otherwise. There is no doubt that peaceful political campaigning to change the mind of the Government and of people generally about the validity of nuclear disarmament, whether unilateral or otherwise, is an entirely legitimate activity which does not fall within the very strict criteria of the 1980 White Paper." [Official Report, 10 December 1984; Vol. 69, c. 737.]
That is what the Home Secretary said and he has repeated the essence of that statement on several occasions since. Yet, according to Miss Massiter, MI5 deliberately and wrongfully classified Joan Ruddock, the Chairman of CND, as a subversive so that they could open a file on her, including Special Branch references to her movements.
Since the controversy about the Channel 4 programme began, there have been further serious allegations about unauthorised activities by MI5, including telephone tapping and surveillance by other means of organisations which do not meet any of the required criteria. Misgivings have become widespread. This is a comment — very anguished, and properly so—in a leading article in the Sunday Telegraph last week:


The chief danger of police-state methods creeping into democracies is not that they are authorised from above but that they generate themselves from within.
Concern expressed in this way over a wide spectrum of opinion in this country was at first brushed aside by the Government. At length, however, 12 days ago, the Prime Minister announced that she had asked Lord Bridge of Harwich to conduct an inquiry into the allegations. As we know, Lord Bridge reported within five days. Some people asked how he was able to complete his investigation in so short a period. For me the puzzle was how he managed to spin out the time, for he investigated hardly anything.
When the Home Secretary made his announcement of the inquiry, in that curious way that he has, I asked him a series of questions about the terms of reference of this inquiry. I asked him if Lord Bridge would deal with allegations of persons being falsely classified as subversive. The Home Secretary said that Lord Bridge would. But there is nothing in Lord Bridge's report to indicate that he did.
I asked if Lord Bridge would deal with allegations that material obtained by MI5 had, against the principles of the Maxwell Fyfe directive, been used for party political purposes. Again the Home Secretary said yes. Again there is no evidence from Lord Bridge's report that he did anything of the kind.
There were two areas of concern which the Home Secretary made it clear would not be within Lord Bridge's terms of reference. One was infiltration other than interception. The other was unauthorised interception — that is, interception not authorised by Ministers but undertaken independently and illegally within the secret services. Lord Bridge duly, as required, ignored these matters. I do not criticise him at all. He looked into only what he was told to look into. So, inevitably, he provided the report that he was required to provide. But that was really not a report. It was a theorem; all that was missing at the end of it was the letters "QED".
No wonder that this disreputable exercise has allayed no fears but instead aroused derision. Indeed, there are those who say that the Prime Minister only did it in a desperate attempt to prove that she has a sense of humour.

Mr. Hanley: Disgraceful.

Mr. Kaufman: The hon. Member for Richmond and Barnes (Mr. Hanley), the son of a well-known comedian, is right to complain that anybody should allege that the Prime Minister has a sense of humour.
The question arises, have elements within our security services got out of control? Are they acting irresponsibly on their own initiative? Are they taking an improper interest in political and industrial matters far beyond their proper purview?

Mr. Winnick: Accepting that, indeed, it is quite likely that MI5 is out of control — as a former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins), has more or less said in a letter in The Times today — is it not a fact that the guidelines first mentioned by Lord Harris in February 1975 are so wide that it is quite justified for the special branch to do the kind of investigation that I mentioned earlier during the Home Secretary's speech — namely, to ask a former CND official all kinds of questions which had no bearing whatsoever on national security?

Mr. Kaufman: It is arguable that, as my hon. Friend suggests, the guidelines are too wide, but, however wide they may be, the signs are that if these allegations are accurate, those guidelines are being exceeded. That is the problem; we do not know, and it is worrying enough that such questions even have to be asked.
It is also grubbily characteristic of this Government that their response is not to seek to allay fears by seeking the truth, however much of the truth it may be possible to make public in these shadowy areas. Their response, as ever, is "How can we cover it up?" If the Home Secretary really believes that we are satisfied with what he has told us today, with him looking into matters on his own account during a period of a very few days, he is even more complacent than we thought he was.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: It is of course relatively easy for the right hon. Gentleman, like the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins), to make allegations about members of the security forces being out of hand and conducting themselves in a way that is illegal as well as beyond the guidelines. But what evidence does the right hon. Gentleman have and, if he or the right hon. Member for Hillhead have any, why has it not been brought Forward and given to the Home Secretary?

Mr. Kaufman: I am not making allegations, and I do not speak for the right hon. Member for Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins). I am saying that allegations have been made and that those allegations have aroused widespread misgivings across a wide spectrum of public opinion, including the Conservative press. If the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) does not care about it, he does not care about civil liberties.
The matters that we are discussing this afternoon are very important in a free society. They will not go away. Her Majesty's Opposition insist that what is needed is not a rich charade like the Bridge inquiry, or the kind of exercise that the Home Secretary has gone through and on which we have to take his word, or an internal police examination of the kind he says, but a full and independent inquiry. Only in that way can serious allegations be answered, and proved or disproved.
It is against that background that we must examine the Bill, the Second Reading of which the Home Secretary moved today. We must admire the effrontery with which he did it. He boasted that it is the first statutory limitation on interception. That is true. But the Government never wanted to do it. They have been dragged kicking and screaming all the way. They would have continued to resist if it had not been for the Malone case. It was Mr. James Malone who, when tried for dishonestly handling stolen goods, discovered that his telephone had been tapped by the police. It was he who brought a High Court action against the Metropolitan police. It was he who, even though he lost the case, heard the judge, Sir Robert Megarry, state in court that telephone tapping is a subject that cries out for legislation, who took his case to the European court and who then, almost a year ago, saw the House of Lords pass, against the Government's wishes, a Labour amendment to the Telecommunications Bill placing controls on interception. That is why the Government are legislating. It is not because they want to; it is because they have to.
The Bill that the Government have brought forward is only a little better than no Bill. Indeed, in some ways it


actually makes matters worse than the current practice with regard to warrants for telephone tapping. What is more, it deals only with telephone tapping and interception of letters sent by post. Incidentally, talking of interception of letters sent by post, it is appropriate that today the Post Office has brought out a new series of pictorial stamps, all of which show pictures of bugs.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Kaufman: Not at this point. I will later, if I have the opportunity. The Home Secretary spoke for an hour, and I want to leave time for other right hon. and hon. Members to make their speeches.
Yet we all know that telephone tapping is now technologically an almost primitive form of interception. Other methods are freely available. Pick up any edition of Exchange and Mart, and one will find dozens of advertisements. Here is just one out of many:
Security and surveillance equipment. We have just moved to new premises and are currently the largest manufacturer in the United Kingdom of hi-tech microchip systems. Among our vast range are micro transmitters, pens, adaptors, calculators, lighters, body-worn desk equipment, etc., all types of microphones, probes, dishes, rifle, wall and window, etc. VOS units, receivers, recorders telephone monitoring equipment, infinities, etc.… Send sae … for 32-page catalogue … Access, Barclay and American Express cards welcome.
That advertisement appears in the section of Exchange and Mart disturbingly headed "Leisure".
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure specifically required that in the legislation that it recommended should be introduced:
The specific practices subject to regulation should be set out in secondary legislation to enable new techniques to be incorporated as they are developed.
That recommendation of the Royal Commission has been ignored. It said that warrants should be specific, yet the Bill allows interception without any warrant when a person occupying the premises consents. So a live-in landlord can authorise the tapping of his tenants' telephones.

Mr. Mikardo: Or a hotel manager.

Mr. Kaufman: My hon. Friend, who lives a more gregarious and lively life than I, makes that point, too. In my constituency, I simply deal in squalid multi-occupation.
The Bill allows single warrants covering a number of addresses or whole organisations. So the number of warrants issued need represent only a fraction of the number of people to be covered by such warrants. In certain circumstances, tapping of communications into or out of the country will not carry even such safeguards as attach in the Bill to warrants for internal interception.
Furthermore, the definitions of the criteria for issuing a warrant are vague to the point of giving the Home Secretary and his colleagues a completely free hand. The Home Secretary referred to the criteria in clause 2 —
national security … preventing or detecting serious crime; or … safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom"—
and compared them with the authority given by the European Convention on Human Rights for interception in the interests of national security, prevention of disorder or crime and safeguarding the economic well-being of the country. But the admirable but abstract sentiments of a general declaration are not enough to provide the tight

definitions that are required by an Act of Parliament by which specific actions will be authorised. What is extraordinary is that the Government have, in drafting the Bill, brushed aside their own White Paper "Interception of Communications", which they issued in 1980 and from which the Home Secretary quoted freely this afternoon, therefore implying that he still believes it. That White Paper did not vaguely cite "national security", in the words of the Bill, but said:
there must be a major subversive, terrorist or espionage activity that is likely to injure the national interest".
There is no wording like that in the Bill. The 1980 White Paper did not vaguely cite "serious crime" as the Bill does, but said:
there must be good reason to think that an interception would be likely to lead to an arrest and a conviction.
There is nothing like that in the Bill. The Government's own White Paper said that if a warrant was to be issued for interception on behalf of the security service, it must be a principle of authorisation that — I quote once again from the Government's White Paper cited by the Home Secretary—
the material likely to be obtained by interception must be of direct use in compiling the information that is necessary to the Security Service in carrying out the tasks laid upon it by the Directive".
That is, the Maxwell Fyfe directive.
Again, there is nothing like that in the Bill. In laying down conditions for the issue of warrants to assist in detecting crime or on behalf of the security service, the Tory White Paper of 1980 insisted:
normal methods of investigation must have been tried and failed, or must, from the nature of things, be unlikely to succeed if tried.
There is nothing like that in the Bill.
Therefore, we shall move amendments to put all Lord Whitelaw's principles into this Home Secretary's Bill, because, taking into account the free-for-all permitted by the vague inclusion of "economic well-being", clause 2 will, as it stands, and if it passes into law in that form, be hailed as a tappers' charter. The duration of warrants is unacceptably expanded. This is what the 1980 White Paper said about it:
Every warrant is time-limited: it includes a date on which it expires if not renewed. All warrants are first issued with a time limit set at a defined date not exceeding two months from the date of issue, and are subject to review before expiry. Warrants may be renewed only with the personal authority of the Secretary of State. Warrants issued on the application of the police may be renewed for not more than one month at a time; warrants issued on the application of the Customs and Excise may be renewed for not more than two months at a time; and warrants issued on the application of the Security Service, and postal warrants on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, may be renewed for not more than six months at a time".
That was current practice according to the Government in April 1980, yet clause 4 of the Bill permits all warrants — all the categories that I have just quoted from the Government's White Paper — to be issued for a full six months and to be renewed for a similar period. In the light of that fact, how could the Home Secretary claim in his speech that it is neither the purpose nor within the scope of the Bill to widen current practice, when that provision does widen current practice? We shall table amendments to put that right as well.
Perhaps the most grotesque provision is contained in clause 9. It changes the law so that in future there may be no reference in court proceedings to the use of interception. Of course, the Malone case and what followed from it stemmed from the admission of tapping


made by the police in court during that trial. In turn, the Bill stems from the Malone case. So we have the extraordinary fact that if at the time of the Malone case the proposed legislation had been in operation, the Bill would never have been brought forward. Just think about that, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
The safeguards in the Bill, about which the Home Secretary has boasted, are almost meaningless. The Birkett report of 1957 recommended:
There should be a regular review of outstanding warrants not less than once a month both by the Home Office and by every authority that is granted a warrant to intercept.
No such review is required by the Bill. We shall seek to insert it.
The European convention, which the Home Secretary has quoted in aid this afternoon, lays down:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms, as set forth in this convention, are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority.
Yet the tribunal created by the Bill will not be effective. It is to be composed entirely of lawyers. The Home Secretary boasted about that. There is no reason why it should be composed entirely of lawyers. It would be useful, for example, to have a communications engineer as a member, since he would know more about the subject than the barristers, advocates and solicitors who are to be recruited.
Incidentally, the Home Secretary gave no clear reply to the question by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding) about whether telecommunications employees would be able to give evidence to the tribunal without risk of breaching the Official Secrets Act 1911. The Home Secretary responded with a vague generality. I hope that before the end of the debate we shall have a specific reply to that question.

Mr. Mikardo: Or something in the Bill.

Mr. Kaufman: Something in the Bill would be better but we should like an anticipation of what is to be put in the Bill.
In any case, the tribunal will be able to operate only if a warrant has been issued against a person who complains. Therefore, it will not be able to investigate the possibility of unathorised interception. If a warrant has been issued, all the tribunal can do is to check that the statutory procedures have been observed. It cannot consider the merits of the decision.

Mr. Brittan: That is not correct. I made it clear that it has to consider, among other things, whether or not the criteria set out in clause 2 have been met. That is clear. In response to interventions by the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan) I clarified that point beyond peradventure, as I have done in the past. The right hon. Gentleman persistently and wilfully refuses to see what is plainly there.

Mr. Kaufman: I am grateful to the Home Secretary for that absolute, clear, unquestionable, categoric assurance. I hope that he will continue giving that kind of assurance in answer to questions such as the one I have just put again on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under- Lyme.

Mr. John Morris: Let us have it now.

Mr. Kaufman: Indeed, yes, as my right hon. and learned Friend says, the Home Secretary leapt to his feet when he was able to correct me on another point. Let him

leap to his feet again and give us the other assurance which we require. No? That is a pity. Therefore, in a way we have our reply.
Overall, even though we have got a further assurance, which I welcome, it has to be said that compared with the likely results of the activities of the tribunal, the Bridge report looks like a mighty blow for civil liberty.
The new office of commissioner has greater and potentially more beneficial powers. I very much hope that the important suggestion made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) will be considered by the House. It is important that members of the security service should have access to an independent person if they have misgivings about what they are being asked to do.
The drawback about the office of commissioner is that he will be appointed by the Prime Minister and will report to the Prime Minister. There will be no accountability to Parliament. We strongly take the view that the House must seize the opportunity of the Bill to start the process of making the security services responsible to Parliament. We believe that the commissioner should be appointed not by the Prime Minister but by the House, and that he should report not to the Prime Minister but to a Select Committee of the House. He should be a servant of Parliament, not a functionary of the Government. We shall be moving amendments to bring that about.
When it commented on the White Paper from which the Bill originated, the Financial Times said in a leading article:
at every sensitive point of balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the state, it fails the individual … the best advice seems to be to say and write as little as possible.
That is a devastating comment to be made by a responsible newspaper on the state of freedom in this country under this Government, but it is an accurate statement.
The turmoil taking place in the security services and the allegations about transgressions of the rules by the security services are harmful to the very national security that those services are supposed to safeguard. If MI5 wastes so much of its time spying on people like Joan Ruddock, no wonder it was unable for so long to spot a Bettaney in its own ranks. If MI5 is accumulating mountains of paper about hundreds of thousands of often innocuous persons, that is enormous time and effort taken away from dealing with the real enemies of the country.
The problem is that all security services operate in a climate created by the Government of the day. If a judge can say that the political interests of that Government are synonymous with the national interest, it is understandable that MI5, or at any rate some people in it, make the same mistake, regardless of the directives that govern them. If we have a Prime Minister who says that local councils which wish to pursue their own policies rather than those of the Government must be put down, as she did three days ago, people in MI5 can be understood, if not forgiven, for taking that ugly intolerance as the new conformity. If we have a Prime Minister who says of the miners' strike, as she did three days ago, "I am fed up with people saying, 'Don't gloat'," people in MI5 can be understood, if not forgiven, for regarding trade unionists as persons who can justifiably be spied upon.
The Prime Minister has become like the Queen of Hearts in "Alice in Wonderland". She goes about all over the place saying, "Off with their heads !." Indeed, it is


difficult to be sure whether it was the Lewis Carroll character or the right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) who made that memorable pronouncement, "Sentence first, verdict afterwards." During the past six years we have had too much of, "Sentence first, verdict afterwards." We need proper, fair, democratic procedures, and never more so than in these matters which the Diplock report four years ago rightly said have always been looked upon with suspicion and distaste. It is because the Bill fails to meet that test that we ask the House to vote for the amendment.

Sir Edward Gardner: My concern about the Bill is a concern, shared, I like to think, by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House, that there should be a proper and acceptable balance between the right to personal liberty and the need for an effective and efficient security service as an essential part of the defence system of the country.
I was at least made happy by one sentence used by the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) when he was attacking the Bill. He acknowledged that this country has real enemies. Those real enemies are within our midst and have to be dealt with. One way of dealing with them is by the proper and efficient use of the security service.
My concern is also that the powers that are given to the security service should be, as indeed they are, express and limited powers, and should in no case be extended into general powers. I am also concerned, as I am sure that the House is, that nothing should be done to disturb or to diminish our right to personal liberty without the clear, imperative and overriding need to deal with subversive activities and the activities of espionage and terrorism.
It is unrealistic to suppose that our personal liberties can be protected and sustained without giving up something at times. Every time we go to an airport and have our clothing searched, or every time we go to a public building and are stopped and asked to open the packets that we are carrying, that is offensive to public liberty. However, it is something that we accept because if we do not accept it we should be giving terrorists, subversives and spies an open invitation to get on with what they are doing and to do their worst. These things have to be accepted by society, and we know that.
I am particularly concerned, as I hope the House is, that we should have an efficient security service using the same weapons that are used against us by our secret enemies — the weapons of secrecy, stealth and surprise. One thing that the House and everyone who values personal freedom has to be careful about is to see that we do nothing to undermine the efficiency of the secret service, because if the secret service is no longer to be secret, what is it? I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw) who said the other day in the House that he wanted his money back. We must have secrecy, and that secrecy must be protected.

Mr. Winnick: That intervention by the hon. Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw) concerned us because it was made without qualification and quite obviously meant CND and trade union people. The hon. Member said, to roars of Tory laughter, that if such people are not being

checked he wanted a refund. Does this not illustrate the lack of concern on Tory Benches over civil liberties? People such as Joan Ruddock, Mrs. Haigh and Bruce Kent are being investigated because of their political views, but they are not a threat to national security. That is the core of the issue that concerns Labour Members.

Sir Edward Gardner: This is to turn reality on to its head. We do not say that, because somebody happens to be a member of a trade union or of the CND, or is a dentist or a member of the Bar or any other particular calling or profession, it therefore follows that they are subversive and enemies of the country. However, it does follow, as everybody who looks at this problem with any sense of reality must accept that it follows, that such organisation as trade unions, the CND and, for all I know, professional bodies throughout the country, offer cover to our secret enemies. Therefore, if one is seeking to identify those enemies, one has to see who is in these organisations.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that hostile intelligence agencies would be failing in their duty to their masters if they did not seek to penetrate such organisations? They do not always succeed, but it must be right for our intelligence agencies to keep an eye on those hostile agencies that seek to infiltrate such organisations.

Sir Edward Gardner: I hope that in what I have said I have already made my meaning clear. That is, that if one is looking for secret and hostile elements, one has to bear in mind that they can operate only under a cloak of secrecy and they may do that as a professor in a university, or as a member of the dental profession, a trade union or the CND.

Mr. Mikardo: Or MI5.

Sir Edward Gardner: The hon. Gentleman is right. That is an important point, to which I shall come.
The hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) is standing reality on its head because the secret service has to identify people who shelter under anonymity and discover who the hostile elements in the country are who shield themselves by secrecy. This can only be done — there is no other way of doing it—by a security service that can rely on secrecy, stealth and surprise.
The House will remember that Lord Birkett in 1957, when he was making his report on the security service, saw as a highly effective method of identifying secret enemies the interception of communications. Lord Birkett said that this is the only effective method of counter-espionage and of safeguarding the vital secrets of the state. No doubt, if he had been reporting today, Lord Birkett would have added to that, as he would have had to, protection against terrorists.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that there is a danger in saying that the powers should be directed at those who are hostile? Hostility to the state is not what is objectionable, because in a sense that is a matter of opinion. It is the willingness to use either violent or subversive methods to promote that hostility that is objectionable.

Sir Edward Gardner: I agree with my hon. Friend. I was using a blanket word, and I should put it more carefully. I should use with greater confidence the definition of subversive that Lord Harris gave in the other place when he was Minister in the Labour Government in


1975. My right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary quoted that well-known definition. It is that subversive activities are those that affect the safety and well-being of the state and that are intended to overthrow and undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.
The Select Committee on Home Affairs has had its attention directed to Lord Harris' definition. The Committee has taken a considerable amount of evidence from a number of witnesses, including my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary. No doubt it is a matter of debate whether that definition is one that ultimately will be accepted. I say personally, divorced altogether from what the Select Committee says, that when I started to look at that definition, I had some doubts about it. I was especially uncertain about the wisdom of including a reference to the well-being of the state. However, having spent a considerable amount of time — as did all the other members of the Select Committee—in considering the definition, I am coming to the conclusion that it is, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary said when he gave evidence to the Committee, a definition that it would be hard to improve upon.
While taking evidence, we asked a number of witnesses in public session — so I can repeat what was said without any breach of privilege — about that question. Speaking personally, I felt that they had some difficulty in improving upon the Harris definition.

Mr. Hanley: In the context of the Bill, does my hon. and learned Friend not agree that qualifying the phrase "well-being of the United Kingdom" by the word "economic" makes the Bill clearer than the definition of subversion?

Sir Edward Gardner: That may well be so. It is because I feel offended by any possibility of the misuse or abuse of the powers—the limited powers—given to the security service that I especially welcome clause 7, which establishes a tribunal to determine whether the Secretary of State responsible has exercised his powers correctly in granting a warrant. I am pleased to note that anyone who feels aggrieved and thinks that he has been injured by incorrect exercise of the powers used by the Secretary of State to issue a warrant can now look forward, by means of appearing before the tribunal, to being compensated for any injury.
I am also very content that the Government in clause 1 have created a criminal offence of the unlawful interception of communications which, if proved, will attract a prison sentence of up to two years or a fine.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: I wonder whether my hon. and learned Friend can help the House on one point? The tribunal has an important role to play in testing the appropriateness of the warrant, but how does someone go to the tribunal and establish that the Secretary of State was wrong to issue a warrant on the grounds that he thought it necessary to do so
in the interests of national security"?
Is that not a concept so broad as to be incapable of challenge?

Sir Edward Gardner: I do not think that such a case would be incapable of proof, although it might well be difficult to prove. It would depend entirely on the

circumstances that gave rise to the allegation and how each and every one of those circumstances could be established before the tribunal.
Although I welcome clauses 7 and 1, I am not satisfied that the Bill goes far enough. If a member of the security service had a suspicion, or had cause to believe, that powers were being misused or abused, there is no procedure in the Bill that would help him to make his complaint known to any particular person upon whom he could rely for remedy. I put to my right hon. and learned Friend the argument that no matter how excellent the quality of a public service may be, there must always be a risk that there will be in that service someone who will misbehave himself. It that happens now, I cannot see how that misconduct will be exposed to inquiry or how someone who suspects or believes that that misconduct is taking place can appear before someone who could determine whether the suspicion was justified. I cannot, in reality, believe that a member of the security services is likely to go to his superiors and say that he believes that certain misconduct is taking place. To do so might well put at risk his future hopes of promotion or even his job.
I therefore ask my right hon. and learned Friend to consider seriously the possibility of appointing an independent and objective member of the security services to whom those with such a complaint could turn, and who could, within the secrecy and security of the service, investigate the complaints. When he had made his investigations, the complaints could be dealt with within the service and without any breach of security.
Our most valuable and precious possession is personal liberty. I would not in any way advocate that anything should be done by the House in the Bill or in any other Bill that might in any way taint what Edward Gibbon called
the image of liberty in which we delight".
I believe that the Bill is a measure that we can rely upon to sustain our liberty, to benefit our liberty and to improve our hopes of keeping that liberty in the future.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: All Home Secretaries have to maintain a balance between the need to maintain the security of the state and the need to maintain and preserve civil liberties. That is sometimes a very difficult task, and judgments have to be made. Whatever the rules may state, and whatever may be laid down in White Papers, there comes a time when one has to think hard before one allows, or does not allow, something to happen.
I declare an interest in that as Home Secretary and as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland I authorised telephone tapping over a period of five years. I declare a further interest. Since March 1974, to varying degrees, I and my family have been protected by the special branch against terrorist attack. I do not have to read about the activities of the special branch, because I meet members of the special branch frequently. I am not naive enough to believe that they never do anything wrong, but I am closely in touch with them.
I have also received valuable advice from a small number of people in MI5 who gave me information about the work of terrorists, particularly in one part of the world and eventually in many parts of the world. The advice and information that they gave me has served the nation well, despite the fact that, on many occasions, we did not prevent terrorist activities. Had we done so, people would


not have been killed in shopping precincts and elsewhere in this country. That small group of officers are friends of mine. I have learned to respect them. They are certainly not stupid reactionaries.
Home Secretaries have a difficult time answering direct questions about telephone tapping. It is easy to say no, but if one says no, when the time comes, why should one not say yes? I should like to comment on some of the allegations that have been made. On the last day of the Labour Government in 1979, after my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) had conceded defeat, I went back to the Home Office and signed some interception warrants. That was necessary, because there was at that time no successor. They had to be done that evening. I think that I signed four and wrote on them that they had to be looked at by the new Home Secretary when he was appointed. The job of Home Secretary is not like any other in government. He is alone. He sometimes gets in touch with the Prime Minister, but it is not a Cabinet or Cabinet Sub-Committee decision.
When Lord Bridge ruled that no warrant for interception had been issued in contravention of the rules, I was not the slightest bit surprised, as I do not believe that that has been done by any Home Secretary. In any event, the checks and balances make it impossible. However, subjective considerations come into play when decisions are made.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: The right hon. Gentleman has great experience, and he might be able to help the House in an unusual way. According to clause 2, a warrant can be issued if the Home Secretary thinks that it is necessary for national security or economic well-being. Does the right hon. Gentleman think that it is possible to formulate the criteria more narrowly and precisely or should they be left broadly drawn?

Mr. Rees: I had intended to make some suggestions about that later. I think that they are drawn too broadly. To put it another way, they are drawn more broadly than the rules that emerged from White Papers of the past.
The Bill has arisen out of the Malone case. In March 1979, I announced that I was setting in train a study of the implications of the case. The process has taken six years, although I understand that other things have occurred. The judge ruled that telephone tapping could be done lawfully because there was nothing to make it unlawful. All Home Secretaries used the prerogative. But the judge also argued that telephone tapping was a subject that cried out for legislation. I agree. Mr. Malone appealed to the European Court of Human Rights which, in 1982, issued an opinion in favour of him and ruled that the action had been in breach of article 8 of the convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
It is important to recall what article 8 says:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
That takes us into privacy legislation and the like. Article 8 continues:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security"—
that is pretty broad—
public safety or the economic well-being of the country".

I have never authorised a telephone tap in the interests of the economic well-being of the country, and nor has anyone else as Home Secretary. That is new. By absorbing what the European court says, we have taken on a new concept. Article 8 continues:
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
That is what the Government have put in the Bill. They have taken the words of the European court. Much as I respect the European court, such a general statement is not good enough for legislation.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence: Is the right hon. Gentleman right in saying that the economic power is new? Has it not been operated by the Foreign Secretary, though perhaps not by the Home Secretary?

Mr. Rees: I said by a Home Secretary. I was careful to say that, although I did not know until I checked with my right hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Milian) that apparently it had been authorised by the Foreign Secretary. It was never done by me.
I agree in principle that we should give statutory approval to telephone tapping. It is vital that we be able to add to our information to apprehend certain categories of people. However, it is not the prime mover or the main means of getting information. When I was asked for a telephone tap, those asking had sheets of paper giving information such as that there would be a robbery on Saturday, that armed men were involved and the rest. They had everything except information about where it would happen. I can remember telling people with whom I had agreed a telephone tap to come back on Monday morning and tell me what they had found out. It would be foolish to imagine that telephone tapping is the main source of information.
We hear of informers in Northern Ireland and it is a means of getting information. This is also the case in the criminal world. Of course, telephone tapping is important in regard to terrorism. I had better be careful what I say. A foreign terrorist might for example, come here through Heathrow and I might be told that he is part of an international terrorist gang. Telephone tapping in this type of case might be the only way in which to get information.
There has been much talk about Left-wing subversives because of a recent television programme. In espionage, it is rarely that way round. I was always surprised to find out who it was alleged was involved in espionage. On the whole, they are not from my constituency or the village in which I was born — they come from a different walk of life. However, I must admit that I often used to make snide remarks about that until I realised that many people that I knew never had the opportunity.
There is an important point to make about drugs and through a tap eventually sewing up a drugs case and gaining the information to lock up people for a long time. A television film might show a policeman on a bike suddenly arriving at a seaside resort in Cornwall, and the media describe him as a clever policeman because he arrived at the right moment. However, a lot of thought was given to the exercise before the policeman arrived.
I believe in parliamentary democracy. This House believes in parliamentary democracy. Those who want to overturn parliamentary democracy by revolutionary means are, in my view, subversives. However, many people who call themselves revolutionaries could not overturn a rice


pudding. I was born into the Labour movement; I did not come to it after studying PPE or modern greats at Oxford. During my 50 years in the Labour movement I have seen the paper revolutionaries come and go and become good Catholics and good members of the Conservative party in less than 20 or 30 years.

Mr. Dalyell: While my right hon. Friend is in such an expansive mood, could he give us a judgment whether, when he occupied the high office of Home Secretary, he thought that he was told all that he needed to know by the security forces? I ask that as an interrogative question.

Mr. Rees: I was always told what I wanted or needed to know about telephone tapping. In Northern Ireland, I knew a devil of a lot more about a great many people. I locked up 600 people. Two or three of us would talk into the long hours of the night; we talked as friends and as people who knew a great deal. To this day, when I read what certain people now say I give a wry grin.
When I was Home Secretary, I could not possibly know everything that was happening in MI5 — not because anyone was trying to fool me, but because it is the nature of the system. However, I am not saying that because of that I was not responsible — I accepted full responsibility for anything that was done. But it was impossible to know all.

Mr. D. N. Campbell-Savours: Did my right hon. Friend note the source quoted in The Sunday Times, which in reference to the Home Secretary's effectiveness said:
He hasn't got a clue what is going on … If he comes round, you lock away any sensitive files and set up a display file specially for him to look at—a spoof file on some imaginary subversive with lots of exciting material in it. He's not going to know any better.
Hon. Members might think that stupid, but my constituents and millions of people are concerned that the Home Secretary does not know what is going on. My right hon. Friend is a former Home Secretary. Does he accept that anything in that newspaper comment is true?

Mr. Rees: Quite frankly, I do not. Perhaps someone is preparing false files, I do not know. I simply repeat that it is impossible for a Home Secretary, dealing with all the various aspects of a wide Department, even to pretend that he knows all that is going on in MI5.
In any aspect of the security services, the Home Secretary must trust the man in charge. Even if the Bill were 600 pages long, with a list of rules and regulations as long as my arm, ultimately everything depends on the trust placed in the man in charge of the organisation. There is no way around that.
I am mainly concerned about clause 2. I certainly could not support economic sanctions, even though the Bill refers only to economic information from abroad. We may talk about subversives, but there are those who indulge in financial deals across the exchanges who do more harm to this country than many people who call themselves subversives. The Bill refers to deals outside this country, and that concerns me because I do not understand what it means. Does it mean that if a firm in this country has headquarters in New York, it is all right to try to find out what is going on in that company? [AN HON. MEMBER: "The Isle of Man"] I had responsibility for the Isle of Man when I was Home Secretary, but I did not know too much about that, either.
There are already rules covering phone tapping. None of the rules in the White Papers led me to tap a phone to gain economic information. That would be wrong and outside the rules. No Home Secretary of any party would sign a warrant to get economic information from a firm, trade union or anyody else.
In the recent film on television, allegation was made about the fire service dispute, so I checked on the steps that I took. When representatives from the union told me that there was to be a strike, I said that I would have to have green goddesses available. The union co-operated fully. The last thing that it wanted was the middle of London to burn. Why on earth would anyone want to tap the union's telephones? Such an allegation is made more in paranoia than anything else.
Subversion is a subjective definition, and I have already said that parliamentary democracy weighs with me. I have to ask such questions as whether there is contact with a foreign embassy, whether certain people are anything more than windy revolutionaries and whether there is any talk of arms. If there is any danger of this, there is subversion.
The Guardian took me to to task recently because, apparently — I never remember these things — during a short debate someone asked me who determined the meaning of subversion. I said that I did. The Guardian said that that was a delusion of grandeur. It was not — it must be a judgment for the Home Secretary to make.
Every hon. Member is affected by his experiences. I first entered politics in the 1930s, and I have never forgotten what happened in Germany. In the early days, as a member of the Labour League of Youth, I was in politics when others who stayed on were only in the school debating society. I was concerned when I saw the flicker of civil liberties going out in Germany. It came from a National Socialist party, and I learned that not everyone who says, "Lord, lord, I am a Socialist," is necessarily a Socialist.
Harold Laski used to tell us that there are 999 definitions. I knew the only one that mattered to me: that one would get power through the ballot box, despite all the difficulties and problems that are involved. I take up the point that was made earlier: when the Prime Minister referred to "the enemy within" was that a subjective definition of subversion? I say it is a subjective view. I was asked whether there needs to be a sharper definition. However sharp that definition may be, a subjective evaluation has eventually to be made.
Another problem arises from the enormous number of foreign agents who come to London. Some large countries seem to me to deal with their unemployment problem by having a large secret service. Their foreign agents talk to unsuspecting people in this country and report back. This is picked up by somebody else and the next thing is that a file is opened on the person because it is thought that he is in contact with a foreign agent. That is why I never go to foreign embassies if I can avoid it. It seems to me that they earn a living by building up out of nothing the importance of those to whom they speak. It causes trouble. I hope that it has never caused trouble for me, but I know that it has caused trouble for other people.
On clause 2 and the rules with which it deals, may I put this point to the Home Secretary. The place to put the Maxwell Fyfe rules and the Birkett rules, suitably brought up to date, is in a schedule to the Bill. I believe that clause 2 ought to be a general clause, with a schedule to the Bill


containing the rules that I used to operate brought up to date. Any Home Secretary will have to look at those rules. I used to look at a list of my duties, under which I operated. I would be surprised to find how much a Home Secretary was responsible for. But clause 2 is not good enough as it stands. It needs to be refined. The subsection dealing with the economic well-being of the United Kingdom needs to be taken out completely. The details need to be put into a schedule to the Bill. Much discussion will have to take place, as the rules are brought up to date.
I did not understand what the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins), meant when he said that the political aspect of the work ought to be dropped. I came across a political problem once. The National Front used to parade in my constituency with the red hand flag of Ulster. It had a link with the Ulster Defence Association. A member of the National Front, with a Conservative councillor, was supplying arms to paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. They were arrested. They regarded themselves as a political organisation. Although one may say that politics must not enter into it, when one tries to define what is meant by politics it is not easy to do so. I read that in a Film there was a "plant" in a fascist party in Leeds. I knew nothing about it. I am very glad that there was. It may regard itself as a political organisation. I want everybody in this country to be able to stand up and put their views, whatever they may be. All I know is that black kids in Leeds were beaten up and that this political organisation was involved. I believe that such political activities need to be monitored, but that monitoring needs to be controlled. Clause 2 needs to be shorter, with the details spelt out in a schedule.
As for the allegations made in the film about the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, in December of last year I said in the House that I had never regarded CND as a subversive organisation. The fact that an organisation says things with which many people disagree does not make it a subversive organisation. CND cannot possibly be a subversive organisation. Many of those who live in my part of Yorkshire and disagree with my views on defence are members of CND. To say that they are subversives is stupid. Many of them are Christians. They are imbued with the same spirit as the members of the Peace Pledge Union of the 1930s. In no way could I regard them as subversives. As for the allegation regarding Shelter, I have never heard anything so daft. If the Communist party, for what it is worth these days, were to take over Shelter, I do not know that I would lose much sleep. I have doubts about the allegation.
As for the point made by my right hon. Friends the Members for Cardiff, South and Penarth and for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), I believe that members of MI5 should have the right to go to a tribunal on the question of telephone tapping. This is a telephone tapping Bill. If citizens in general can go to a tribunal, members of MI5 ought to be able to go to a tribunal.
Clause 4(1) reads:
A warrant shall not be issued except—

(a) under the hand of the Secretary of State; or
(b) in an urgent case, under the hand of a person holding office under the Crown".


That is far too broad. I am told that certain senior offices are not really offices under the Crown. Anyway, I have

been stopped on the motorway and at the nearest police station I telephoned a deputy under-secretary or the permanent under-secretary and spoke to nobody else. The reference to a person holding office under the Crown debases the existing rules. Only a Home Secretary should issue such a warrant, nobody else, and, if necessary, via a senior civil servant. The clause is too vague. As for timing, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gorton is right. I have already revealed that one gives permission for a period of time. Some telephone taps continue for a long time. I do not intend to spell it out, even in this House. However, I imagine that every hon. Member knows what I am talking about. They are blanket tappings. They are not on individuals. However, even those blanket tappings were reviewed every six months. But six months, in general, is too long.
There is a great deal to tidy up in the Bill. I welcome the fact that telephone tapping is to be put on a statutory basis. How could I say anything else? I cannot change my mind because I am in opposition. What had to be done was obvious. I ought not to say that one cannot change one's mind when in opposition, but I am not prepared to change my mind about telephone tapping. Nevertheless, the Bill needs to be substantially amended. I shall play my part in Committee. I am not being asked to vote against the Bill, but unless I receive assurances on the breadth of clause 2, I shall vote for the amendment.
I have read the script of the film that I watched last night on tape. I want to say two things about it. One of them has made me very angry, for personal reasons. An allegation was made about a man called Tommy Roberts who worked in the information office in Belfast. He had lived in this country for 20 years and worked in the Ulster Office. He then returned here. By the very nature of his office, the Home Secretary hardly knows anybody below a certain rank; his Department is so big. However, in Northern Ireland the Department is so small that I knew everybody. I knew Tommy Roberts. I remember that in August 1976 I asked Tommy Roberts and his wife Margaret what they were going to do. They said that they were going to march with the peace people down in Belfast and that they had come to collect my wife at the Castle to go with them. For the first time I had to say to my wife, "Please do not go."
Once the wife of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was seen marching with the peace people in Belfast the media would immediately say that the peace people were organised in the Castle. Northern Ireland politicians, with one or two exceptions, would have drawn exactly the same conclusion.
Tommy and Margaret Roberts were good people. They were going to go down to Belfast in the rain that day and make their little mark for peace in Northern Ireland. What do we get in the film? Tommy Roberts would not have known about telephone tapping of any sort. He would not have known the remotest thing about it. But what did the film say? The allegation that it made about telephone tapping and Tommy Roberts is complete rubbish. I have discussed it with my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, Central (Mr. Mason) who succeeded me in Northern Ireland.
That would not be too bad, but what did the programme go on to say? It said that at a party Tommy Roberts was drunk and that he was "a close aide of Mr. Roy Mason". Clever stuff! It is said that he said, "I know you. We have got you taped," or, "We have got you tapped". He was taking the mickey, although the Northern Irish use a


different word. It was said, "Because he was drunk, I asked him again." Has anyone ever thought of Margaret Roberts? Tommy has been dead for five years. That was repeated again on the Sunday after the film by the scissors and paste journalists who regard their research as a matter of going to an old paper and cutting something out. It was rubbish. In the Elysian fields Tommy Roberts is having a good laugh and taking the mickey out of those journalistic Warriors in the Europa hotel, some of whom never budged an inch to get their information. However, some were excellent. I determined to speak today on behalf of Tommy Roberts. He was a good man whose name has been besmirched.
As far as I know, I have never met Harry Newton. According to the film, he was a Left-wing informer and a former member of the Communist party. A friend of mine, whom I would trust completely, and a close friend of Mr. Newton, told me that the people doing the film came to see him and he told them that he knew Harry Newton. They said that they had a lot of information for a film on MI5 which was dynamite and they wanted personal information on Mr. Newton because he had been a victim of surveillance by MI5. They did not tell him of the allegation that he had been an informer and they told him a lie to get the information. If a Minister did that on the Floor of the House there would be hell to pay. But that was done by a journalist, getting information out of a friend of mine who is on the Left of the Labour party by a long way, who was glad that there was to be an investigative television film, who thinks it incomprehensible that Harry was an MI5 agent for over 30 years. He told me that he still thought that it was a leg-pull.
The Secretary of State is not here. I appreciate that he cannot say anything about telephone tapping. Harry Newton is dead. But an allegation has been made by a journalist. I bet that they would be shouting to have it cleared up if that had come from the Secretary of State.

Mr. Winnick: If Miss Massiter were telling the truth and if what she stated on the film is the position—we know why she decided to give up the work—and if she made those allegations regarding Mr. Newton, what possible motive could she have if they were not true?
I do not know and who does in the House except perhaps the Home Secretary, if he has checked the files? If the position is as alleged by Miss Massiter it must be taken into consideration. If she was not telling the truth, what possible motive would she have for making those allegations on the film?

Mr. Rees: I do not know. All that I am concerned about is that it has been brought to my notice that a man's character has been besmirched. All I am saying is that it ought to be cleared up.
Let me make a general observation on the media. Quite properly, there is concern about the film. Quite correctly, there is concern about what MI5 does. But the media must think carefully about what they do as well. The other day The Guardian went on to say that I
got rid of Messrs. Agee and Hosenball on the basis of undisclosed and highly suspect security information.
It could not possibly know. But that will appear again, on the scissors and paste basis, as people try, not very well, to emulate the Washington Post. The Guardian says: "Highly suspect." It goes on to say that in the ABC case the information came from the offices of the National

Council for Civil Liberties. That is rubbish too, but it will appear again. The responsibility of the media in that respect is suspect.
I do not need instruction on civil liberties from those who have no responsibility. I have often called in aid the Franks committee of 10 years ago. I remember that the press came to us and said that we need not worry about the Official Secrets Act. They said that they were responsible and would look after it. We said:
The news media … have a public function as well as the Government and would act responsibly by refraining from any seriously damaging disclosures of official information.
In those lovely words—I did not write them, but I can guess who did—the report said:
It seemed to us that this second argument rested upon a number of premises of doubtful validity and we discussed it closely with the representatives of organisations holding such views who came to see us.
The report went on:
The constitutional responsibilities of the Government and Parliament for protecting the nation cannot be abdicated on the basis that a failure to exercise them will be made good by the responsible behaviour of others. The same degree of responsible behaviour is not, in any event, shown by those who may publish or communicate official information. Restraint in publication varies from one kind of publication to another.
I read that because the Government, of whatever political persuasion, have a responsibility for secret information which cannot be bandied about.
The Bridge report dealt with one aspect of the current allegations on MI5. I am concerned about files on non-subversive organisations. I am concerned, if such is the case, about lack of co-operation between MI5 and special branch in certain areas. MI5 or the special branch has no role in narrow political surveillance. I have been very concerned about the setting up of DS19 in the Ministry of Defence. It is not the function of the Ministry of Defence, whether on the decision of the Minister or not, to be a political Department. If the Government want to get at CND, they should set up a department in the Tory Central Office. With DS19 we see what happens. Someone could ring up and say that he was head of DS 19, and ask for some information. There would be two official Departments talking to each other. It was wrong. If my right hon. Friend had become Prime Minister after 1979 and had set up a political department in the Ministry of Defence, the media criticism would not have stopped. DS19 was the wrong thing to set up and it needs to be looked into. These rules should be included in the schedule. I do not want a Minister of Security. That would be dangerous. There is apparently to be a new head from outside. We did that in 1978. That is a useful thing to do from time to time.
What has been said about the setting up of a Privy Councillors' committee probably will not wash. The last Franks committee saw everything and reported truthfully. Indeed, I signed truthfully, or I would not have done so. People said that there was a cover-up. But whatever Privy Councillors do, people will say that there has been a cover-up.
Nevertheless, there is a lot of information that cannot be slung around in the House or in Committee—

Mr. Dalyell: Which Franks committee?—

Mr. Rees: The committee dealt with a subject called the Falklands. However, I still suggest that there should be a committee of Privy Councillors to look at the rules. The Government should give an assurance that before


reaching clause 2, such a committee will have a chance to provide a new set of rules. We would need to have a look at a schedule that is far tighter than the clause.
The same group could look annually at a report from the head of the secret service. It would have to report to the Prime Minister and Parliament upon matters such as files, surveillance and so on. The Home Secretary published the rules on surveillance in December. I have with me the statement on surveillance, and it is far more important than telephone tapping. We are moving out of the horse and buggy age. However, I believe that this type of surveillance should be covered by a separate Bill, as the subject needs to be given much more consideration.
As a first step, we should ensure that telephone tapping is covered by statute. I shall play my part in Committee. As it is, the Bill is not suitable, but I could not vote against Second Reading for that reason. However, I shall certainly vote for the amendment unless we are assured that something will be done. This matter is important. An ex-Home Secretary cannot just join the ex-Home Secretaries club and say that there are no problems. Of course there are problems. In all walks of life there are changed values. We are operating in a different world from that of the 1930s, 1950s or 1960s. But it is no good crying about that. We had better look at the issues involved. After all, the House has a responsibility.
Those of my right hon. Friends who say that something must be done are not being unpatriotic. They are doing what hon. Members have done many times before. They are asking awkward questions. I might not like some of the questions and I might be glad that I am not a member of the Government and having to deal with them. But those questions must be answered. This country must be superior to all other countries in this respect. It is a good country that asks questions. The questions have now been asked, and it is up to the Home Secretary and the Government to respond.

Sir Anthony Kershaw: The right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) made a most compendious speech, which will greatly benefit the House. He drew on his experience and the wisdom that he has accumulated over the years, and the House should be grateful for what he said.
I believe that the surveillance of those who feel little or no obligation to obey the law is both justifiable and desirable. Of course, as the right hon. Gentleman said, the vast majority of cases involve criminal offences to do with robberies, drugs, and so on. But there are a few cases that are pursued more in the interests of the state, and it is only right that they should be looked at.
There is one body, CND, which seems to think that it falls into some sort of special category and which resents such security activity more than most people, and has said so in a letter to me. That body maintains that CND merely seeks to change the legislative process by legitimate, obvious and democratic means. It is its right to do that, and no one can possibly carp about that, or criticise CND for it.
However, one is entitled to ask, if such people have nothing reprehensible to hide, why they are so sensitive about phone tapping, especially when they spend quite a lot of their time upbraiding the Government for their

secretiveness. But no one can overlook the fact that some members of CND have broken the law or have condoned those who have done so. Nobody denies that a high proportion of the CND council are politically to the Left, or that there are some Communists and Trotskyists whose loyalty to this country cannot necessarily be assumed.
In those circumstances, it would be a breach of duty in this age, in which subversion and terrorism have taken the place of open war, if my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary did not take reasonable precautions against such people in order to defend the state. I commend him, and his Labour predecessors, for the action that they have taken.

Mr. D. E. Thomas: In the hon. Gentleman's reference to senior members of CND, is he including Mr. John Cox?

Sir Anthony Kershaw: It is not fitting to give the names of particular people, but it has not been denied that there are five people on the council of CND who are of the extreme Left persuasion. There were eight members before the last election. However, they are perfectly entitled to their views.
I turn to another subject. I have been surprised by rumours in the press, presumably inspired by Whitehall, that the Prime Minister intends to shake up the security services by appointing from outside a sort of cleaner of the Augean stables. If those rumours were inspired by Whitehall—the newspapers were rather specific about that — it was surely an error of judgment on the Government's part. On the one hand, the Government, by this Bill and by their speeches, justify the activities of the security services — as we have seen today — and on the other they seem to allow snide suggestions to be made that the services have broken the rules. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Minister will say whether the Government consider that the security services should be cleaned up. If so, who will they appoint to do that?
Several suggestions have been made about the degree to which, and the methods by which, the security services should be supervised. Up until now, those ultimately responsible not only politically but adminstratively have been the Prime Minister and certain other Ministers. When things have gone wrong, commissions or individuals — drawn from among the great and the good — have sought to analyse what has happened. Their reports have necessarily been secret, but have been understood to say either that all was well, or that it shortly would be. Unfortunately, those assurances have been repeatedly falsified. After each debacle, there has been another separate inquiry. I do not think that the tribunal outlined in the Bill will do the job of supervising the way in which the security services do their job, that some sort of supervision is necessary can hardly be denied. Unless Parliament and the public are satisfied that the security services are acting correctly, they will not have confidence in them, and the security services will not have confidence in themselves.
As pressure on the security services, in the present climate of public opinion, is bound to increase, just as before the war, before the fallacies of Socialism were clear and the dangers of Fascism were obvious, there were found to be those whose loyalty broke, so, now, a long peace has lessened the fear of military defeat, and uneasiness about nuclear weapons may erode the loyalty of those in the security services.
I should like to contrast the treatment meted out to some of the major traitors since the war with the threats and actual prosecutions that have been made against some of the minor MI5 officers, whose motives in making their revelations were not to bring down but to strengthen this country's security. The sort of reassurance that we need about our security services will not be provided by the occasional Law Lord or tribunal. Such people can have no technical expertise about the ins and outs of security work. They do not command the extensive files and so on that have to be produced for a proper investigation.
I do not believe that such bodies have in the past got down to the nitty-gritty of the issues involved. We need someone, or a body of people, with inside knowledge. We need people from inside the security organisation.
I know that asking a policeman to watch another policeman has sometimes been criticised, but the merit of it is that only another policeman knows all the detail and where to look for weaknesses. The idea is not novel. Many public bodies have an inspectorate. The Foreign Office, the education system, the armed forces and the constabulary all have inspectorate systems. The existence of such a body would remind services, if they needed to be reminded, to remain within the guidelines and the law. If such a body had been in existence, it would have discovered or discounted the serious events which have so dramatically and squalidly been a feature of our intelligence services since the late 1940s.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Does my hon. Friend also regard as critical the proper screening of those who join the security services both at the beginning of and on many occasions throughout their careers?

Sir Anthony Kershaw: I have no doubt that that is important. It is clear that when Miss Massiter and Mr. Bettaney joined the service they were acceptable and that during their service they changed. Presumably, they had no one to complain to, their jobs were not supervised, and the secrecy which necessarily exists in such organisations meant that they worked on their own and suffered all sorts of pressures which those outside such services cannot easily recognise.
A body which is known constantly to keep an eye on details, on what is going on and on those who work in those services might have prevented both of those cases. The two people might have changed their minds or, if it had been detected that they wished to leave the service, they could have done so and the disasters would not have occurred.
I do not forget or deride the misgivings of patriotic law-abiding people who may fear that their privacy may be invaded. I hope that the Bill will reassure them by codifying the practice. However, they would be even more reassured if they knew that the security services were properly run according to the law. A permanent inspectorate along the lines that I have outlined would benefit both the service and the country.

Mr. Robert Maclennan: The hon. Member for Stroud (Sir. A. Kershaw) has turned the debate to the ways in which the Bill could be bettered, especially by considering the adequacy of the scrutiny provisions. He has helpfully moved the debate forward.
It is right to remind ourselves that the right of a citizen to respect for his private life, his home, family and

correspondence is a fundamental freedom, which we enjoy and which distinguishes democracy from dictatorships. For British people that fundamental right is guaranteed by article 8 of the European convention on human rights. However, it is not an unlimited right in the Convention.
I remind the House that the European Court spelt out the necessity for a limitation in a case which preceded the Malone case that has given rise to the Bill. In the Klass case in 1978 the court stated:
Democratic societies nowadays find themselves threatened by highly sophisticated forms of espionage and terrorism, with the result that the state must be able in order effectively to counter such threats to undertake the secret surveillance of subversive elements operating within its jurisdiction. The Court has therefore to accept that the existence of some legislation granting powers of secret surveillance over mail, post and telecommunications is, under exceptional circumstances, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and/or for the prevention of disorder or crime.
If that right of surveillance is abused by a public authority or if it constitutes an unlimited discretion, it would undermine or even destroy our democracy on the grounds of defending it.
In the Malone case, the European court held against the British Government on the grounds that the protection from that abuse of power in the United Kingdom rested not in law but on administrative procedures which, although hallowed by Home Secretary after Home Secretary and Government after Government, were founded not on the expression of law but on the reiteration of administrative practice. For that reason, not for a sudden perception of the importance of statutory control, we have the Bill today.
It is noteworthy that when the Home Secretary introduced the Bill he never once referred to the Malone case or to the fact that as recently as 1981 his predecessor specifically ruled out any question of placing the control of abuse on a statutory basis.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Does my hon. Friend agree that a reason why the Home Secretary did not mention the Malone case was that the Bill palpably fails to meet the circumstances of the Malone case? Indeed, with the rules of evidence and questioning which are introduced in the Bill, Mr. Malone would never have found out that his telephone was tapped because his counsel could not have asked the question that led to that discovery.

Mr. Maclennan: I agree with my hon. and learned Friend. I intended to turn to that point.
Today's debate was preceded by a trailer—the public exchange about the revelations of Miss Massiter in the television programme that was made for Channel 4. The debate might have been different if that trailer had never been shown. It is common ground, at least among those who have had responsibility of Government, that surveillance is a necessary defence of the state, that there must be discretion, albeit within limits, and that it is appropriate for some form of scrutiny to take place. What has given the debate its sharpness and partisan character, which was shown in the speeches of the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) and of the Home Secretary himself, is the fact that the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary reacted to the revelations, not with any recognition of the public anxiety, but in a partisan and inappropriate way. Whether the revelations are true or false, they are serious and should have been subjected to proper and searching scrutiny and examination.
The inquiry by Lord Bridge was inevitably incomplete because he was told to limit the scope to cases where authorisation had been or should have been given by Ministers. Certain matters were specifically ruled out and, therefore, Ministers cannot be surprised that their assertions are regarded as inadequate. The matter is not irrelevant to the provisions of the Bill. The Bill proposes that we should establish a commissioner with powers similar to those at present exercised by Lord Bridge. The adequacy of those provisions must be tested by our experience of how they have worked in practice. The fact that they have palpably not worked in the present case must make us question the adequacy of the provisions relating to the establishment of a commissioner.
A Bill is certainly needed, but this Bill falls far short of what is required to protect the public from abuse of the Secretary of State's discretionary power to order surveillance. The Home Secretary claimed three things for the Bill — first, that it does not widen the scope of existing powers. That is clearly not true. The Bill widens those powers extensively in several respects, including the duration of the warrant. He said that the Bill is clear and comprehensive. It must be said that it is neither; it is not clear with respect to the powers enjoyed by the tribunal. That is one of the most important defects of the Bill with which the Home Secretary will have to deal in Committee.
As I read the Bill, and as I believe all outside commentators have read it, the tribunal will not be allowed to examine whether the Secretary of State, in exercising his powers under clause 2, was right in his judgment that it was necessary to do so for the public interest as defined in clause 2. It will be impossible for the tribunal or anyone to stand over the Secretary of State's shoulder and question his subjective judgment that the issuance of the warrant was necessary. That is a crucial question in determining whether the tribunal has effective powers of scrutiny.
That leads me to the third test which the Secretary of State put forward.

Mr. Kevin Barron: Has the hon. Gentleman read schedule 1(4), which states:
It shall be the duty of every person holding office under the Crown to disclose or give to the Tribunal such documents or information as they may require for the purpose of enabling them to carry out their functions under this Act"?
Is that not wide enough to cover everyone who might have to give evidence and information to the tribunal?

Mr. Maclennan: I doubt whether the tribunal has powers of subpoena. They are certainly not spelt out. If it does not, it should have. The procedural limitations on the role of the tribunal vitiate its effectiveness and make it unlikely that it will be able to grant effective redress. The House cannot regard that lightly, because the European convention requires that effective redress be given to the individual. Article 13 mentions "effective domestic remedies", but I do not believe that the Bill provides effective remedies.
In exercising the right to order surveillance, it is inevitable that wide considerations will move the minds of Secretaries of State who have that power. That is why I am sceptical about at least two of the proposals that have been put forward as methods of controlling the exercise of the power. The first proposal, which is to follow the practice in the United States, is that the issuance of a

warrant will be acceptable only if it is done judicially—by reference to the courts. That is also provided in parts of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. I doubt whether, in practice, where matters of national security are concerned, a judge in this country would put himself in the shoes of a Minister and hold that the Minister's certificate was capable of being challenged in the courts. That is not an effective route.
The second possible route — it was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees), who formerly held the high offices of Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland — is to narrow the grounds on which the power is exercised. I am somewhat sceptical about that, too. The language of the European Convention, which is incorporated in clause 2, is extremely broad. It may not represent the practice of the right hon. Gentleman or other Ministers who have authorised surveillance, but it is probably necessary that it be broad to encompass the circumstances in which it would be proper for a Minister to order surveillance. But it is proper to have those broad categories of powers only if they are qualified by something that is not in the Bill, but which is part of the international law of the European court: that the test of necessity should be applied in interpreting whether the broad powers have been used properly. That is not a subjective test like the one written into clause 2.
A central issue in the debate is that the Bill makes no provision for scrutinising whether a Secretary of State in issuing the warrant acted proportionately to the end to be achieved and whether the interference was necessary to achieve the intended objective. That test must be written into the Bill, and the power of objective scrutiny must be given to the tribunal and to the commissioner if we are to rely on the third and proper route, to ensure that Ministers do not abuse their powers of telephone tapping and surveillance, which is the effective ex-post facto scrutiny of what has happened. It is unreasonable to seek to fetter the discretion of a Minister who must deal with great issues of state, including the threats of terrorism and serious crime, and threats to the economic well-being of the country, by saying in advance that he can operate only in certain narrow categories of circumstances. But we must have a guarantee that, after the event, his actions can be examined objectively.
How can that best be done? Not, in my view, by the strange provisions of the Bill: establishing by letters patent —in other words, on the say-so of the Prime Minister—a tribunal which may hear complaints from those who, by chance, suspect that their telephones have been interfered with. It is proposed to ask five lawyers to join the tribunal. I doubt whether that can be regarded as an appropriate organisation.
When considering what is appropriate, it is sensible to examine what has happened in other countries. I draw the Government's attention to the experience in the Federal Republic of Germany, which was approved by the European Court of Human Rights in the Klass case. In Germany, two bodies are responsible for scrutinising surveillance powers. The first is a parliamentary body drawn from the Bundestag in proportion to the representation of political parties, which represents the senior voices of the West German parliament. That body in turn appoints the equivalent of the commissioner proposed in the Bill. The Federal Government do not themselves appoint a commissioner, as would happen here


if the Bill became law. In Germany, a man of high judicial office assisted by two lay assessors is empowered by parliamentary appointment to investigate the complaints of individuals, that they have been subjected to unjustifiable interception. I realise that systems are different and that our parliamentary system of scrutiny, of ministerial discretions has grown up quite differently from that of the Federal German Republic, and the two experiences are not wholly interchangeable. However, I believe that there is merit in considering a system of external scrutiny which is established by Members of Parliament, although answerable to the Prime Minister and to members of the Government. I commend that procedure to the House for further deliberation in Committee.

Mr. James Callaghan: I fully agree with the last sentiment of the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan). I do not intend to take up much time in view of the wide-ranging and powerful speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees).
The debate raises in an old form the never-ending conflicting questions of security and civil liberty, or security versus civil liberty, and accountability and secrecy, or accountability versus secrecy. The job of the House is to try to strike the right balance between the two, and Ministers must be constantly called to account in the exercise of responsibilities in these matters. There is no ideal answer. It is a question of drawing a balance between the two conflicting sets of questions.
I believe that when the Bill is on the statute book, for whatever reason it was introduced, much responsibility will still attach to the Home Secretary and to the director of MI5 for the way in which it is operated, and Parliament will never be able wholly to call either of them to account. On balance, the statute, I think, will be a help.
The Home Secretary made some play about the fact that he is introducing the Bill and that the Labour Government had not done so. The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows the reasons for that, and I shall not go into them.
I take the view that the fact that we are making unauthorised telephone tapping a criminal offence must of itself be a gain. If any officer in MI5 has been minded to tap a telephone, up to this moment, if it were known, I assume that he has been subjected only to some disciplinary procedures. From now on, he will be committing a criminal offence and can be subjected to a severe fine or on indictment to a period of imprisonment. That must be a gain, and I do not think that it is possible to say otherwise.
Likewise, with all the defects of the tribunal and the commissioner, they are a long-stop which I believe will be of some benefit. I do not think that in any way they solve the great problems outlined in the first part of my speech. They are a long-stop and, therefore, are themselves of some value.
I do not regard the Bill, however, as being of supreme value — nor, I suppose, does the Home Secretary. Indeed, my guess is that by the time we reach Third Reading he will be very sorry that he has had to introduce the Bill because the number of amendments that can and will be attempted to be written into such a Bill are manifold.
The Bill is an attempt to legislate for something that hitherto has been exercised by the Home Secretary in my

view with responsibility, with care and with due recognition of the conflict between civil liberty and security and between accountability and secrecy. Therefore, I feel that in this, as in other fields, an attempt to legislate will involve the Home Secretary—not that I should weep any tears about it — in a tremendous problem by the time that he has finished.
I wish to make one or two comments about certain provisions of the Bill. First, I believe that there would be an advantage — because, in my judgment, Ministers should not get too intimately concerned with the affairs of MI5 — in having some independent discussion between the head of MI5 and a group of outsiders, whom I will not define more closely than that at present, about the objectives, targets and priorities of MI5 from time to time and, indeed, fairly regularly. After all, although there is a great deal of fantasising about it, MI5 at present has a limited number of people at its disposal. The idea that thousands of people are wandering round gathering information is absurd. There is a limited number and in my experience — although I agree that it is now nearly 20 years since I was Home Secretary, and the practice may have changed — it is the director of MI5 who broadly decides the targets, priorities and objectives. He may be the most estimable man in the world, but for him to act on his own, or at least in concert with his senior officials, all of them in a rather enclosed society, is not to my mind the best way to aim at and secure the right targets or, indeed, to determine the correct priorities.
It is said in the film, of which I have read the transcript, that the CND was first made a subject of surveillance—not of interception, according to the film — and then in 1981 it was taken out. I assume that that was done on the judgment of the director of MI5, if the statement in the film is correct. I think that there is a great deal to be said for having a group of people with a broader understanding of the ebb and flow of political activity in the country who can at regular intervals discuss with the director of MI5 why he has chosen certain objectives, why he has decided that one matter should be a priority rather than another and why he is concentrating on certain areas. That could only be of value to his work. In my judgment, it might present a better balanced picture to the director of MI5 of what is necessary.
I am not speaking about the security field directly — espionage, the IRA, international terrorism and other such areas — although obviously there might be value in discussions on whether it is right to place a degree of priority on international terrorism as against the IRA, or on the IRA as against some other kind of subversion. I am talking about what the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) referred to earlier today as political activities — the position of the Communist party, the danger of the Communist party. For example, assuming that the Communist party is targeted on the ground that it wishes to overturn parliamentary government in the country, would it be right to target it rather than the Workers' Revolutionary party or some other party which is attempting to subvert the state by overthrowing parliamentary government?
I am sure that the director of MI5 has his views about these matters, but in my view it would be wholesome and healthy if there were others with a political judgment to bring to bear — not, I think, judges or Law Lords, but people with some experience of politics, and I guess that


some could be found. Such people could have discussions not only with the director of MI5 but with the Prime Minister or, indeed, the Home Secretary.
Although the Bill is not directly concerned with this aspect of the matter but is concerned, as I recognise and said in an earlier intervention, with interception in the broadest sense, the issues that have been raised as a result of the Bill and the things that have been said demand that public confidence should be satisfied. I believe that there is something to be said for the idea that I have put forward.
I think that there is a case for dissatisfied officers having another outlet apart from the director of MI5. I heard what the Home Secretary said, and I fully recognise that it is their job, if they are dissatisfied on certain matters, to go to the director. We have seen two cases recently, if not three. Two cases were mentioned in the film, there is the case of Mr. Bettaney and there have been others. In these cases, the people who have been concerned have been unable to find a suitable outlet for their disquiet.
The security services are essential and nothing that I am saying is intended to derogate in one jot or tittle from their responsibilities or morale. Rather, my remarks are intended to make it easier for them to operate, with the full assent of the people. It is important for officers who find themselves operating in a semi-political field and who are dissatisfied to have a further opportunity to consult, and that is why I suggested the commissioner. I appreciate the Home Secretary's objection to that suggestion, but he should consider some other way of meeting what has become a problem in this area. It must have adversely affected the morale of MI5 to have had the two recent cases.
I thought that the suggestion of the hon. Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw) of an inspectorate was going along the path that might be traversed. How it should be devised must be a matter for close consideration and I would not think of suggesting a final answer now. The Home Secretary rather ruled out my suggestion, and I am not sure whether he was in his place to hear the suggestion of the hon. Member for Stroud. Suffice it to say that a problem exists and that it must receive close consideration.
The Bill represents an improvement but not a solution. Indeed, I doubt whether there ever will be a solution. Even when the measure is passed, everything will finally come back to the discretion of the Home Secretary and the integrity with which he discharges his task. There is no need to doubt that integrity in any Home Secretary, past, present or future. The Home Secretary has a difficult task to perform. He should not interfere too closely in the affairs of MI5.
Party politicians, even when Home Secretaries, can misuse information, although I do not believe that that has been the case. However, I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South that it was a grave error on the part of the Government, in setting up DS19, to try, if they did, to use information gained by MI5 for their own purposes in combating CND.
That, if it happened, was going beyond the proper remit and ambit of an exchange of information. I hope that it will not happen again, if it happened then, and I am glad that the unit has been wound up.
The Bill represents a slight advantage. It will introduce some elements of safeguard in that the tapping of a

telephone without a warrant will be a crime. I repeat, however, that the most important safeguards that we have at the end of the day are the integrity of the Home Secretary and the knowledge, understanding and firmness of principle of the director of MI5. They cannot be replaced by any statute, no matter what it might say.
If the Prime Minister decides to appoint someone from outside, that should not be taken as a slur on MI5, as the hon. Member for Stroud pointed out. It may be thought that there is no one from within who entirely fits the bill. We have had no hesitation in appointing people from outside to other occupations, and there is no reason why MI5 should be exempt in that respect.
It is important to maintain MI5's morale, which has been shaken by recent events. Our job is to strengthen its morale, but at the same time to ensure that neither its officers nor Government go beyond what we believe to be the correct balance between the security of the state and the civil liberty of our people. In the end, MI5 is about the civil liberty of our people. That must be protected. MI5 should not misjudge its remit. Nor should we hamper its activities.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The House will have been struck by the contrast between the speeches of the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) — a clever, facile and secondhand speech — and those of the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) and the right hon. Member for Morely and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees).
While the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South was speaking, I heard a remark from below the Gangway opposite to the effect that the Home Secretary could be deceived. Hon. Members should remember that one can perhaps fool a weak Home Secretary about some things for much of the time and about many things for some of the time, but one cannot possibily fool a diligent Home Secretary about everything all the time.
I agree with the central point made by the right hon. Members for Cardiff, South and Penarth and for Morley and Leeds, South that, at the end of the day, this House must trust the Home Secretary. We have no alternative. He is accountable to Parliament and he must exercise his discretion maintaining the difficult balance between liberty and accountability, secrecy and freedom, and it is right that we should put on record that we have had good reason to trust all our Home Secretaries. I include in that the present Home Secretary. In trusting them and allowing them to perform their difficult task we thereby strength the morale of the security service, on which a great deal depends.
My interest in this matter has developed over about 25 years. I knew of Burgess and Maclean in Washington. I did not know when I met them that they were traitors. They were men of charm and high intakes of liquid. Subsequently, from time to time, though not closely, I also knew Kim Philby. I did not know then that he was a spy.
I was told subsequently by people in the American security service that a fourth man was spying in Britain and I pursued that matter closely, inquiring into it at the highest level of politics and security in this country. I was told that there was nothing in the story. In fact, we were wrong and the Americans were right. Anthony Blunt was the fourth man.
Since then I have followed these issues as closely as it is possible for an hon. Member to follow them—and as one who has links with the police service in Britain — and I have no doubt that at any time there is a persistent attempt to spy on this country, to sell its secrets and to subvert its freedom. The Bill must be seen against the background that we are facing, whether or not we like it, a continuing attack on our liberties by those who wish to destroy us.
I support the Bill, as one who at one time had his telephone tapped. I support the Bill because it will clarify the law, because it will regularise the procedures under which this disagreeable but necessary activity is to be allowed and because it will provide important and new safeguards.
Most of all, I support the Bill for the larger reason that it will help to tackle the threats to our society from terrorism; from trafficking in drugs, which is often used to finance terrorism; from the increasing problem of assassination, which is used as a method of achieving political change; and because there is a continuing risk from abroad to our democracy.
I have over the last three or four years been able to make some study of terrorism and I should like to indicate to the House one or two of the things that I have discovered. They may well be known to other hon. Members.
Looking simply at those acts in which terrorists have crossed international frontiers and used weapons, explosives or funds that originated in other countries, there have been, since 1970, 3,400 separate such incidents. These have included 1,800 that involved the use of explosives, more than 300 hijacks of aircraft, close to 200 kidnappings and perhaps 85 or 86 assassinations of political leaders or diplomats, the most conspicuous recently being the assassination of Indira Gandhi in India.
Among the heads of state who have been assassinated in the past 10 years are the President of Bangladesh, the head of state of Nigeria, the Presidents of Afghanistan, Yemen, South Korea and Liberia, and so on. Also, some 23 ambassadors have been assassinated in their posts.
The worst feature of terrorism almost certainly is bombing. Bombs are easy to make and can be and are planted without the terrorist himself running any risk of detection. What happened at the Grand hotel in Brighton is clear enough evidence of this, and the same goes for the majority of the 8,000 or more bombings that have taken place since 1969.
The hijacking of aircraft comes second in the league table of terrorist incidents. I have here a record of some 300 aircraft hijacks and, despite the relative success that we have had over the past 10 years in reducing the incidence of hijacking of aircraft through new surveillance systems, including the telephone tap, terrorists now have found a way round these techniques.
Two recent incidents—in both of which the bags had been thoroughly examined before the passengers boarded the aircraft but nevertheless hijacks took place — were founded on the simple fact that the terrorists had been able to carry on board their so-called duty-free bottles of liquid. In fact, those bottles contained in one case petrol and in the other diesel oil. They were mixed in the lavatory, an appropriate wick was put in and the terrorists then had Molotov cocktails. They doused some of the passengers with petrol, walked up and down with a lighted copy of a newspaper, and by that act they were able to have their own way. Hijacking is still a serious matter.
So, too, is kidnapping. About 1,800 people have been kidnapped for political purposes in the past five years. And so the problem goes on.
As the terrorists develop their onslaught on civilised society, two other developments can be seen. First, their technology improves. Secondly, their international cooperation increases all the time. The rifle that killed President Kennedy was fired from a distance of 200 paces. That meant that the area of search for the police and security people was perhaps 1 square mile. Today there are available to terrorists through the arsenals of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO precision guided missiles which can be fired from a stand-off position of some three or four miles. They will literally go round corners and they have a 90 per cent. guarantee of killing. The consequence of that advance in technology is that the search area which the security services must clear when guarding against such an attack—at the inauguration of a president or at the Cenotaph in Whitehall — has been very greatly increased.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Griffiths: No, not for the moment.
The dilemma that I am putting to the House is this. Technology is assisting the terrorist and making more difficult every day the counter-efforts of the security services. That is precisely why it would be madness to seek to take away from the security services the technology of telephone surveillance in trying to prevent the murders, bombings and assassinations that threaten our society. It is in that light that I wish to refute the murmurs and, indeed, the comments that I have heard in the House and read in the press that it is totally wrong to permit, or even to regularise, the tapping of telephones. The issue is simply how—

Mr. John McWilliam: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for an hon. Gentleman to accuse hon. Members of the Opposition of not wishing to legalise telephone tapping when I successfully tabled an amendment in Committee to the British Telecommunications Bill in 1981, supported by hon. Members on both sides?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman knows that that is a point of information, not a point of order for me.

Mr. Griffiths: I turn now to the Bill. My main concern is whether, by its complexity, it might hobble the security service. I have listened very carefully to what has been said. I certainly go along with what the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth said about the need for the director of MI5 to have access from time to time to some other body for advice, for an incestuous or even monastic quality can develop in that organisation. The idea of an inspectorate put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw) should be considered very carefully by the Government.
What I find attractive about this Bill is that for the first time it makes it illegal for anybody improperly to intercept communications in the public system. It is something of a surprise to discover that there has never before been such an offence of general application in our law. Postmen and the staff of public telecommunication systems have long been liable to prosecution for improper interception, but until today there has been no specific proposal for the


statute book to contain a single, comprehensive offence applying to everybody irrespective of who he is or who he works for. This Bill now provides that, and I welcome it.
Secondly, the legislation sets out the grounds on which interception can be authorised. It is surprising that the statute book has never before set out these grounds. The Bill lays down the form in which warrants must be issued, how they must be handled and when they must be reexamined if they are not to lapse. It ensures that all decisions to issue warrants must be, as they always have been, personal to the Secretary of State. There can be no delegating and no passing of the buck.
Thirdly, the Bill establishes entirely new safeguards. These are a crucial element in creating the confidence that the public needs to feel whenever we enact legislation of this kind. The tribunal not only has the ability to adjudicate on decisions taken by the Secretary of State but can also offer means of redress. It can, if it thinks fit, quash the warrant in question and award compensation against the Secretary of State.

Mr. Barron: That is right.

Mr. Griffiths: Indeed it is. I am glad to have the hon. Gentleman's support. That is a real advance and I should have hoped that the Opposition, in those circumstances, would welcome the Bill instead of seeking to nit-pick it to death.

Mr. Robin Corbett: We have tabled a reasoned amendment.

Mr. Griffiths: That is one way of putting it. No doubt the hon. Gentleman will make his point later.
I should like to conclude with this general point.
There are continuous, organised and dangerous efforts to spy out the secrets of the state. Similar organised and continuous efforts are made to spread subversion and to penetrate the apparatus of the Government and work of high security.
Those are the words of the Birkett report, under which successive Governments have operated. Against the background of the crime, violence, terrorism and assassination that we see today, I do not think that anyone can doubt that those words of Lord Birkett in 1957 are even more applicable today.
The point that the Home Secretary had to make bears repeating to the House. The police in England and Wales estimate that in the past 10 years they have been able to make more than 5,000 arrests to recover more than £40 million worth of stolen property and to seize drugs valued at over £50 million as a result of interception. Anyone who knows the situation in Northern Ireland would agree that if those have been the fruits of authorised interception in England and Wales, many lives have been saved and many terrorist incidents have been prevented by the proper use of interception in Northern Ireland.
I hope very much that in Committee there will be some amendments to the Bill. One amendment that I would support, if I had the misfortune to serve on the Committee—and, frankly I shall do my utmost to avoid it because the Home Secretary may regret—

Mr. Alex Carlile: But the Committee will be on the Floor of the House.

Mr. Griffiths: In that case, I shall have opportunity to make a contribution in Committee, although I do not believe that that decision has been taken yet, and I doubt that the Bill will be taken on the Floor.
Nevertheless there will be some amendments and one that I would support is the clearing up of the economic dimension—I am not sure that I know what that means — and the clearing up of clause 3, as well as the question whether the members of the tribunal will be able to bullyrag practitioners while they are on the job. Restrospection is one thing. Involving themselves in the day-to-day workings of the service while it is conducting investigations is a very different matter.
I detected in the Opposition — not throughout the Opposition, as I know that there are different views and wide experience on the matter — a collective sigh of relief when they came to this Bill. At long last they can get into the open ground of attacking our so-called secret police. They spent much of the past year attacking the police over the miners' strike for being a paramilitary force, a national force, a Conservative party force and a brutal force. All those allegations have been shown not to be true. But, now that the miners' strike has come to an end, thanks in large measure to the actions of the police in upholding civil liberty, the Opposition cannot wait to create the new demonology of something called the secret police and telephone tappers.
I understand the politics of why they are doing that. However, I hope that they will listen to the wisdom and experience of the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South and the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South, and Penarth. Both spoke with knowledge, not prejudice.

Mr. Ian Mikardo: I always try to begin any speech by following the usual practice of the courtesy of the House by referring to the speech of the person who spoke before me. However, on this occasion I cannot comment on the speech of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) because it consisted of nothing but what Mr. Punch used to call a glimpse of the obvious. There is no point in the hon. Gentleman holding forth about the necessity to use powers of invigilation, surveillance and interception against terrorists, kidnappers, assassins, drug pushers and people undertaking other serious crimes because there is no dissent in any quarter of the House from the proposition that it is right to use all possible methods for dealing with such crimes and with any threat to the state from hostile forces outside the state. There is no argument about that.
The reason why the hon. Gentleman could not name a single one of the persons who he says have been opposing telephone tapping for any purposes whatever is that the whole lot of them are figments of his fevered imagination. We all admire the splendid job he does in earning the lolly that he gets from the Police Federation. Nobody wants to interfere with a chap, a working man, earning his living. So we are always very tolerant of him, and I shall therefore pass on without further comment.
The hon. Gentleman knows as well as I and every other Member of the House that the Bill has been introduced not because of the unhappy increase in the incidence of drug pushing, assassinations or aircraft hijacks. There is only one reason why the Government have brought in the Bill, and we all know it. It is absolutely clear. They have


reluctantly brought in the Bill only because they were compelled to do so by the condemnation of the European Court of Human Rights. Without that condemnation, we would not have the Bill. They have brought in a Bill that does the absolute minimum necessary to push aside that condemnation of the European court, instead of a Bill dealing seriously with the problem of safeguarding the rights of non-criminal citizens against the ever-increasing arbitrary powers of the state apparatus, which is the sort of Bill that they should have introduced.
It is pretty clear that the Home Secretary does not understand the problem at all. Whenever he is challenged on any aspect of this multifarious problem, he always falls back on the assertion that he has never acted improperly in authorising a warrant for a telephone tap. Recently, he got Lord Bridge to confirm that assertion. For my part, I do not need Lord Bridge's confirmation. I have never doubted for a moment that the right hon. and learned Gentleman and all his predecessors have always acted, in respect of the authorisation of telephone taps, with absolute and total probity.
The problem is not phone taps authorised by the Secretary of State; it is the very much larger number of phone taps that are made without any application for an authorisation, perhaps because it was known that an application might be refused by a Home Secretary acting properly. The much larger number of phone taps made without application for authorisation have absolutely nothing to do with serious crime or a threat from enemies of the state abroad. Telephone taps concerning those matters are applied for because the authorisation will be given. The ones that are done without authorisation are virtually by definition those that are not concerned with the security of the state or serious crime. If the Home Secretary does not know about that, he is very much alone and very much an innocent abroad.
Annex 2 of the White Paper shows that in 1984 there were 581 unauthorised taps. The number of people involved in the work is just over 400, so on average each of them did one telephone tap every nine months. That is not a high level of productivity for a Government who are always going on about the need to increase productivity. The most elementary arithmetic leads to the conclusion that 581 taps are only a small fraction of the total number of interceptions.

Mr. McWilliam: Will my hon. Friend reflect on the fact that the people making the taps are now employed by private enterprise? What does he think the attitude of private enterprise would be to that level of productivity compared to the attitude of the state by whom the people were employed previously?

Mr. Mikardo: That is a subject on which I hesitate to speak, because I have no authority so to do. I do not have enough knowledge to make a serious, authoritative comment on that question. I hope that my hon. Friend will catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because many hon. Members, not on this side alone, are well aware that almost certainly he knows more about the technology of these matters than any other hon. Member. I am sure that his contribution to the proceedings on the Bill will be valuable.
The Home Secretary's ignorance of what is happening is exposed further when he keeps on telling us that no hon. Member is having his telephone tapped. When he says

that, he is saying something that he does not know. All he knows is that he has not authorised a tap on the telephone of any hon. Member, but there is, unhappily, good reason to believe that there is eavesdropping on some of our telephones. In his starry-eyed ignorance of what is going on all round him the Home Secretary reminds me forcibly of the man who for 19 years played the piano on the ground floor of a honky-tonk without finding out that the upstairs floor was a brothel.
The Home Secretary has told us that under the Bill unauthorised tapping will be a breach of the law. I suppose that that will help a bit, but hon. Members are wrong if they take that as total security for citizens. The security forces often behave as though they are above the law. They defy existing laws with impunity as, for example, when they break into a house or an office to plant a bug or to steal papers. They regard that as part of their normal day's business. If they are prepared to defy and violate present laws, why should anyone think that they will feel obliged to obey this law if and when we pass it?

Mr. Jonathan Sayeed: Will the hon. Gentleman cite some evidence for all the assertions he is making?

Mr. Mikardo: I have a great deal of evidence for what I am saying. I am prepared to give that evidence to a Minister. I have offered it and the offer has not been accepted. I have knowledge about the telephones of Members of Parliament being tapped.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: Let us have it.

Mr. Mikardo: I shall claim the same privilege as the Minister. I am not giving information in public about particular cases. If he has that right, so have I.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Giles Shaw): The House has listened with fascination to the hon. Gentleman's allegation. He no doubt heard my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary say that all the allegations that have been brought to his attention in relation to the unauthorised use of the powers of surveillance services have been examined. If the hon. Gentleman has such evidence, and would like to give it to a Minister, I should be delighted to receive it.

Mr. Mikardo: I shall be happy to tell the Minister of an occasion on which somehow an employers' organisation knew of the decision of a trade union about the bottom figure at which it would be prepared to settle in a wage negotiation. I have evidence of other breaches as well. If the Minister sends me an invitation to talk to him about these matters, I shall gladly accept it.

Mr. McWilliam: Perhaps I can help my hon. Friend. On page 161, of the now unavailable book "Operation Julie", the head of the operation, Inspector Dick Lee, explained how he avoided routine police channels and persuaded an unnamed organisation to tap a suspect's telephone. I put that on the record for my hon. Friend.

Mr. Mikardo: When the time comes, we shall deal with it. I promise hon. Members that I shall not run away from the challenge. I have never run away from a challenge in the years I have been in the House, and I will not do it now.
Another serious defect of the Bill is that it does nothing to protect people against interception of communications by means other than the post or the telephone. As I have


said, there are bugs put into houses and offices. Bugs are planted in motor cars and in hotel bedrooms. British and other west European business men going to do business in Moscow used to regale each other in the aeroplane on the way there with stories of the consequences of their hotel bedrooms in Moscow having had bugs planted in them. There are hordes of funny stories on the subject. We now know that hotel rooms in Great Britain are bugged as well. Direction-finding listening devices can be beamed into a room from a vehicle parked a couple of hundred of yards down the road.
The plain fact of the matter is that this country is rapidly falling victim to some of the practices of a police state. It is becoming increasingly difficult for us to deliver curtain lectures to other Governments about basket III of the Helsinki final act without being conscious of the mote and the beam. Let me illustrate that by pointing out some comparative examples. I have already mentioned phone tapping that takes place here, as it does in totalitarian countries, and the bugging of hotel bedrooms. There are other examples. In the Soviet Union any opposition to Government policy automatically ranks as subversion and can, therefore, be treated as a crime. Recently in Great Britain a Government representative and a judge both claimed that opposition to Government policy automatically ranked as subversion, and, therefore, could be treated as a crime. In the Soviet Union—

Mr. Sayeed: rose—

Mr. Mikardo: No, I am not giving way. I want to draw to a close. Other hon. Members want to speak. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
In the Soviet Union a man can be denied employment, and often is, in the public sector solely because of his political beliefs. In Great Britain a man can be denied employment in some parts of the public sector solely because of his political beliefs. I should have thought that Conservative Members would be as offended by all this as I am. I do not know why they seek to defend it.
In the Soviet Union a man can be convicted of a crime by a single judge on the basis of evidence given only by a bribed police informer. In one part of the United Kingdom, a man can be convicted of a crime by a single judge on the basis of evidence given only by a bribed police informer.
In the Soviet Union some completely innocent people are prevented from travelling outside their own gubernya. Recently, in Great Britain, some completely innocent people were prevented from travelling outside their own county.
In the Soviet Union some people cannot even get to their own homes without showing their identity cards. In one part of Great Britain, people will have difficulty getting to their homes without showing their identity cards.
In the Soviet Union restrictions on movement within, and out of, the country are applied discriminately against some ethnic groups. In the United Kingdom restrictions on movement into the country are applied discriminately against some ethnic groups
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) reminded the House, in the Soviet Union, public servants who query Government policy can

be recommended for psychiatric examination. In Great Britain recently, at least two public servants who queried Government policy were recommended for psychiatric examination.
In the Soviet Union the Government withhold from the people any information that might show up their leaders in a bad light. Recently in Great Britain the Government have withheld from the people some information that might have shown up their leaders in a bad light.
In the Soviet Union politicians addressing their party conferences make use of information winkled out by the security snoopers. In Great Britain one Minister, addressing a gathering of members of his party, has made use of information winkled out by the security snoopers.
I have a final example. The Soviet Union has refused to sign the United Nations convention on torture. Great Britain has refused to sign the United Nations convention on torture.
We in Great Britain detest the suppression of human rights and civil liberties in the totalitarian countries, but increasingly we show our detestation of these practices by copying them. We have not yet reached the high level of tyranny that has been reached, for example, in South Africa, Chile or the Soviet Union, but we are learning fast and we are catching up fast. Great Britain has managed to get itself condemned by the European Court of Human Rights more times than any other country. I see that the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Cash) enjoys that. Perhaps he is proud of the fact.
We need a Bill to begin reversing that awful process instead of this pathetic and ineffective measure, which will do nothing to offset serious breaches in the rights of ordinary, decent non-criminal citizens.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence: I always consider it a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Bow and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) because he is a very senior Member of the House. He sits with me on the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and we have a fair bit in common on a number of issues. Therefore, it saddened me to hear him being so paranoid when he addressed the House on this subject. One gets the feeling that some hon. Members are upset that they are not considered important enough to have their telephones tapped. The hon. Member for Bow and Poplar said that Members of Parliament are having their telephones tapped, but when he was asked for evidence on this at this late hour he talked about employers bugging some trade unions. That has nothing to do with Members of Parliament.
There may be a lot of bugging. I have no doubt that as the methods that are cheaply available are far more widely developed and the electronic apparatus is improved, more and more people will engage in bugging. The first question whether the state is doing so, and the second whether the state can stop the activity without the need to resort to a police state. That itself would be counter-productive and undesirable as a means of monitoring what is happening elsewhere.
The hon. Member for Bow and Poplar read out an absurd list of comparisons between this country and the Soviet Union. I shall mention just three as the hon. Member was going so fast that I could not get them all down. He said that identity cards are being used here in the same way as they are used in the Soviet Union. The identity cards that I think that the hon. Gentleman is


referring to are to help the residents of Molesworth to get home. They are not there to stop the residents of Molesworth from getting home, which is the purpose of identity cards in some other states.

Mr. Mikardo: Comrade Ivan must know that that is what the Russians say that they are doing.

Mr. Lawrence: The hon. Gentleman knows that when the Russians say that, it is not true. Perhaps he should ask the residents of Molesworth, who want to be able to get home, whether they would prefer to be able to do so or be prevented from doing so. The procedure is just to make it easier for law-abiding citizens to go about their ordinary lawful ways. The hon. Gentleman knows that one of our criticisms is that that is not what happens in the Soviet Union.
The hon. Member for Bow and Poplar talked about recommendations to psychiatric help. That may or may not have happened, but there is the world of difference between recommending critics of the regime to have psychiatric help and forcing them to do so even when it is not justified, which is what is happening in the Soviet Union.
The hon. Gentleman also said that in the Soviet Union a person can be convicted on the bribed information of a paid informer. Perhaps that does happen, but in this country nobody can be convicted on such evidence alone, unless a jury of 12 good men and true is convinced that that is the appropriate way to deal with the problem. When one examines them, there is not a great deal of merit in some of the rather more paranoid utterances of the hon. Member for Bow and Poplar. He greatly amuses the House and is greatly respected, but he sometimes goes over the top, and this is one of the subjects on which he does so.
The only disturbing thing about the debate is that Her Majesty's official Opposition are against the Bill. The most positive action that the Government have taken and will take to strengthen civil liberties is opposed by the Opposition.
That the Bill does not deal in one swift, all-embracing, legislative swoop with every single unjustified infrintement of the liberty of the individual in an increasingly complex and vulnerable society, is no reason for voting against it. That it may not be yet the most perfect tool for accomplishing the end that it seeks, is no reason to vote against it.
This is the first serious attempt to put into statute form a protective set of principles and rules in favour of citizens and against the insidious power of the state encroaching on the privacy of our lives. It is there for all to see and to know exactly what it contains and what their rights are, and for independent watchdogs to monitor these activities. I would have thought that all libertarians of all parties would support this Bill. However, Her Majesty's Opposition — I have listened to most, if not all of their speeches—seem to be opposed to it.

Mr. Clive Soley: The hon. and learned Gentleman is supposed to be a lawyer. I warn him that he will soon be added to the list of lawyers whom I would pay not to defend me. Almost everthing that he has said has been factually wrong. It is factually wrong to say that we intend to vote against the Bill. The hon. and learned Gentleman should at least be able to read the Order Paper and understand what is written on it.

Mr. Lawrence: I listened with great interest to the speech of the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman). If that was a speech in favour of the Bill, the right hon. Gentleman could have fooled me.

Mr. McWilliam: There is a reasoned amendment.

Mr. Lawrence: There may be a reasoned amendment, but it is directed against the structure of the Bill. That is astonishing, given that the structure of the Bill is in favour of protecting the rights of citizens against the encroaching power of the state.
Perhaps the Labour party is no longer concerned about the freedom and protection of the individual. Certainly when the Labour Government were in office for five years they did nothing to guard the citizen in that respect, while, if the film "20:20 Vision" is anything to go by, they took every opportunity to tap the telephones of trade union leaders. Perhaps moderation and good sense have gone out of the window since Labour's takeover by—

Mr. Merlyn Rees: I wish that the hon. and learned Gentleman had been here to listen to the speeches. He is making a silly party political speech worthy of a barrister with a poor brief. This is not a matter for silly nonsense. The hon. and learned Gentleman has not listened to the debate. We are not going to vote against Second Reading, and we have made it clear that clause 2 needs altering. The hon. and learned Gentleman is debasing the whole debate.

Mr. Lawrence: The right hon. Gentleman is being offensive. Perhaps he does not mean to be. I heard 35 or 40 minutes of his speech, and I found it most interesting. He did not seem to be aware that, under his Government, the Foreign Secretary had powers to protect the economic well-being of the nation. Perhaps I misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman. When I intervened, he said that he had meant only that the Home Secretary did not have such powers. That was very interesting, but it did not advance the argument.
I may be mistaken in saying that the Opposition are voting against the Bill but I am not mistaken when I say that the Opposition speeches — I have heard most of them—show that the Opposition are strongly opposed to the Bill, and that is what I am criticising. It is impossible for anyone who is concerned with the protection of the liberty and the rights of the individual strongly to oppose the Bill. The Bill provides for that protection for the first time in statute form, and makes unauthorised tapping a criminal offence.
If the criticism is that the Bill is not wide enough, that is a reason for supporting it. It is not a reason for opposing it in the way that it has been opposed this evening.
Perhaps the Opposition cannot make up their minds about their attitude to the Bill. Perhaps they do not wish to appear to be moderate. Hon. Member after hon. Member faces reselection by extreme Left-wing committees who do not encourage moderation. I do not know what the reason is, but I am astonished that any hon. Members who believe in the liberty of the individual can speak as strongly as they have against the Bill.
It is clearly in the public interest that for the first time there should be a statutory framework for the protection of the rights of the individual in questions of telephone tapping and postal interception. Nearly everyone must agree that in some circumstances the public interest has to be served by making interceptions. It may be believed that


national security is being breached by espionage or subversion. Serious crimes may be about to be committed, or may have been committed but not yet detected. It may also be necessary to preserve the nation's economic wellbeing.
However, if we believe all that we hear on television, and anecdotal and direct evidence of interferences with individual liberty, we are driven to believe that a gap can arise between the rules laid down by Government and the operations of the interception services or of individuals outside those services. How is that gap to be bridged? It is all very well to criticise a Government for bringing in a Bill to deal with the part of the matter that lies within the Government's sphere of influence, but the right hon. Member for Bow and Poplar suggested no way in which a Government could prevent people outside their control from tapping other people's telephones.
To some extent, the Bill will help to close that gap. Ideally, we should go further. In time we shall do so. However, it is difficult to see how the gap can be closed completely when we are not agreed on the methods necessary to stop all unjustified interference with privacy.
Meanwhile, the Bill is an important step. It does not extend the state's power over the individual; it limits it. I think that the Bill should enjoy the support of both sides of the House. It is not perfect. If Bills were perfect when they were brought in, there would be no need for Committee stage or Report. The Bill needs further thought and attention.
Together with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Fylde (Sir E. Gardner) and the right hon. and learned Member for Warley, West (Mr. Archer), I have the honour to serve on the council of that admirable organisation Justice. Justice has already suggested some improvements. Most of them were taken up by the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton. Indeed, they formed a major part of his speech.
Justice says what the right hon. Gentleman refrained from saying — that the Bill certainly improves the situation. We shall be churlish if we do not admit that that is so. Justice suggests, first, that judicial authority should be obtained for every warrant. I do not agree with that. The Secretary of State will know more about the need for a warrant than any judge, and if a judge said yes to every Secretary of State he would be a mere cipher, and that would be a position unbecoming to the judiciary.
Justice suggests, secondly, that the purpose for which surveillance is required needs to be more precisely defined. I agree with that. Serious crimes should be properly, and more restrictively, defined. Thirdly, Justice suggests that a Bill that allows the manager of a hotel to consent to the surveillance of a resident is defective. I agree with that.
Fourthly, Justice suggests that if he comes upon contraventions against an individual that the individual himself does not know about, the commissioner should inform the tribunal and action should still be taken. Certainly, effective protection would need to involve more than a complaint from a member of the public who is aware of an infringement. That is common sense.
Fifthly, Justice suggests that mistaken material should be destroyed. I agree with that.
Public confidence will be most important in the operation of the law. If there is some doubt about whether

lawyers ought to be chosen by the Government, the lawyers could be chosen by the senate of the Inns of Court, or by the Law Society — [Interruption.] If the Opposition believe that those bodies are politically governed, will they tell me which political party governs them? I do not see why the tribunal should not be selected by independent bodies, subject to the disapproval of the Prime Minister if she knows something that they do not.
We are striving to strike a balance between the security of the state and the freedom of the individual. That task becomes more difficult, but more urgent, as international terrorism grows stronger, assassinations become more frequent and crime becomes more international and ever more serious.
One point at issue between the two sides of the House is whether there should be more public scrutiny by Privy Councillors or a Select Committee, or whether we should trust the judgment of the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretaries of State for Wales or Scotland — improved, as the Bill requires, by the monitoring of a tribunal and a commission. The problem is that the more public scrutiny there is, the greater is the chance of the nation's secrets, whether by espionage or criminal or economic information getting out. If such information is given to a Select Committee or even to Privy Councillors, the chances are that information will get out, not because of malice, dishonesty or impropriety, but because we are constantly under scrutiny and, bit by bit, the media manage to worm things out of us. If such information gets into the hands of the enemy of the state, our security is at risk.

Mr. Austin Mitchell: It occurs to me, as the hon. and learned Gentleman has emphasised the importance of facts derogatory to the economic performance of the country, that it might be useful if the facts about our economic performance got out so that everyone could do as badly as us.

Mr. Lawrence: The hon. Gentleman reminds me of Art Buchwald who once asked at an Oxford union debate why we did not give the Russians our secrets as that would put them three years behind. I do not recommend that doctrine any more than the hon. Gentleman's.
There might be changes and improvements to the Bill to reassure Opposition Members, who might support it, and the public. I am sure that the Government will listen to those suggestions and take the necessary steps to improve it. It is one of the most substantial steps towards the protection of the civil liberties of the individual in recent memory. As such, it deserves the House's support and I hope that it gets it.

Mr. John McWilliam: I am proud to declare my interest as a sponsored member of the National Communications Union (Engineering Section), which was formerly the Post Office Engineering Union. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) has left, as there are a couple of points that I should have liked to put to him had he been here.
I should like to put clearly on record my union's stance on interception of communications and then make a couple of points for myself. I cannot deny that interceptions are sometimes made by members of my union. The National Communications Union welcomes the Government's


recognition of the need to introduce legislation in respect of the interception of communications. Indeed, it has campaigned since 1980 for a precise statutory basis for such interceptions.
In 1981, I managed to amend the British Telecommunications Bill in Committee, but when it came to the Floor of the House several hon. Members, such as the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) and the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, who have said that they have not had an opportunity to vote for a controlled statutory basis, voted against my amendment. I have checked the Division list. They voted in favour of the Government's amendment which removed the statutory basis. It is not true to say that hon. Members who have been here since 1979 have not had an opportunity to put the interception of communications on a proper statutory basis. The then Home Secretary, who has been translated to another place, told us, "Everything is all right, lads. There is no problem. Vote this one down; we do not need it," when he knew that the Government were in trouble in the European Court of Human Rights and likely to be clobbered by the Malone judgment. I leave it to Conservative Members to examine their consciences and to consider where this new-found enthusiasm for legislation has come from. I include the Home Secretary and several others in that criticism.
My union acknowledges the important role of telephone tapping and the interception of mail in combating crime and espionage. However, it is important that there should be safeguards against the misuse of such powers, those involved being accountable to law. That is where the Bill begins to fall down. Our members take a professional pride in their work. We welcome a statutory framework which clarifies matters and assures my members' integrity in the eyes of the public. Such assurances must be called for increasingly with the privatisation of British Telecom. No longer is tapping to be carried out by a public corporation because it is now a private company.
With the liberalisation and diversification of the communications industry, which the Government have encouraged, more private companies have potentially become involved in the interception of communications. Mercury, cellular radio consortia and cable television companies have all become involved since the Telecommunications Act 1984 was passed, and with none of the safeguards that used to exist when the dear old Post Office engineers were established civil servants and subject to the discipline code of the Civil Service. They are now subject only to the profit motive of their employers.
Two significant events have increased the pressure on the Government. One is the Malone case, on which 18 judges declared unanimously that the warrant system for telephone taps authorised by the Home Secretary lacked clear safeguards and violated rights to privacy. Even before that judgment, the Government were committed to introducing legislation on this subject as there was an Opposition amendment to the 1984 Telecommunications Bill. My colleagues and I withdrew the amendment on the basis of a clear commitment that the Government would introduce proper and separate legislation that would cover the issues that my right hon. and hon. Friends have mentioned today. The Bill does not fulfil the commitment.
There is another problem, because the Bill covers only telephone tapping and the interception of mail. It does not cover surveillance techniques. All kinds of things are

being used. Hon. Members have mentioned infinity taps, spike microphones, fibre-optic taps and parabolic microphones. I shall not take time exploring the merits of some of these questionable devices, but it is clear that if the Government are saying that the use of such devices will also be covered by warrant and scrutinised properly by the House they are saying, "We have been forced by the European Court of Human Rights to put some controls on, but we do not give anything for human rights." They are saying that they will determine the safeguards, which will not be subject to criticism or challenge, and that they are prepared to allow other abuses of privacy to continue.

Mr. Mikardo: It seems a quite tenable proposition that the Home Office has told MI5, "Look chaps, bad luck, we have to introduce this Bill to limit telephone tapping because we have been caught out by the European court. Don't worry, you will still be able to keep tabs on anyone you want to keep tabs on. You need fewer taps and more bugs."

Mr. McWilliam: My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. Some devices are neither a tap nor a bug, but both—for example, the infinity tap. That is inserted in a telephone which is switched on by dialling the number of the telephone and sending an ultrasonic tone down the line. The telephone does not ring, and when the last digit is dialled it turns the telephone into a microphone that can pick up all conversation in that room. In Committee on the Bill, I shall detail the history of the infinity tap. I believe that a member of the public has been deprived of his rights. He invented the infinity bug as an experiment. It was picked up by the security services when they raided his flat, and they never returned the relevant papers. He has not received a halfpenny in compensation for his invention. One has to tap the line, but it turns into a bug when it is in a telephone. There is a grey area—it is impossible to distinguish clearly between interception and surveillance. Indeed, there are a number of grey areas in this murky ground that we are now covering, but I shall not waste too much time discussing them tonight.
One of the problems is the grounds on which warrants are issued. The proposed grounds detailed in the White Paper give much scope for interpretation of the definition. For example, in the category relating to serious crime the definition includes
an offence of lesser gravity in which … a large number of people is involved.
Does that mean that the miners' strike and the relatively trivial offences committed would, by definition, give rise to interception of communications? When my union was in industrial dispute with British Telecom and the Government last year, interception certainly took place. As one would expect, my union members are quite good at finding out about such things and we know how to set up false pickets and other false events and then send someone along to take photographs of the police turning up with nobody else present.
It is wrong to say that interception has not happened without warrants. In addition to officially authorised taps certain official tappings do not require warrants. That derives from an institutional relationship between the police, the CID or the special branch and the Post Office—subsequently British Telecom—which was established in the Home Office circular in 1969, and was cited by L. H. Leigh in "Police Powers in England And Wales" on page 215. We know that such things have happened in the


past, and the information has been published. Therefore, the remarks made by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds and others about all taps being covered by warrant are nonsense.
The category of warrant concerned with national security includes major subversive activity and circumstances related to internal and external aspects of the nation's security. The recent concern raised by the claims by Cathy Massiter show the sensitivity and importance of a precise definition. It also highlights the problem when a Minister is given powers to interpret such definitions — for example, in the Ponting case — and the accusations, justified or not, that he or she may lay themselves open on grounds of political partiality.
The 1980 White Paper "The Interception of Communications in Great Britain" stated that warrants are renewed for one month for the police, two months for the Customs and Excise and six months for the security services. The Bill extends that to six months in all circumstances. We have not heard a word from the Home Secretary about that, so I hope that the Minister will tell us why that should be the case.
The Bill provides for an investigation by a tribunal. However, I believe that the safeguards are thoroughly inadequate. The Bill provides for five legal gentlemen on the tribunal. I make no complaint about the legal profession. I would not think about lecturing the Home Secretary on the legal profession because he is a lawyer and I am not. However, I take it ill when he lectures me about the telephone system and how to intercept it. I have spent some 20 years in the design, construction and maintenance of that system. I do not believe that the Home Secretary would recognise a bug if it jumped up and bit him, any more than I would recognise a tort if it had jam on it and I thought I could eat it.
It is no good having five lawyers, because all that they can determine is whether the paperwork is right. They cannot determine whether an interception has taken place. The Home Secretary is shaking his head. I draw attention to clause 7(3)(a), which states:
On such an application"—
one where there is the belief that there has been an unauthorised interception—
other than one appearing to the Tribunal to be frivolous and vexatious"—
that safeguard is needed because a number of people tell me that their lines have been crackling and making strange noises, but anyone who thinks that their line is intercepted because of that is round the twist, and I assure hon. Members that if a telephone line is intercepted, the line is as clear as a bell because the first thing that is done when the line is tapped is to get rid of all faults—
the Tribunal shall investigate.
What will it investigate first? Will it be whether there is a relevant warrant or a relevant certificate?
I accept the logic for what it is, but if the tribunal first tries to discover whether there is a warrant and then whether there is a tap without a warrant two things will happen. First, the tap will be taken off and, secondly, the Minister will be told that there is not a warrant. That is the wrong way round. The first duty of the tribunal should be to determine whether the line is intercepted. Its second duty is to determine whether there is a warrant. If it is the other way round, an official tap cannot be detected

because it will have been taken off. If the taps are carried out by an unofficial agency, they will not be carried at the telephone exchange. The telephone exchange would be needed to determine whether there was a tap on a line, but unofficial agencies would not have access to the exchange. Therefore, the Bill is fundamentally flawed. I hope that the Minister will explain the logic of checking the paperwork before checking whether there is an interception. Why does he believe that checking the paperwork first will safeguard anyone?
I have had a great deal of experience in this area. I look forward to putting specific points and amendments in Committee. In 1981, in Committee stage on the British Telecommunications Bill, I made a serious and determined attempt to bring about a statutory provision that would allow telephone tapping to be legal and would protect the rights of the individual. My hon. Friend the Member for Bow and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) also served on that Committee and assisted me. We accepted amendments from Conservative Members and produced a compromise which provided a far better basis for the interception of communications and for the protection of the individual than this Bill provides. It did not go as far as I wanted it to go. It possibly went a shade further than Conservative Members of the Committee wanted it to go. However, when it returned from Committee to the Floor of the House it was voted down by the Government. The Government cannot now stand up with clean hands and say, "We wanted to introduce a statutory basis for the interception of communications." They do not have clean hands; they have been forced into it. The Government have taken the minimum step that they believe they have to take in order to be cleared by the European court and the European convention on human rights.
I have to remind the Government that two sections of the European convention on human rights are involved. The Government have covered section 8 fairly well. However, they have not even begun to attempt to cover section 13, which gives individuals the right of redress. Even if the Bill became law, I do not believe that it would meet the objections of the 18 judges who were involved in the Malone case, nor do I believe that the Government could depend upon it in a future case in which somebody might think that he had been deprived of his rights—I believe deliberately—because of the form of the Bill.
We shall not vote against Second Reading. The hon. and learned Member for Burton must not imply that we shall. We shall vote for the reasoned amendment and will attempt to amend the Bill in Committee to cover some of the points that both I and other Opposition Members have made. Above all, we shall try to bring the Bill fully into line with articles 8 and 13 of the European convention on human rights. The Bill does not do so at the moment.

Mr. Derek Spencer: For those hon. Members who like hunting the bogey man, this subject is full of possibilities. Some right hon. and hon. Members of the Opposition have thrown themselves into the chase with all the vigour that they can command. But for those of us who are of a less neurotic disposition I believe that this topic is important and practical and that most people take as their point of departure the principle that those who seek to justify these powers have the burden of showing to everybody's satisfaction that such powers are necessary, that they are not exercised beyond the extent that is


necessary and that their exercise is properly circumvented by remedies and checks. That is the gut reaction from which most people in this country start and it is not surprising that the common law contained the offence of eavesdropping which was defined as
listening under walls or windows or under the eaves of a house and framing slanderous or mischievous tales.
Some of my political opponents on Leicester council who are currently engaged in a rate-capping campaign may find themselves embraced in that activity.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Will the hon. and learned Member give way?

Mr. Spencer: No, not at the moment.
The penalty for eavesdropping was the use of the ducking stool. Therefore, right hon. and hon. Members will not be surprised to learn that, although the gut reaction of the English common law was to institute the offence of eavesdropping, it was in fact abolished in 1967 by the Criminal Law Act of that year when misdemeanours and felonies were consigned to the shelves of legal history. I shall now give way to the hon. and learned Gentleman.

Mr. Cartile: I am most grateful to the hon. and learned Member. His history lesson is very constructive and interesting, but in the light of the experience of the common law and of the wise use in days gone by of the offence of eavesdropping, does not the hon. and learned Member agree that the Government should have learnt the lesson of history and incorporated in the Bill the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure that the use of all surveillance devices by the police should be regulated by statute?

Mr. Spencer: The hon. and learned Member has already heard what my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary had to say on that point. If the hon. and learned Member speaks later, I hope that he will take the opportunity to refer to the fact that no Government have done as much as this one in drawing to the attention of the public the guidelines about surveillance under which the police now work. We are indebted to my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary for the guidelines that he made available at the end of last year which, for the first time, brought that matter before the eye of the public. The nonsense that we hear from the Opposition about this Government trying to suppress civil liberties is, I believe, the absolute reverse of the truth. No Government have done more to reveal to the public the guidelines under which the police operate in relation to surveillance, and now the Government are legislating in relation to the interception of communications.
It is a tribute to the tranquillity of our constitution that it has taken 106 years for any party to introduce legislation relating to the interception of communications. The first telephone installation took place in this country in 1879. There were seven lines. Last year there were more than 20 million lines. This Conservative Government are now introducing legislation.
We would be justified in asking, first, whether it is necessary to have this practice at all, or whether we can take the view that our society is so well ordered and tranquil that the interception of communications is not required. I believe that no reasonable person would seek to advance that proposition. Every right hon. and hon. Member of the Opposition has tonight, either expressly or

by implication, accepted the need for some degree of interception of communications to be carried out by the organs of state.
I put this question fair and square to the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick): if the National Front were to go to my constituency, 25 per cent. of the constituents of which are of Asian origin, and plan a major riot and attack upon the Asian section of the community, does the hon. Member think that the Home Secretary might be entitled, if he saw fit, to authorise an interception of communications against those members of the National Front who were minded to engage in that kind of activity? I shall look forward to hearing his answer in due course. I shall take no more time to answer the first question, whether we all take as our common point of departure that in some circumstances the interception of communications is necessary. The answer must be yes.
I pass on to an area which it is more useful to investigate: and that is, whether the interception takes place in circumstances that make it strictly necessary. Certainly the evidence that we have heard today from the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) takes the wind out of the sails of those who would say that a great deal of it goes on. Obviously, there is not a great deal of it going on. According to the figures available, there are four warrants per 1 billion letters that go through the post and there are 21 warrants for every 1 million phone lines. Therefore, in purely statistical terms, the extent to which interception takes place is, as it should be, on a small scale.
Opposition Members say that the criteria in clause 2 are vague and unsatisfactory, and they seek to impugn the Bill on those grounds. That attack is difficult to sustain. The words are clear and unambiguous. The three criteria use ordinary English words that any member of the public could easily understand. The warrant must be necessary
in the interests of national security; for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; or for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.
There is nothing vague about that.
As an extra line of attack, it is said that the Brill is sweeping. Certainly it is couched in general terms, but the answer to that has already been given by the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South. His speech illustrated how, right at the heart of the Home Secretary's duties, lies the exercise of discretion and judgment, which it is not easy to translate into words which will cover every conceivable eventuality. Although I followed his factual exposition of the burden which the Home Secretary has to carry, I did not go with him along the road down which he invited us to follow him when he said that the categories of cases and criteria which the Home Secretary should apply should be set out in a schedule to the Bill. That conclusion which he sought to draw was at odds with the premise that he had earlier laid down.
The answer to the second question, whether the interception takes place only in circumstances which make it necessary, has been affirmatively given by the Opposition.
That leaves us with only the last question: are the safeguards adequate for instances where interception takes place? That is what the Bill is all about. It introduces, for the first time, a new criminal offence of unauthorised tapping. That is quite new in our law. Surely it must be calculated to deter those people who are contemplating unauthorised tapping.
Clause 7 is drawn in wide terms. It is purely subjective. If any member of the public believes that his phone has been tapped in an unauthorised manner, he can complain to the tribunal, which has available to it the various powers that are given under the Bill. It would be open for the tribunal to call for papers to see whether the original warrant complied with the criteria set out in clause 2. That is an effective check upon the exercise of ministerial discretion.
An hon. Member sought to attack the Bill on the grounds that the tribunal is comprised only of lawyers. Being a lawyer myself I would be the first to say that they are by no means perfect. They have a range of defects. But for the most part they do not have any special defects. Those that they have tend to mirror those of a cross-section of the community.
The important thing is that, in the Klass case, the European Court of Human Rights considered the position in West Germany where the supervisory system is not a judicial one. It said that in its view the best supervisory system was comprised of judicial personnel. In setting up such a tribunal in this Bill we are surpassing the German model and complying with the exhortation that came from the European Court of Human Rights in the Klass case.
This is a workmanlike Bill. It is a balanced and common sense approach to the problem. If there is any threat by Big Brother, he will hereafter be more of a bogey man and less of a reality.

Mr. Tony Benn: My interest in this debate is that it is one of the few occasions—I cannot recall another one—when we have had a debate on the security services. If we are to discuss the security services, we should look at the threat. We must analyse with clinical precision what it is that the security services are there to protect Britain from.
I do not think that any hon. Member would disagree with the proposition that the security services are there to protect us from violence, from abroad or at home, or from crime. But there is a substantial difference between criminal and violent actions and radical opinions. This Bill—this is why it is so important that we should debate it—deliberately fudges the difference between the two.
It is a bad Bill. Clause 2 gives a blank cheque to the Home Secretary to tap or intercept any telephone call. But what is most offensive to me about the Bill is that it was introduced and supported with soothing words implying that in our most perfect of all perfect democratic worlds there is very little interception of telephone calls. Indeed, when the Home Secretary introduced the Bill, in a speech that was as soothing as it was deceptive — indeed, misleading — in character, he said that there was no change in the status quo.
Therefore, I want to begin by bringing such experience as I have had as a former Postmaster General, Minister of Technology and Cabinet Minister for many years to bear on what happens. We should know what happens. The reality is that for many centuries the Government of the day have maintained a continuous interception and surveillance of all their critics. Indeed, the Royal Mail was set up in 1660 because the king had to be able to open everybody's letters to know who was writing to whom about what. The prerogative of the Crown, which, until

this Bill, was the sole authority for interception, goes back to that. Those who have read 19th century Labour history will know about Oliver the spy, and will know that the state has always had agents provocateurs who have operated mainly in the Labour movement.
Today, I received an extract from Hansard through the post. I did not pick it out myself, but it is dated 2 July 1925. The then hon. Member for Leith, Captain Wedgwood Benn, asked the Home Secretary
what general rules govern the attendance of secret police at meetings; on what subjects they are asked to report; and whether they are employed to register in general opinions expressed, or whether their duties are limited to the prevention of crime and of the advocacy of crime?
Sir William Joynson-Hicks replied:
It is the duty of the police to obtain all the information they can with regard to the aims and projects of revolutionaries, in order that they may inform His Majesty's Government on the subject and be forearmed against any attempts to put such projects into effect. It is impossible to state categorically the means by which this duty can best be discharged, and even if it were possible, it would not be in the public interest to do so.
The hon. Member for Leith, who happened to be my father, then said:
Could the right hon. Gentleman say clearly whether the purpose of these secret police visits is to register opinions or to prevent the advocacy of violence? That is the question".
The Home Secretary replied:
The object of police attendance at any particular meeting is to inform me of what takes places at that particular meeting; and if there are revolutionary sentiments or revolutionary projects discussed at that meeting, it would then be my duty to see that they are not carried into effect."—[Official Report, 2 July 1925; Vol. 185, c. 2778–9.]
At least that was honest. The Home Secretary then said that he was going to send secret police to meetings to tell him what was said. That has been the basis of Government surveillance and of the interception of all telephone calls and other communications ever since then. It would be ludicrous for one party to try to gain an advantage over another, and so I must say in all fairness that what we are discussing has gone on under all Governments, with very little difference between them. Anyone who has read Barbara Castle's diaries will know that she reports in them that the security services from time to time reported to her about the attitude of trade union leaders.
When I recommended Jack Jones, who was one of the pillars of the Labour Government in the support that he gave to our incomes policy and so on, as a possible chairman of the National Enterprise Board, Box 500 told me that he was subversive. Actually, he did not want the job anyway. Hugh Scanlon was described as subversive.
Anyone who thinks that the supervision, surveillance, bugging and tapping of trade union leaders has not gone on under other Governments is misleading himself. It is important that we should be honest with ourselves and with the public, as otherwise no one will believe a word that we say.
Harold Wilson, who had an absolute obsession with Communists and particularly with Trotskyites, used to boast of the amount of surveillance that he undertook. I think that it is right—at least I feel an obligation—to tell those who do not know it that if they are Communists, read the Morning Star, Militant or the Socialist Worker, or if they are active in strikes, are perhaps members of Friends of the Earth, hunt saboteurs or engaged in, say, the activities of the Animal Liberation Front, they will be watched, bugged, intercepted and listened to, because that has been the practice of successive Governments.
To the best of my knowledge, I never met Harry Newton, but on the assumption that Catherine Massiter spoke the truth, he was recruited from the Communist party and was engaged in penetrating CND or whatever for 30 years — and I cannot see why Catherine Massiter should not have spoken the truth—in acting as an agent provocateur, and in encouraging people to do things that they would not otherwise want to do. Thus, if we are told that we are maintaining the status quo, we should be clear what it is.
I come to an important point that has so far been missed. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) is here. All the talk about security is about the Home Secretary. But security in Britain is controlled by the Prime Minister. My right hon. Friend is one of the very few people—and he may be unique—who has occupied three great offices of state, or four if one includes the Treasury. He has been Foreign Secretary in charge of MI6, Home Secretary in charge of MI5 and Prime Minister in charge of the lot. When discussing security, the most important thing is to know that it goes back to No. 10 Downing Street. I am not even sure—and I wondered when I listened to my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees), who was once Home Secretary—how far Home Secretaries always know what is happening in security, or how much Prime Ministers tell Home Secretaries and Foreign Secretaries.
I recall one occasion in 1966 when I had a particularly sensitive nuclear secret that I had to take to the Prime Minister. He told me not to tell the Foreign Secretary, who was then George Brown. I can quite understand why he said, "Don't tell him," but the fact remains that the Prime Minister said to me, "Whatever you do, don't tell the head of MI6 what you've told me about this particular nuclear secret."
The question whether we are propping up or undermining parliamentary democracy arises because this whole security business rests on the use of an undiminished mediaeval prerogative. Indeed, I made that point in the Belgrano debate. The Prime Minister has the power, and so has the Home Secretary under his authority, to intercept, and to define national security and then to keep secret what is done. It is important to make that point.
I made my next point in the Belgrano debate too, because the issues are comparable. It is important that the country should know that British intelligence is wholly integrated with, and subordinated to, United States intelligence, which supervises and controls our intelligence service. Anyone who has followed this issue — perhaps my interest stems from many years as a Minister with nuclear responsibilities—knows that what is called the special relationship with America, and is often referred to at Pilgrims' dinners and on formal occasions, in fact means that in return for American intelligence supervising our intelligence and obtaining information from our intelligence about our "subversives", the Americans let us have access to their military and nuclear technology.
Therefore, we are not special or free agents. As I said in the debate on the Belgrano, the decision to ban trade unions from GCHQ was part of the price paid for that special intelligence relationship. Indeed, there is an inner, inner Official Secrets Act that Ministers have to sign, over and above their general responsibilities, if they are to be allowed to have access to United States intelligence.
In the light of that, I come to the criteria in the Bill. Those set out in clause 2(2)(b) about crime are wholly acceptable. Who could possibly object to a Home Secretary deciding, in anticipation of some serious crime, to put a bug or a tap on communications? But clause 2(2)(a) and (c) about national security and economic well-being is entirely discretionary in ciaracter. There is no objective test that could be applied.
I have mentioned the question whether the Bill upholds or undermines parliamentary democracy, because the whole purpose of Parliament is to discuss and decide what is in the interest of the nation in terms of security, and what is in the interest of the nation in terms of its economic well-being. The democratic process is determined on polling day and then reflected in subsequent votes in Parliament. But once national security and economic well-being are abstracted from that, and are withdrawn into the prerogative, and once it is said that those are matters for the Prime Minister to decide, then the very parliamentary democracy that the system is allegedly being used to defend is undermined.
Arguments about national security must be central to a free debate. Let us take the argument of whether our national security is improved or harmed by nuclear weapons. I shall not go into the arguments in detail, because this is not the time or place for that. But there are those—including the Secretary of State for Defence and the Prime Minister—who believe quite sincerely that we must have nuclear weapons with which to defend the security of the country. Others, including me, believe that the presence of American nuclear bases which can be used to fire nuclear weapons without the consent of the British Government, is a threat to national security. It is impossible to take that out of the debate and to say that that is something which, if the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary so determine, justifies bugging. That would destroy Parliament.
As to economic well-being—

Mr. William Cash: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way.

Mr. Benn: I shall not give way, as I should like to develop my point. I am trying to be non-controversial. I am making a constitutional point, and I ask Conservative Members to consider the following. If a Government were elected which Conservative Members did not like, and used those powers, and said for example that monetarism was damaging the economic well-being of the country and that the telephones of monetarists, stockbrokers and anyone engaged in closing a factory here and opening one in South Africa could be tapped, they would not like it. The House should be careful that it does not give too much power to the executive. Although the words look lovely to a Thatcherite Government, they might not look so lovely to the Conservative party if these powers were in the hands of those who fundamentally disagreed with its philosophy.
One cannot fall back on the final defence that the measure is to protect parliamentary democracy. Many of the keenest and most important debates in our history have been about parliamentary democracy. I looked up one of my favourite quotations from 6 July 1831. Sir Robert Peel, who opposed the Reform Bill, warned that even a limited extension of the franchise was contrary to our parliamentary traditions. He said:


I am convinced that it is not founded on the acknowledged principles of the constitution — because it does not give security to the prerogative of the Crown—because it does not guarantee the legitimate rights, influences and privileges of both Houses of Parliament".
The case against the Reform Bill was mounted on the grounds that it would undermine parliamentary government.
Mr. Asquith, who opposed votes for women in 1910, argued the same case, and said that if Parliament gave votes to women, it would undermine parliamentary democracy. I warn the House to be extremely careful not to allow national security, economic well-being or a definition of what parliamentary democracy is to be subtracted from the public arena, the Chamber, and handed over to secret decisions by a Home Secretary and Prime Minister surrounded by security officers. If one did that, one would undermine the parliamentary democracy that we are supposed to be protecting.
The proper handling of the matter should include a full inquiry into the security services by a Select Committee and detailed discussion about what is subversive. As I said earlier, there is a subversion of violence or the planning of crimes of violence which is clear, but radical personal conviction is not the same as subversion. To argue that those who hold an unpopular view are by virtue of their view or membership of an organisation subversive, is a dangerous doctrine. That is true of the Right and the Left. There must also be accountability for operations undertaken by the security services afterwards under the proper protection of either Privy Councillors or a parliamentary Committee. The Americans have that and there is no reason why we should not have it.
I am deeply worried that the Prime Minister, who loosely used the term "enemies within" to cover everything from the IRA to the National Union of Mineworkers, is building a public argument to give herself that power in the guise of national security or economic well-being. She is giving herself the power to watch and control everybody, and for the first time that power is to be put in statute form as well as used as a prerogative.
To put it bluntly and simply, the Prime Minister, Ministers and security services who support the Bill are endangering the democracy that they pretend to defend. Because Governments of all parties act in that way, surveillance, interception, bugging, tapping and agent provocateur work will continue under any Government. It always has done and always will do.
However, we must safeguard our liberties. Sarah Tisdall, Clive Ponting and Cathy Massiter are people from within the service who were moved by their consciences against what they were asked to do. The ultimate safeguard of our liberties does not rest with the Home Secretary, the head of MI5 or any of the officials who work in it, but with those who are committed by conscience to their convictions: those outside who campaign for change, and those inside who have the integrity to differentiate between what they are asked to do and what they know is right. Our safeguards rest with them, not in this place, in Acts of Parliament, in judicial inquiries or with lawyers, who are paid, I fear, to say almost anything. Our safeguards lie with the basic integrity of people who argue their case from conviction and those inside Government who will not be the tools of a police state.
Those thoughts should be on our minds when we debate the Bill in Committee. On reflection, the Conservative party may conclude that it has as much to lose from the subtraction of legislative power and its transmission back to the executive, as have the Opposition.

Mr. Stefan Terlezki: I believe that the Bill is most important for national security, the well-being of our great country and, indeed, the national economy.
I am worried that some Opposition Members attack and criticise the interception and surveillance of organisations such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and of extremists, and say that militant leaders of trade unions must never be interfered with. They also say that the leaders of Militant Tendency, Trotskyites, Marxists, crypto-Communists and Fascists should never be interfered with and should be left alone.
As a taxpayer and one who believes in freedom, democracy and the well-being of the economy, I should be horrified and appalled if extremists, Trotskyites and organisations which might damage our economy, policies and the political freedom of this House were allowed to get away with it, and to pursue their destructive activities against my country. They should not be allowed to undermine the economy and our national security, or be a threat to freedom. I would be worried about that. Therefore, I agree with and respect the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan), who spoke wisely and helpfully in the debate.
Of course we all accept that phone tapping is a frightening intrusion into the privacy of the individual and that it must be controlled and supervised carefully and rigorously to ensure that we do not fall into the category of interrogation, as some of us have experienced in our lives. Governments of all parties have authorised, through their Home Secretaries and Foreign Secretaries, the tapping of a limited number of telephone lines. Now, for the first time, an independent tribunal will be established to provide effective protection of the individual, which will have the power to do a job effectively for the benefit of our citizens. Interception is authorised only when the Secretary of State considers that it is justified for the prevention or detection of serious crime or to safeguard national security. The maintenance of the economic well-being and the security of our country must be paramount.
The authorisation of the interception of communications as a means of finding out some of the secrets of criminals and terrorists engaged in dangerous activities must be carefully pursued. Regrettably, Britain is suffering from the activities of the most highly organised criminal gangs, especially in drug trafficking, that we have ever encountered. The ruthlessness and violence of criminals and terrorists are increasing. There is a constant threat from terrorism which has resulted in many callous and indiscriminate murders, and it is no secret that our national security is constantly at risk because of the activities of foreign spies and their treacherous stooges who have infiltrated our security network. They are the apparatchiks who, in co-operation, regrettably, with born and bred British people, are trying to undermine the security and freedom of our country. I regret that very much.
The Government would put innocent lives at risk if they were to deny the police those essential powers. Every Government must ensure the safety of their citizens and


the security of the country, and all previous Governments have done so. Regrettably, the Labour party today is different from the Labour party of the past. The organisations and fringe bodies that have latched on to the Labour party contain individuals who are more concerned with wrecking the nation than with promoting alternative democratic policies and protecting freedom and democracy. We should ask ourselves the straightforward question: does the controlled use of phone tapping prevent terrorist outrages, convict major drug traffickers or identify traitors seeking to undermine our security? If the answer is yes, I am convinced that we must support the Government and the Bill, because it is the best safeguard that we can have.

Mr. David Winnick: The Bill is being debated against a background of serious allegations about the security services. During the past few weeks, we have been informed—it has not been contradicted in any way — that leading trade unionists, leading campaigners for nuclear disarmament and other such people have been the victims of state harassment. That is why it is important that adequate provision is made to protect the civil liberties of our people. The Bill has been harshly and rightly criticised from the Labour Benches because it is completely inadequate.
Many people are bound to ask: how useful is the proposed tribunal when that body will be able to decide only whether interception has been properly authorised? It will not be able to give all the reasons why authorisation was given in the first place. The Home Secretary told the House two or three weeks ago that anyone who has suspicions about telephone interceptions can refer them to the tribunal, which will have access to relevant information and can establish whether there has been interception, authorised or not, and whether, if the interception was authorised, that authorisation was properly given. In other words, at most it will be the remit which was given to Lord Bridge. That will certainly not answer the complaints of people who have every reason to believe that their telephones are being tapped.
As I have stated, the tribunal will not be in a position to go into all the factors that have led to the authorisation being given. If I understand the Bill correctly, the tribunal will not be able to tell somebody that his or her telephone has been tapped if an authorisation has duly been given. What safeguard is that to the people whom I mentioned, be it the chairperson of the CND or an official of a trade union? They will make their complaints to a tribunal, but they are not likely to get much satisfaction. That sort of harassment is not likely to come to an end. Is it any wonder, therefore, that we are critical of the Bill?
I do not deny—nor, I assume, would my right hon. and hon. Friends — that there are occasions when interception, as in criminal cases, can be justified. It is not part of my argument to say that in no circumstances is interception unnecessary. However, it should be kept to the very minimum. I also accept that there are cases where, in the defence of the realm and of security, there are justified reasons for it.
Labour Members who serve on the Select Committee on Home Affairs have been concerned about the guidelines on subversive activities in the course of the public sessions. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) that these matters have been

going on for some time. The present guidelines were issued in February 1975 by Lord Harris, then a Labour Minister of State at the Home Office. The guidelines state:
Subversive activities are generally regarded as those which threaten the safety or well-being of the State and which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.
"Political means" can have a pretty wide interpretation by the security service and special branch. I am convinced that those guidelines are far too wide and that, as long as they remain, the kind of abuses will occur about which we have been hearing, and which concern certainly Labour Members if not Conservative Members. If we are properly to safeguard our citizens, the guidelines given to the security service must be considerably tightened up.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield, speaking as a former Cabinet Minister, in a frank speech said that these practices have been going on for a long time. Indeed, he took us back, and rightly so, to past centuries and to the way in which Governments have used spies, agents provocateurs and so on. I am sure, however, that some of the practices that went on in the 1970s have been widely extended in recent years. It may well be that other Governments intend to act in the same way. The difference lies in the attitude of Labour and Conservative Back Benchers.
Labour Members, even if our party were in government, on seeing a film like "MI5's Official Secrets" would be deeply concerned, as we are now. We would be no less concerned because our own Government were in office. But there does not seem to be much concern on the Conservative Benches. That is why, when the hon. Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw) in an intervention in Home Office questions the other week said to the Home Secretary—without qualifying it—that if such people as CND and the rest—this is clearly what he meant—were not being investigated, he wanted a refund of his money, Conservative Members roared with laughter. I do not consider it amusing. It should not be part of our duly to permit the sort of abuses that have occurred and which clearly should be brought to an end.
Consider, for example, the film "MI5's Official Secrets" which was originally banned and which, perhaps because of pressure and the fact that no prosecutions were to take place, was shown on Channel 4 last Friday. No Minister has said that the facts depicted in the film were incorrect. Like other hon. Members, I knew nothing of Miss Massiter before the film was made.
If Miss Massiter is genuine — I have no reason to believe otherwise—and if she has no motivation other than what she stated on television, what she said should concern hon. Members in all parts of the House. If agents of the state—she was employed of course by MI5—are harassing law-abiding citizens, who certainly believe in parliamentary democracy and so on, she is to be congratulated on performing a service to the state. We should know about abuses that have occurred.

Mr. Richard Hickmet: The hon. Gentleman suggests that Conservative Members, particularly Back Benchers, are not concerned and have expressed levity about the matter. Is it not a fact that the Government have introduced this legislation because of incidents that arose in the Malone case, those incidents having occurred during the lifetime of the last Labour


Government? Is it not also a fact that the ruling of the European court as much as anything else stimulated the presentation of the Bill?

Mr. Winnick: It is clear that the Government have been forced into it by the European Court. I do not believe that they would have acted otherwise.
Consider the case of the late Mr. Harry Newton. It is understandable that his widow and some of his friends are concerned about allegations that have been made. The Home Secretary should clear the issue up one way or the other. I tabled a question on the subject and asked—so far as I was able, because of restrictions at the Table Office—
if the late Mr. Harry Newton was given any sums of public money.
The answer that I received yesterday from the Home Secretary was:
I understand that certain allegations have been made about the existence of links between Mr. Newton, the security service and special branches. It is not the practice to comment on allegations of this nature.
Why not? Mr. Newton is dead. Let us have the facts and get the matter cleared up once and for all. If he was planted as a spy in an organisation such as CND, we should be told why that action was taken. If Conservative Members are concerned for civil liberties, they will share my sentiments on matters such as that.
It may interest the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths), who acts for the Police Federation, to recall the story in The Observer a week last Sunday in which it was stated that a former editor of the CND journal had been interviewed about leading people in CND. The Home Secretary reminded us today that CND is a lawful organisation and we know it is not illegal, even under the present Government, to campaign for unilateral nuclear disarmament. I could not get much joy in response to a question that I asked the Home Secretary on the subject. The right hon. and learned Gentleman responded to my question about the editor of the CND journal:
I am assured by the commissioner that no inquiries have been initiated by the Metropolitan police special branch outside the terms of those guidelines."—[Official Report, 11 March 1985; Vol. 77, c. 27–28.]
I quoted from the guidelines. If it is true, why on earth should the special branch ask a former editor of the CND journal questions about the people in CND, about their private lives and the leadership style of the general secretary? What on earth have such investigations got to do with national security? Conservative Members say that we are in a state of paranoia over these matters, but surely we have every reason to be concerned.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I will try to answer the hon. Gentleman's rhetorical question, which he prefaced by saying "If it is true". The reason why it might well be perfectly reasonable to interview the editor of the journal—or, indeed, the editor of Conservative Monthly News—is that any Soviet agent within this country who is worth his salt would try as hard as he could — perhaps he would fail—to penetrate organisations like the CND in order to achieve his own purpose. It must be right for the security service to keep an eye on that.

Mr. Winnick: I think that the hon. Gentleman, on reflection, will recognise what a feeble response that was. It is interesting to note that no allegation has been made

that the editor of Conservative Monthly News, or whatever it is — it is not a journal that I read — has been interviewed in any way. What the hon. Gentleman is saying in effect is that it is perfectly all right for the police to interview people and probe into organisations. So where is the end of it, where is the limit?

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: rose—

Mr. Winnick: No, I will not give way.
I believe that all these matters which my hon. Friends and myself have spoken about should give rise to concern about the way in which civil liberties in this country are being seriously infringed.
There is a reference in the Bill to safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. I doubt whether leading companies in this country which invest abroad, undermining our manufacturing industry and creating a great deal of unemployment in our constituencies, are the object of any investigation by the security service or the special branch.
This Bill is hardly likely to meet our concern about civil liberties and the way the freedom of law-abiding people is being undermined as a result of the guidelines and the lack of concern on the part of the Home Secretary and other Ministers. Perhaps there are some people in security and in MI5 — I hope not many — whose belief in parliamentary democracy is not all that strong. Perhaps there are those who believe that this House is just a talking shop and that there is no reason why we should be debating security.
It is all the more necessary that the security service and all the rest have some parliamentary accountability. I do not question the need to safeguard genuine security but, to the extent that these political abuses occur and continue to occur, the security service will undoubtedly become the object of criticism and hostility. So, in its own interest there is a good case for some parliamentary accountability.
Civil liberties are one of the reasons for the existence of this House. First and foremost it is our job to ensure the freedom of our citizens. Tory Members speak a great deal about that but in practice they do not seem in any way concerned about the allegations that have been made concerning the security service and the special branch. As I see it, our job is at all times to safeguard civil liberties. If the civil liberties of the general secretary and the chairperson of CND, and of leading trade unionists, are being undermined by probing, telephone tapping and all the rest of it, we must try to rectify the situation. It is my view that the Bill before us today is a miserable substitute for the real protection of civil liberties.

Mr. D. E. Thomas: One of the most remarkable features of the debate has been that we have heard parts of the memoirs of at least three Cabinet Ministers. It is important for us to have those clear statements in the House of what goes on in the procedures of Government.
Surely the major problem that we have to face in the Bill is the expected failure of the Government to produce what they intended to produce, as set out in their White Paper. In paragraph 7 of the White Paper the Government say that their aim in introducing legislation is
to provide a clear statutory framework within which the interception of communications on public systems will be authorised and controlled in a manner commanding public confidence.


It is clear from what we have heard in the debate—I endorse everything that the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) has just said — that the Government have totally failed to produce legislation that provides anything like a clear statutory framework. I shall go into a little detail on some of the wording in a moment.
The Government have also failed to produce anything that can command public confidence. This has been admitted on the Conservative Benches. It is clear that the security services themselves are in a crisis of confidence. We have not seen—certainly not in recent years—such criticism of the security services from a broad spread of the media as we have seen in the past three or four weeks. When the Bill was originally published, most of the leading papers were extremely critical of its failure to produce the safeguards that it set out to produce. I endorse those criticisms of the contents of the Bill.
The Bill fails completely from its inception in dealing with the issues at stake. It is called the Interception of Communications Bill. In reality, as we have heard from many Opposition Members, only certain communications are covered. There is coverage of only one form of interception—in the telephone system. The broad area of invasion through bugging devices, directional microphones and all the other forms of surveillance is not covered.
There was a famous incident in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Caernarfon (Mr. Wigley) at Talysarn when a whole community was bugged by the security services because a bug was placed in the telephone kiosk. It was only through people in the community surveying the activity of the security services that the bug was discovered. No explanation, adequate or otherwise, has been forthcoming from the chief constable of north Wales or the Home Secretary about the intention of that bugging. That incident gave rise to a popular song in the Welsh language, which I shall not quote tonight.
Such incidents show the way in which the community has been sensitised to the surveillance upon it. Such sensitising of the community to surveillance, as in the famous Talysarn incident, has happened throughout Britain in recent weeks, as the "20:20 Vision" programme, on which I congratulate the producers and all those who appeared on it, reminded us. It reminded us of the reality of control of dissent in our society. The Bill is part of the control of dissent. It deals with a limited attempt to intervene with a small aspect of the communications network, but by doing that and not dealing within a statutory framework with the rest of the surveillance of communications it fails to put the surveillance of communications on a democratic basis. There is no new accountability in the form of surveillance.
In clause 2(2) we are given the three reasons for the issue of a warrant for surveillance by the Secretary of State. They are the interests of national security, preventing or detecting serious crime, and safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Nowhere in the Bill or the debate have we had a definition of what those terms mean. At the end of some of the longer Bills that we have discussed, detailed schedules have contained definitions of precisely what the wording meant.
There has been no attempt in the Bill or the White Paper to define exactly what the interests of national security are. However, in the White Paper there have been some attempts in paragraphs 20 and 21 to define what serious offences are. As we have already heard from successive

Home Secretaries, national security is defined by each Home Secretary. The right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) said that it should be for the Home Secretary of the day to produce a definition of subversion. In my 11 years in the House, the category of subversion has been extended gradually.
There is no definition of serious crime or of national security in the Bill. However, paragraph 20 of the White Paper says:
Interception will be authorised only if the offence is one for which a person with no previous criminal record could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to three years' imprisonment; or is an offence of lesser gravity in which either a large number of people is involved, or there is good reason to apprehend the use of violence, or in which the financial rewards of success are very large.
In regard to a serious offence and the involvement of large numbers of people, I want to compare the form of words used with what is in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. It categorises criminal offences into offences involving arrests with a warrant, arrests without a warrant, which are arrestable offences, and serious arrestable offences. The gravest of these is a "serious arrestable offence" which includes offences which cause
serious harm to the security of the State or to public order".
In the context of the White Paper and the Bill, will serious offences include the same kinds of serious offences as are defined in that section of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act? If so, and if the involvement of a large number of people in an offence of lesser gravity is a category which would authorise interception, any mass demonstration organised by anyone in the United Kingdom becomes immediately a subject of surveillance.
I go further. In one of his most revealing answers, the Secretary of State for Defence, who has made many revealing answers in the House not so much by what he has said but by the style in which he has said it, told those of us who questioned him about the successful battle of Molesworth that the reason that the police, the military police and the Royal Engineers were used against the peace movement was to anticipate and prevent mass civil disobedience.
No doubt it is part of the Government's strategy in preventing dissent to prevent those who disagree with their policies from gathering together and organising themselves in dissent. As we have seen throughout the mining dispute, demonstrations, picketing and the movement of demonstrators and trade unionists were all subject to various forms of surveillance. At the beginning of the dispute in south Wales there was a celebrated case in which buses which had been hired by the National Union of Mineworkers were followed. This could have happened only as a result of the tapping of telephones of private bus operators in south Wales. All forms of demonstration against the Government could be categorised as serious offences which would be subject to surveillance.
Another category concerns me. There has been reference in the debate to warrants issued by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. We have heard a little about warrants issued by the Home Secretary. Under the Bill, a warrant can be issued on grounds of national security in support of the Government's defence and foreign policies. We should be told more about the use of warrants in this category. As the Bill proceeds, we shall ask further questions on that. Does it refer merely to warrants issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in respect of the activities of MI6, or are we


talking of the use of warrants against people who do not support the Government's defence and foreign policies? It is important for us to understand what that category is. Here again, the self-definition of national security by the state is being broadened in a way that undermines democracy.
The Bill does not cover the reality of the surveillance that is going on. It pretends to give us a structure of accountability, whereas in reality it gives us no such structure. This has been true of the history of the argument about telecommunications surveillance in Britain. We have always been given inadequate figures. For example, last year 354 warrants were issued by the Home Secretary. We are never told how many of these warrants apply to individuals and how many to organisations.
Clearly the House would accept that paramilitary organisations dedicated to political violence should have blanket surveillance. However, there is no argument for a blanket warrant for surveillance of people who are members of legal, democratic organisations whose objectives are open and whose activities and forms of action are open just because certain individuals in the organisation are members of political parties that are apparently subversive.

Mr. Bill Walker: If these organisations are known to have as members activists who regularly and constantly break the law, should they not be under some surveillance?

Mr. Thomas: I do not know what organisations the hon. Gentleman is referring to. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting, as I think that he is, that CND is an organisation that is subversive because it dissents from the Government's defence policy? That is the kind of thinking that is motivating Conservative Members and many people in the security service.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: rose—

Mr. Thomas: I shall not give way, as I must finish my speech.
We have to face up to a Government who are increasingly intent on targeting various forms of dissent. For some reason, the Communist party, which is a democratic party, is regarded as a subversive organisation. In the case of my friend John Cox, a vice-president of the CND and a long-time activist in the peace movement in Wales, his membership of the Communist party is apparently, according to Cathy Massiter in the "20:20 Vision" programme, sufficient reason for the Home Secretary to grant a warrant to have his phone tapped.
It is important that we should know what categories of people and organisations the Home Secretary is prepared to allow to be used in this way. If the practice that is being made legitimate in this Bill is the practice of tapping the telephone of a person such as John Cox, democratic politics in Britain are being undermined by the Government's activities.

Mr. Robin Corbett: As chairman of the parliamentary home affairs group, I wish to make it clear that we accept the need for interception of telephone calls and mail. Attempts from Conservative Benches to smear the Labour party and pretend that it is anti-police do not deserve serious treatment.
While we acknowledge the need for a Bill, this Bill does not do the job that it should set out to do. There are not the safeguards that the Home Secretary pretended. For example, with the proposed tribunal, who says that it is only five lawyers who have the wit and the wisdom to do the job? Why does the commissioner have to be appointed by the Prime Minister and report to the Prime Minister alone? If the Government are allegedly going down the road of more open government, why can they not go a step further and acknowledge the strength of the case for a special Select Committee, in line with that which oversees the work of the Ombudsman, to oversee the work of the commissioner proposed in the Bill?
I must explain to Conservative Members that one does not have to be paranoid to believe that it is possible for MI5 and the special branch—out of enthusiasm or something worse—to make mistakes and to step over the limit. In a constituency adjoining my own, there was the case involving Mrs. Madeline Haigh who wrote a letter to the newspapers protesting about the plan to bring in cruise missiles. As a result, flat-footed special branch officers came to crawl all over her house, play around with her telephone and knock on her door. The chief constable made a misstatement to the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr. Fowler) but, when the complaint was persisted with, he acknowledged that the officers had gone over the top.
In the film "MI5's Official Secrets" it was alleged that the application for the tap on the telephone of Mr. John Cox, the vice-president of CND, gave the reason that Mr. Cox was a long-term member of the Communist party and prominent in CND, and that it was desired to investigate his contacts and activities in order to ascertain whether the Communist party was manipulating CND in a clandestine manner.
The Home Secretary has assured us more than once, at the Dispatch Box and in evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee, that mere membership of a lawful organisation that opposes the views of the current Government is not enough to justify him in signing a warrant for interference with telephone or written communications. I do not doubt that Government Members accept that view. In that case, why did the Home Secretary, in August 1983, allegedly authorise the tap on the telephone of Mr. John Cox?

Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones (Lord Commissioner to the Treasury): Because he was a Communist.

Mr. Corbett: The hon. Gentleman cannot have it both ways. The Home Secretary has told us that mere membership of a lawful organisation is not enough to justify surveillance. Moreover, even if someone is suspected of being a subversive — if that is what membership of the Communist party means—there is the other test to be applied before the Home Secretary should sign the warrant.
According to the allegations in the film, the information collected as a result of the signing of the warrant was passed to the DS19 unit in the Ministry of Defence, which has been set up to counter the activities of CND. For the first time, a Government stand charged with misusing the security services for purely party political ends. The Government would do well to lay that allegation to rest. If it is untrue, it will cost the Government nothing to say so. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South


and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) made the point that, had he been Prime Minister, he would have jumped very smartly on the setting up of such a political unit in one of the great Departments of State.
One does not have to be paranoid to believe that things can go wrong. Little has been said about the interception of mail. I wish briefly to refer to some of the allegations. We know that, in London, intercepted mail goes to Union house at St. Martin's-le-Grand. Last year, CND had planned to hold a demonstration in London in June. They contracted with the Post Office beforehand to distribute some 76,000 items of mail to CND members. The Post Office agreed to a final delivery date of 31 May, but CND later received 100 letters from members complaining about the late arrival of mail. In some areas, the mail was not received until, on average, 21 June—more than a fortnight after the demonstration. We cannot dismiss all these people as mad—there are more than 100 of them. We should know because hon. Members get more mail than many people, that it is extremely rare to get a damaged piece of mail, but more than 100 members of CND did.
A standard letter to a national council member of CND in Northumberland, postmarked 14 September 1984, was received unsealed and with the flap open. A second letter, posted by the social services department in Bradford on 13 September 1984 was received torn open and unsealed. A letter to another national council member, who happens to be a general practitioner in Gloucester, was posted on 21 August 1984. It was the campaign newsletter mailing and it was received slit down one side, although the contents were intact. Another GP in Nottingham received a letter which was slit down the side. A second letter from an hon. Member was received on 8 September 1984, torn and readdressed from Huddersfield post office. It is no good saying these things cannot happen or that all the people involved are liars or worse. Because people in MI5 and the special branch can get over-enthusiastic, we ought to tread carefully when laying down a lawful basis for interception.
Group secretaries of CND in Salford and Manchester have reported:
for the fourth time in one month packages from CND have been ripped open by the time they reach us".
An organiser of Christian CND in London received on 23 November 1984 a National Westminster bank statement which bore a post office damage label and had been resealed at the back of the envelope. When the recipient queried that with the bank, the manager said that the statement was sent out in good order.
Earlier today, my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees), a former Home Secretary, said outside the House that when he was Home Secretary he did not authorise telephone taps on the headquarters of the Fire Brigades Union during its dispute. I accept what he says, but people working in those headquarters believe that they have evidence of their telephone being tapped. One alleged in the "20:20 Vision" film that, on picking up the receiver to make a telephone call, played back into his ear was a conversation that he had had on that telephone a little earlier. Why should my right hon. Friend lie? Something is going on behind the Home Secretary. Some in the security services are acting without his consent.
Tim and Bridie Wallis live near Molesworth and object to the Government's nuclear defence policy. They have a perfect right to object to it. As the Home Secretary has said

several times, there is nothing illegal about that. On 31 January, someone dialled the Wallises' home number. After obtaining first the engaged tone and then the unobtainable tone—that would not happen now after privatisation — the caller was finally connected to an answerphone which said:
This is Tim and Bridie Wallis's number. We are out at the moment. Please leave your name, address and phone number and we will ring you back".
Asked to leave his address on the answerphone? He rang the Wallises' number twice more during a period of five days and each time got the answerphone. The voice on the answerphone was described as male, with an Americanised accent. The caller did not know Tim Wallis well, but knew that he spoke with an American accent. He therefore assumed that it was Tim's voice on the machine. The Wallises report that the telephone regularly rings once or twice and then stops before they can answer it.
I could give a list of people who have lawfully monitored cruise missile exercises around Greenham common but have found telephones out of order when they go to make a second or subsequent telephone call. We accept the need for surveillance — unfortunately — but this House must meet the genuine complaints of those engaged in perfectly lawful activities.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: A meeting was held in the county building at Linlithgow yesterday, sponsored by West Lothian district council, in which the National Coal Board, the NUM, NACODS and Lothian regional council members took part. I was asked a specific question about a specific statement that appeared in a well researched article by Nick Davies in The Observer on Sunday. It stated:
the new direction of F Branch has forced MI5 officers to twist the definition of subversion in order to justify the new choice of targets"—
in a manner that directly concerns a number of my constituents, not only in the mining industry.
The most common practice is to charge it a non-subversive group by finding one subversive individual within it and using him as a pretext to study the organisation itself. The Scottish NUM, for example, which does not qualify as subversive, has been targeted via its president, Mick McGahey, who qualifies because of his membership of the Communist Party.
I want to know—not necessarily in the reply tonight, but in a letter—whether Nick Davies is telling the truth or whether he has misunderstood the position. Many of my constituents are anxious to know the answer.
We will deal with many of Mr. Davies' other statements in Committee—for example, whether there are burglars of A1(A) or locksmiths and carpenters of Al(D). The difficulty is that there is a calm assumption that British intelligence can ignore the criminal law, and that is one of the central issues of the present controversy. It is no wonder that sensible people have become disturbed about the activities of British intelligence.
What exactly are the true responsibilities of MI5 and how does it set about fulfilling them? There is no statute to define the role of MI5; there is no statute even to register its existence. Its only constitution is a six-paragraph directive, referred to by the Home Secretary in his opening speech, secretly issued 33 years ago by the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe. That memorandum forms the minimum framework of rules, regulations and supervision. Such a code, if it were ever effective, has faded into a hazy twilight under the strain of increasing


Government demands for information about new targets — demands that many MI5 personnel, not necessarily all, given the sort of people that they often are, have been all too eager to comply with.
It is all very well for the Home Secretary to say in his opening statement that he and the Prime Minister are satisfied, that they take seriously the continuing duties, and various other anodyne phrases. We must ask whether they are in control. What is going on behind their backs—even if we assume that they do not know about it? MI5 has shifted since 1970 from being essentially a counter-espionage organisation, aimed at coping with the schemes of foreign powers, to a domestic surveillance organisation. I am told that MI5 now has 7,000 employees. If this is true, what in heaven's name does MI5 find all these folk to do with their time? Techniques and operations which had been acceptable when used against some supposedly "bona fide" enemy run a coach and horses through MI5's own directive and the laws of the land when they are turned on domestic targets such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament or the National Union of Mineworkers.
The time for all hon. Members is limited, Mr. Speaker. Therefore, I should like simply to make one point at some length. It is to back up the argument of my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) who said that there should be a good communications engineer on the tribunal. It is not sufficient for the tribunal to consist only of lawyers. There must be somebody on the tribunal who knows something about solid state physics.
During the 1960s, when the current network of electronic exchanges was being designed, the security forces insisted upon the incorporation of a facility known as TKO—for trunk offering. The technical details of this are in the public domain. I refer to the Post Office Electrical Engineering Journal 1971, which is familiar to my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding).
TKO works as follows. When one dials a trunk number —for example, 01 837 1234, the telephone number of The Times—the "0" gets one a trunk line at the exchange. This dispatches one's call onward through the network, tagged "1×837 1234". The "×" is one of four priority codes: call box, private phone, operator, or TKO. Thirdly, on receipt of a TKO tagged call the receiving exchange connects the caller into the addressed line without disturbing it. In other words, if the telephone is on the hook, one hears nothing. If it is in use, the person can hear them but they cannot hear him.
Since TKO is accomplished by means of solid state switching at the exchange, the only way to be sure that a telephone is clean is to check the appropriate board at the exchange with a tool known as a logic analyser. Even this does not guarantee that one's number will not receive a TKO a few seconds later. In particular, the patent machines sold to detect tapping by measuring line impedance are completely useless against TKO. I was foolish enought to invest in one. An authorised TKO is carried out using a monitor phone which looks a bit like a tape recorder with a numerical keypad on it. The operator thereof merely taps out the desired number and listens or records as desired.
More than 1,000 monitor phones are currently in use. Authorised users include, of course, GCHQ, the police and the security services and also such seemingly innocuous bodies as the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise. In addition, all exchanges have a monitor facility built into general equipment. This is routinely used by operator supervisors and maintenance engineers who may often informally supply intercepts to local end users.
Worst of all, because of the huge number of British Telecom technical employees and staff in supplier firms who must have access to the basic telephone system specification, and because of the article I have already mentioned in the Post Office Electrical Engineering Journal, there are at least 100,000 people in Britain with the knowledge and expertise to construct an unauthorised monitor phone.
The principal use of these is in hacking, or gaining unauthorised access to computer data, in particular in order to break into somebody's mailbox in Telecom gold. The hacker does a TKO on the victim, not on the gold, and then records the victim's log on code next time he accesses his mailbox. That is the technical position. I shall not go on about it other than to say that there must be people on the tribunal who are capable of looking at the mechanics of what is being done. Lawyers, although they are necessary, could be simply putty in the hands of those who want to get away with things that they should not be getting away with.
My interest in this matter has been aroused particularly by the case of the late Hilda Murrell on which I spoke during the debate on the Consolidated Fund. It is important for Ministers to understand that suspicions have arisen in the minds of many hon. Members who have been in the House for 20 years or more, which would not have arisen before, because of the complete breakdown of consensus politics. Those of us who would have accepted a ministerial word—Conservative or Labour—as a man's bond in previous Parliaments can, because of recent events, no longer do so. That is the breakdown in political trust which is afflicting Britain. Therefore, we may be forgiven for being far more suspicious of Ministers than we would have been previously.

Mr. Kevin Barron: The debate has been in some ways wide of the mark when one considers the Bill. I make no excuse for some of my opening remarks. There are two major reasons why speeches have not been directed straight at the Bill, both of which I understand. First, there has been the Bridge report and the recent public comment in the media, both on television and in newspapers, on surveillance and Britain's security service in relation to the Bill. Secondly—the Minister accepted this in his opening speech—the omission of other types of surveillance from clause 1 means that this is a narrow Bill. Recent events in the media suggest that the Government have sought to whitewash the interception of communications, and I share that view.
The Government asked Lord Bridge to do in five days what it would have taken any Select Committee or other group of hon. Members weeks and weeks to do—to look into the allegations made in a television programme, stretching back over 14 years, on how telephone calls are intercepted and how people are surveyed. Many suspicions


have been brought to fruition in a programme that was temporarily withdrawn from the television screens of the British people.
No individual can sort and obtain from the Home Office and security service all the documents which could be of assistance in determining whether the issue of a warrant was justified. That would be impossible for anybody to undertake in five days.
Lord Bridge's final comment—that he was satisfied after a full examination of all the relevant documents that no warrant for interception was issued in contravention of the appropriate criteria—must leave every right hon. and hon. Member with many question marks in their minds. Questions will remain about the contents of that programme and whether there were official phone taps.
I can honestly and earnestly believe why the Home Secretary would refrain from commenting in the House on many matters in relation to major crimes such as drug pushing or many issues that would undermine the national interest and why the Bill will not open the door for those involved in such crimes to check what is happening. But I cannot for the life of me understand why the Home Secretary has not commented seriously today on the allegations that were made in that television programme in relation to matters which I think all hon. Members will agree pose no threat to national security. Yet nothing has been said. We have only two paragraphs in the Bridge report, which was passed from the Prime Minister's office to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition.
My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) mentioned that public comment is being made about the demise of our security service. He pointed out that many others also believe that in the past 14 years this country has changed from surveying foreign powers and their involvement in Britain to surveying members of the public.
It has been alleged—I accept it—that Jack Jones and Lord Scanlon, a member of the other place—were put under public surveillance in 1972—
It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.
Ordered,
That, at this day's sitting, the Interception of Communications Bill may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour.—[Mr. Garel-Jones.]
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Mr. Barron: I repeat that Mr. Jack Jones, who was then general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union — a much honoured man, who since retirement has fought on behalf of the pensioners and of their rights — and Lord Scanlon were put under surveillance by MI5 in 1972 by the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath), who was then Prime Minister.
In the 1980s, MI5 began to survey the peace movement. No one with any sense would say that CND could be described as a threat to national security or that, for example, the chairperson of Christian CND, who works at CND headquarters, is any sort of subversive. Yet allegations have been made daily on television and in the press about how people have been surveyed in one form or another.
On 10 March, an article appeared in The Observer, in which Mr. Nick Davies commented in great detail on MI5.

As his article is important to the Bill and is relevant to what many other hon. Members have said, I shall quote it. He says:
As the line between security and politics became more blurred"—
in that 14-year period—
F Branch grew and took on new responsibilities. The old simplicity of studying the Communist Party and overtly fascist groups was replaced by a complex array of targets, reflected in the branch's current structure.
The old targets—the Communist party and the Communist front organisations such as the World Peace Council—occupy two sub-sections, F2(C) and F2(D). Trade unions are studied by F2(N) with its increased staff. Teachers, students, pacifists and MPs"—
I understand that to mean Members of Parliament—
are to be the job of F2(R) which has recently completed special projects on journalists and lawyers".
If what Mr. Nick Davies and many other well-respected commentators have said about the past 14 years is true, we must ensure that all hon. Members and all members of the public are protected from such activities by strict guidelines and by a measure of accountability.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) read out a list of items from Exchange and Mart. That publication comes out weekly and such items are commonly available for people to buy. The items demonstrate that surveillance and tapping can be carried out not only by those involved in the security network, such as members of MI5, but by citizens or Members of Parliament who want to pry into their neighbours' affairs or into, perhaps, what is going on in the adjoining office in this House.
The Bill and clause 1 fall far short of giving any security to people. I should have liked the Bill to be far wider. Many people have discussed controls. In 1970, a committee on privacy under the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Younger was set up to consider whether legislation was need to further protect citizens, commerce and industry against intrusions into privacy. The committee recommended that the unlawful use of technical device for surreptitious surveillance should be a criminal offence. Clause 1 should be extended to include that.
The Law Commission on breach of confidence recommended that a civil course of action should be available to any individual whose personal privacy had been invaded by the use of the surveillance device. That should also be in the Bill. We should have a far more comprehensive Bill. Hon. Members should be in a better position to take wiser decisions about surveillance and the use of the security forces.
I do not know how hon. Members can interpret exactly what is meant by the three paragraphs in clause 2(2). One of them relates to national security. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) talked about terrorism. No hon. Member would in any way weaken the resolve of the security forces or any organ of the Government to stop and stamp out terrorism and the awful scenes that have for a long time resulted from it. The second paragraph relates to serious crime. No one would wish to claim that people involved in serious crime or in bringing hard drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, into the country, which lead to the death of those who have been led mistakenly to use them, should not be under surveillance. All hon. Members will agree that constant surveillance is necessary, and that when they are found to be guilty of such terrible crimes, people should be brought to justice.
The third paragraph relates to economic well-being. We must ask what that means now, what it will mean when and if the Bill in its present form becomes law, and how Governments will interpret it in future. It is clear from the allegations made by the media during the past two or three weeks that we must question exactly what "economic wellbeing" means. It has been alleged that the telephones of Mr. Arthur Scargill and Mr. Mick McGahey were tapped in the late 1970s, presumably because of what happened in 1972 or 1974. Was that because that was against the economic well-being of the country? At that time I was a working miner, and I can assure the House that I did not think so. Those actions gave me a decent wage for what all hon. Members believe to be a dark, grimy and dangerous job. The national interest was well served in recognising what the miners wanted and in giving it to them.
It is alleged that in 1978, not under the present Government, Mr. Fred Harraway, the chief shop steward of Ford at Dagenham had his phone tapped because people wanted to know what his bottom line was in the Ford pay dispute. That would have interested everyone, but was the tapping for the well-being of the country? I would be worried if that were described as in the national interest or as looking after the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. I would find it difficult to support any Administration that was prepared to put to the test the rights of British people to their freedom to decide the price of their labour.
If those allegations are true, we must ask what clause 2 is about, even though the Bill represents only a small part of surveillance. I am not happy with these bland statements about economic well-being and national security. We must have more debates about them, and that is one reason why I shall vote against Second Reading.
Another reason why I will vote against it is clause 3�ž

Mr. Hickmet: Of course, clause 2(2)(c) would allow the surveillance of meetings between, for example, the leadership of the NUM and Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, would it not?

Mr. Barron: We could discuss the economic wellbeing of this country and the £19·1 million a year trade surplus that Britain has with Libya. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to take me down that path, he should apply for an Adjournment debate on it, and I shall take 15 minutes of his time to talk about Britain and Libya, whether in relation to the NUM or McAlpine or other people involved with the Conservative party and Libya for many years.

Mr. Norman Buchan: I was on the telephone tonight to Mrs. McGahey to inquire about and send good wishes to Mick McGahey after the serious attack upon him, and no doubt, because of that sort of attitude, we were being monitored.

Mr. Barron: I hope that Mick McGahey recovers well from that attack. We read in the media about supposedly sniggering remarks made about Mrs. McGahey's telephone conversations with her friends when people were trying to find out where Mick McGahey was at any one time. If that happened, it was an infringement of the civil liberties of an individual. I hope that all right hon. and hon. Members will stand up and say that our civil

liberties should not be ignored. They must be protected at all times within certain parameters. I have described some people in this country whose civil liberties I would not protect, but the areas must be clearly defined.
Clause 3 deals with the scope of the warrant. This is obviously the area where the Home Secretary needs some flexibility and some control, if that is not too harsh a word for some hon. Members. We must have clearly defined areas where people can and cannot go. If there is to be any accountability, whether to a commissioner or to a tribunal, this is an important clause. Clause 3(1)(a) talks about
such communications as are sent to or from one or more addresses specified in the warrant.
Paragraph (i) talks about
one particular person specified or described in the warrant",
and paragraph (ii) talks about
one particular set of premises so specified or described.
Those provisions are tightly drawn, and many people here would say, "We have some control because a Home Secretary can say what the security services can intercept." But subsection (b) talks about
such other communications (if any) as it is necessary to intercept in order to intercept communications falling within paragraph (a) above.
It is a catch-all phrase. In effect it means that we can move away from those three specific areas to widen the scope of warrants. I hope that in Committee the House will give serious consideration to clause 3 and decide that the provisions of paragraph 1(b) should not be enacted.
I deal next with clause 7. I am sorry that the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) is no longer present. He spoke earlier wearing what he described as work wear—the black waistcoat, the black jacket and the pin-striped trousers that are worn at the Temple. He spoke of the five members of the tribunal being selected from barristers, advocates or solicitors of not less than 10 years standing. We have already suggested the possibility of a trade union official or other people in society who could adequately sit on the tribunal. The hon. and learned Member for Burton said that the five members should be chosen from this famous closed shop which has existed in Britain for many years—as I understand it, the only one that is not under attack from Government legislation. The hon. Gentleman suggested that these members should be selected not from among those with parliamentary responsibility but from members of the senate of the inns of court and the bar. It might be more relevant if they were selected from the bar golfing society, which I understand is very good just now at picking judges. The president or the secretary of the bar golfing society might be in a better position to select members to sit on the tribunal.
I believe, as I understand my party believes, that the five people of the tribunal should be selected more widely than has been suggested. The tribunal will have a difficult but important job to do if civil liberties, about which hon. Members speak frequently, are to be protected. I believe that these five people should have a wider background than the law. They should be the standard bearers. We would entrust them with a great deal of responsibility for the individual liberties of us all, be it Members of Parliament allegedly under surveillance by MI5 or F branch, or members of CND, trade unionists or any other group in society allegedly under surveillance.
Clause 8 states that the commissioner would be responsible for reporting to the Prime Minister and issuing an annual report to Parliament. It also states that the annual report will have to be vetted, and certain matters omitted


for reasons of security. I understand and accept that it is not possible to place before Parliament everything that has happened in a 12-month period. However, in the protection of the civil liberty of every citizen, I suggest that the parliamentary accountability of a commissioner should go wider than the office of the Prime Minister. This accountability should be similar to that of all right hon. and hon. Members who serve on Select Committees and make submissions in confidence which they request should not be for publication. In Committee, I hope that an amendment will be tabled requiring that the annual report of the commissioner be placed before a Select Committee of the House and be subject to questions. This would meet the allegation made in the programme "20:20 Vision" that the Secretary of State was using material gained in a subversive manner from the headquarters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmement.
By acting in that way, it would not be possible for the Prime Minister of the day to be accused of political bias when considering those annual reports. Discussing the matter in confidence, a Select Committee could ensure that those involved in our security services did not go beyond the guidelines laid down by Parliament to protect the rights of the individual.
I shall vote against the Bill at this stage, not because I do not want satisfactory security for the nation and its citizens but to ensure that their rights and freedoms are upheld. If the Bill is read a Second time, I hope that in Committee hon. Members of all parties will joint to amend the measure to ensure that the rights of individuals are fully protected.

Mr. Alex Carlile: The hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Mr. Corbett) concentrated on the question of safeguards and scrutiny. Our aim must be to ensure that the Bill provides the right safeguards against unreasonable telephone intervention and the right form of scrutiny to discover whether there has been improper interception of communications.
With that in mind, I welcome this opportunity to consider legislation designed to set acceptable limits on the interception of telephone conversations. For many years we have read in the press, and in the debate we have been told, stories — many of them anecdotes, often unsubstantiated — about alleged unlawful telephone tapping.
Over the years, on a few occasions, people have told me that they either worked for or had in the past been employed by MI5. I have not believed any of them. I doubted whether they would have been working for MI5 had they been prepared to give that information.
However, we have recently—this has been the value of the "20:20 Vision" programme — had what can fairly be described as being in the category of evidence which has concentrated our attention on the real issues behind our scrutiny of the Bill. That has been the value of Miss Massiter's revelations.
If they be true I know not. I do not have the advantage which, for example, the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) has of having known someone who was named in that programme as having been a spy for MI5. Nor do I have the advantage or otherwise of knowing whether Miss Massiter was speaking the truth.

However, the issues raised by the programme were sufficiently serious and were put objectively enough to call for close attention.
I welcome not only the Bill but the opportunity it gives for the House to consider the whole issue, although I do not welcome all of its provisions. I welcome, too, the fact that the Government have decided to accept the judgment in the Malone case to the extent of incorporating the terms of article 8 of the European convention on human rights in the measure.
We must, however, bear in mind —I am surprised that this has not been pointed out in the debate—that article 8 is now of some antiquity, having been drafted and agreed to in the immediate nervousness of the years shortly after the last war. If one reads that article with care now, one wonders whether it needs some redrafting and tightening, whether it is not too broad and whether, unfortunately, that breadth is not reflected in the Bill.
The Bill arrives in the context of a wealth of criticism of the diffuse state of the law on surveillance and privacy. We have had a number of reports that have severely criticised the state of the law, or in some cases the lack of any law on the subject. If one looks, for example, at the Philips Royal Commission on criminal procedure, one notes in paragraph 3.57 a recommendation that. is not included in this Bill and which in my opinion should have been. It is this:
We therefore recommend that the use of surveillance devices by the police (including the interception of letters and telephone communications) should be regulated by statute. The specific practices subject to regulation should be set out in secondary legislation to enable new techniques to be incorporated as they are developed".
That recommendation, not incorporated in this Bill, goes very much beyond telephone tapping and interception of the mail. It deals with all surveillance devices.
We know of the Younger committee on privacy, which recommended that there should be a right of action in the civil courts over unwanted telephone tapping and also the use of surveillance devices.
The Home Secretary, in answer to an intervention of mine which I feel would perhaps have come rather better from the Tory Back Benches in the circumstances, said that the Government intend, as I understand it, to introduce legislation following the recommendation of the Law Commission on breach of confidence. I hope that we shall hear more about that from the Minister of State when he winds up, because it seems to me that that undertaking, welcome though it is, goes only so far and not far enough in adopting the many recommendations in at least the three reports I have mentioned, which deal with the whole question of the interception of communications of all sorts and interference with privacy. And, of course, a much more modern concern has arisen — the possible intervention in communications which are sent by electronic means, by computer.
I agree with what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan) about the way in which the scrutinising of telephone tapping should take place. Unless we hear something much more convincing from the Home Secretary, given that the reports to which I have referred were prepared some years ago, the House can only deplore the failure to provide a package of legislation dealing with the whole question of privacy and surveillance.
The Malone case gave rise to this Bill, but although the Government appear to be seeking to provide an answer to


the complaint which was found justified in that case and although I accept, of course, that the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary believes that the Bill provides an answer to that, I wish to draw the attention of the House to clause 9.
Mr. Malone was charged with a criminal offence of dishonesty. During the course of the case his counsel was cross-examining a policeman and, as counsel sometimes do, he asked to see the policeman's notebook. In that notebook there was a cryptic reference which did not make any sense in the context of the evidence which the police officer had been giving. After some thought, counsel rightly tumbled to the fact that it was a reference to the tapping of Mr. Malone's telephone. It was that discovery by counsel that led to the case going through the British courts and ending up in the European Court of Human Rights.
Under clause 9 of the Bill, counsel for Mr. Malone, who cross-examined the police officer and obtained an admission from him that Mr. Malone's telephone had been tapped, would no longer be able to ask those questions. It is not entirely clear that that is the case, because a person who cannot be asked questions of that sort in court includes any person holding office under the Crown.
As the Home Secretary knows, one could fill volumes of legal textbooks with arguments, judgments and speeches in the House of Lords, in its judicial capacity, which have dealt with whether a policeman holds office under the Crown. However, that begs the question, because whether or not counsel could ask the sort of question that was asked in the Malone case of a police officer, there is a wealth of cases in which, under the Bill, it would not be possible to conduct such cross-examination —for example, prosecutions by the Inland Revenue or, perhaps more in context, prosecutions by Her Majesty's Customs and Excise, for there is no doubt that Customs and Excise officers are persons holding office under the Crown.
Therefore, it seems to me that the goal which was the aim of the legislation in principle, and which led to the legislation being introduced, is missed by a mile because of the provisions of clause 9. I hope that we shall receive an undertaking that the Government will look with great care once again at clause 9 so that the legislation, if enacted—perhaps one should realistically say, "when enacted"—includes clear provisions that will ensure that if a situation similar to the Malone case arises in court, counsel will not be stopped by an artifice from pursuing the matter.
Another matter to which I should like to refer is the definition of "serious crime" in the Bill. Under its provisions, the Secretary of State can issue a warrant if he considers it necessary.
for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime".
Many hon. Members were most grateful to the Home Secretary for accepting so many interventions in his opening speech, which enabled the debate to get off on a useful basis, and to a constructive start in which all the questions were raised. During an intervention of mine, I asked whether "serious crime" would be defined, and referred to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, in which the term "serious arrestable offence" is defined. The Home Secretary's answer appeared to be that we could not put that definition in the Bill because "serious arrestable

offence" is not the same as "serious crime". At last we have managed to persuade the Government, as many of us tried to do throughout the debates on the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, that the term "serious arrestable offence" includes many trivial non-serious offences that happen to be arrestable. I see that the Home Secretary is shaking his head. Perhaps he will agree with this at least. It is important that some effort should be made to define "serious crime" in the context of this Bill so that parameters are set whereby the Secretary of State knows what "serious crime" is before he considers the issue of a warrant.
Something that has not been mentioned during the debate, but which is of extreme importance, is schedule 2. It is substituted for section 45 of the Telecommunications Act 1984. It deals with the position when a person who is engaged in the running of a public telecommunications system — an employee of British Telecom or Mercury for example — intentionally discloses to someone either the contents of a telephone call or information concerning the use made of a telephone. We all know in the House that industrial espionage that involves serious intervention with personal privacy is becoming almost endemic in certain parts of industry. Yet when we look at schedule 2, containing the new section 45(4) of the 1984 Act, we find that a BT or Mercury employee who, for example, gives to an industrial spy details of all the telephone numbers rung up by a particular person, say the managing director or chairman of a public company, will be subject, even on conviction on indictment, only to a fine. An unduly lenient view seems to have been taken of that.
The Government should reconsider the penalties. It is unacceptable that an employee of British Telecom, for example, should be subject only to a fine in those circumstances. The stakes are so high in industrial espionage that those who persuade the employee to give the details either of the conversations or of the general nature of calls made by a particular person will not be put off by the prospect of a fine. It is unrealistic.
In regard to the powers of the tribunal, it will be able to investigate complaints but it will not inform a complainant whether surveillance is being carried out unless the tribunal decides that the procedure for authorising and renewing warrants has not been complied with. That is what it amounts to. The powers of the tribunal are virtually purely procedural.
The problem arises because the test that the Secretary of State has to apply before authorising an interception is wholly subjective. The tribunal will have to decide whether the Secretary of State in good faith considered that the warrant was necessary. If it decides that the Home Secretary in good faith considered that the warrant was necessary, that will be the end of the matter for the tribunal. That is what clause 2 says. That provision requires major amendment so that the tribunal will be able to scrutinise not whether the Home Secretary considered in good faith that the interception was necessary, but whether the interception really was necessary. Such an amendment would make the tribunal far more effective because it would be able to decide on the merits of the case.
In regard to the procedural provisions and the question of judicial review of the tribunal, the tribunal can make its own rules. That is what the Bill says. It is unlikely, having regard to the nature of the tribunal, that it will provide


rules which conform to the rules of natural justice. Indeed, the essence of the secrecy which underpins the tribunal is that it will have to defy the rules of natural justice. Also, the individual or company feeling aggrieved by possible unlawful interception of communications will not be able to apply for judicial review of the tribunal's conduct or the way in which the tribunal approached the case, even on the ground of legal procedures.
The rules of natural justice, therefore, are not applicable to the tribunal—a most unusual situation in the context of the legal philosophy and jurisprudence of the country. Over recent years, the borders of administrative law and judicial review have been extended most helpfully on occasions by the Court of Appeal; that has been confirmed by the House of Lords in its judicial capacity. The provisions of the Bill in relation to judicial review and administrative law show a surprising, unattractive and even painful regression to those of us who wish to see the law continuing to develop in that sphere.
I invite the Government to consider carefully the whole procedure and structure of the tribunal in order to provide something, whether a tribunal of this sort, a special Committee of the House or whatever, which will ensure that at the very least the rules of natural justice—the most basic of legal rules—can be complied with.

Mr. Austin Mitchell: The passion shown by Labour Members tonight is not a passion about the Bill, which is a pathetic, futile measure, but about the freedom of the individual and his rights and liberties, and in particular the right to privacy. I find it extraordinary that Conservative Members, who have demonstrated such passion in favour of the right to have one's teeth rot, or the right to go headfirst through a windscreen, or the right to have one's head bashed in because one does not want to wear a crash helmet, have not shown more passion on a subject that is of vital importance — the right to privacy and freedom, and the civil rights of individuals.
The origins of the Bill show how pathetic it is. It was forced on the Government by the Malone case, yet closes up the loophole shown by that case so that it could not happen again. It pretends to conform to European practice, but does not do so. Having foisted this farce on us, the Government have taken the credit, and said, "Aren't we magnanimous in providing regulations for phone tapping?"
I speak about the measure from an ordinary, commonsense point of view. I know that in some political circles it is a demonstration of virility to have one's phone tapped. Indeed, when I learned that phone tapping improves the phone service and gets rid of the normal crackle, I almost wanted my phone tapped and wondered whether appeals to the tribunal will come from people who find that they are not getting the normal crackling service from BT, but a good service, which shows that the phone is being tapped.
The unfortunate thing about this Bill is that it tackles only a small part of the problem, and that inadequately. It leaves aside bugging, electronic eavesdropping, and all the devices about which we have heard. Essentially, it is setting out to regulate canal traffic in the age of the high speed train and the motorway. It deals with one, unimportant, part of the problem. The Bill should regulate the use of devices overall and provide for a right to privacy.
Secondly, the Bill covers only a small part of interception—the monitoring of transatlantic calls and of overseas telegrams, the activities of Menwirth hill in monitoring calls in this country. I see from the 1980 figures of the number of people involved in tapping in MI5 that the Ebury bridge office, which I gather is known as Tinkerbell because of its activities in tapping phone calls, has 140 staff. However, in that year, there were 440 interceptions. What rate of productivity is that in the new Britain? They cannot all be listening to the interminable conversations of Mrs. McGahey over the telephone.
The Bill does not even regulate many of the manifestations. It does not regulate what is regulated elsewhere in Europe—the provision to the police and the security services of listings of telephone calls made. The customer finds it impossible to get out of BT a list of the calls that he has made, but such information will be freely available, to the security services, with the intrusion of liberty that is implied in that.
The Bill fails to deal with the problems. It is a buggers' charter because it pretends that the whole situation can be regulated and gives an appearance of confidence and respectability. It claims that all is well, and that the Government are tackling the problem without controlling it. However, the fundamental problem is the nature of the security services, particularly MI5. One has to talk about it on the basis of the hints and leaks in the programme last week because we do not have the information. We need more information about what is going on.
I remember that in New Zealand, the security service was listed in every telephone book. One could ring up and turn in one's friends for fun and profit, and that might be appropriate. On one occasion, I rang the head of the security service and invited him to be on television. He said, "Yes, marvellous, I would love to be on television." He came round. We could do with that degree of openness in our security service, especially when we react of allegations that the cost of security amounts to £1 billion per annum. What are we getting for that expenditure and how many are employed in the service?
It appears from "20:20 Vision" that the service is getting out of control in certain crucial respects. It seems that it is overstepping the limits within which it should operated. That must be so, in the light of recent problems. If those in the service are to fulfil the role that the Secretary of State has prescribed for them, they must be paragons of virtue, fellows of All Souls and men of the highest intellect and integrity, if not High Court judges. But we know that that is not always their nature. For example, we have the extraordinary Bettaney case. Bettaney was recruited for lunatic Right-wing politics at Oxford. Presumably he could not become a Conservative Back Bencher, so he became a member of the security service. He worked in one of the most sensitive parts of MI5 when he was arrested for drunkenness. It is reported in The Sunday Times—it must be true if it is in The Sunday Times—that on one occasion he ran down the street shouting, "I am a spy, I am a spy." Two weeks later he was accused of fare-dodging on British Rail. That was one of the paragons of virtue who was upholding the delicate balance between the freedom of the individual and the efficiency of the service.
That cannot be right. The service is secret and because of that it develops its own attitudes, mentalities and systems and proceeds to function in its own way. The Home Secretary assures us that the allegations against the


service are not correct, but how does he know that that is so? How does he know that MI5 is not making unauthorised taps? Why was Lord Bridge not asked to inquire into that?
If the service functions in the way that a priori reasoning would lead one to assume, it must be difficult to control. It must be impossible to tell whether it is functioning in an unauthorised fashion. The allegations made in "20:20 Vision" need specifically to be confirmed or denied. The programme presented a horrifying picture of a service that was overstepping the limits of its responsibility. It has been tapping those who are Communists who are now in CND and those who were Communists many years ago, who are active in trade unions and the National Council for Civil Liberties.
Most of the allegations of tapping had surfaced before the programme in the form of complaints by the individuals concerned. It is only now that they have been confirmed by the programme. The Home Secretary owes it to us—"20:20 Vision" coincided with the Bill—to tell us whether the allegations are correct. Until he gives us a positive assurance that they have been inquired into and that they are correct or incorrect, his word on other parts of the Bill must be suspect.
The allegations of tapping have a ring of truth, and Miss Massiter was convincing. The allegations tied in so well with the evidence that had come to the surface previously that they had every sign of truth. They present the picture of a service which is exceeding its powers and acting out of control. That is dangerous because the political climate that is developing is such as to encourage the service to function in that way and to behave accordingly. It is true that there were excesses under the previous Labour Government, to our shame, but that Government consisted of solid men and Ministers who were trusted as men of integrity — for example, my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leed's South (Mr. Rees) and prickly individualists who were concerned for civil liberties. How much more dangerous is the situation under a Government with an overwhelming majority? That is in itself an incentive to cut corners, to relax the strict rules and to use power.
We have a Prime Minister who believes that she alone, and those who think like her, have all the answers and the key to truth. She has turned the Punch slogan "That's the way to do it" into a system of government and believes that

those who oppose her are not so much misguided as sinister. She wants to work only with those who are "One of us" and believes that there is an enemy within. If such a climate is being set at the top, it is inevitable that the security service, which is difficult to control because it is closed and secretive, will overstep acceptable limits.
Such a danger will not be controlled by the Bill. Moreover, it will be worsened by the bitterness, confrontational politics and ideological tone that has crept into politics under the Government. Confrontation permeates everything where before there was harmony and trust. We have the very reverse of St. Francisism. The atmosphere of bitterness and antagonism has permeated the police, as can be seen from the treatment of the miners' strike. It is permeating the press and must permeate the security service. That alone can explain the aberrations that we saw in the "20:20 Vision" film.
Do we really need our security service? Is it worth £1 billion, or one tenth of the tax revenue from North sea oil? I know that it is conventional to say that we need it as a manifestation of our being a great power. It is one of those delusions of grandeur from which we suffer. Even if we need it for state security, to combat terrorism and certain extreme forms of crime, it must be admitted that the abuses of the service endanger those very ends. The entire system of interception and bugging thus becomes odious in the public eye.
Once MI5 extends its brief to domestic politics and taps the phones of members of CND, trade unionists and members of the National Council for Civil Liberties, Friends of the Earth and Shelter, and it passes information about the political background of CND on to the DS19 section in the Ministry of Defence, to be spread thence to the Daily Mail and the Daily Express, thus speaking to the people, we are on extremely dangerous ground. It is dangerous because the system comes into disrepute.
In a modern pluralistic society, we are all dissenters. Whether it is on the bomb, the environment, fluoridation, women's rights, animal rights or Welsh nationalism, most people are rebels in some way. They can feel threatened by a service that is extending itself. The danger is that our political debate and system is coarsened. The rights of one are the rights of all. The threat to the privacy of one's telephonic communications or civil rights is a threat to the privacy and rights of all. That is what this debate is about and why there is such passion on this side of the House. Because we are all dissenters and rebels, the Bill and the system leave a nasty taste in the mouth.

Orders of the Day — Interception of Communications Bill

Mr. Harry Cohen: Unauthorised phone tapping is causing considerable and far-reaching concern. It stretches even to the racing pages of a national newspaper, which earlier this week expressed fears that conversations between trainers and owners were being overheard to obtain racing tips. When it reaches that extent, it is a sure bet that something is wrong.
However, the matter is much more serious than that. Tapping is in widespread use against individuals and organisations. The report by Lord Bridge is a whitewash. The investigation was conducted at great speed for the convenience of the Government. It was instigated in response to the "20:20 Vision" revelations, and has been used by the Government as a smokescreen for this debate. Lord Bridge did not cover unauthorised operations, such as breaches of existing guidelines, surveillance of people not engaged in subversive activity or the planting of bugs by illegal break-ins. The report must be cleared out of the way before we turn to the important issues.
Many individuals have been the victims of tapping. A letter in The Guardian on 2 March, from Dr. Joe Collier, stated:
To your list of categories subject to telephone surveillance … I would like to add editors of medical journals. It is a most unnerving feeling to hear one's conversation played back during a phone call.
Dr. Collier is a correspondent with the Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin. The Times of 26 February lists many individuals who have been subject to tapping—trade unionists, the Left, the National Council for Civil Liberties, crusading journalists—not the hacks—CND and even the media itself. The article ends by saying that MI5 now vets all graduates applying for political posts with the BBC.
The Secretary of State for Employment said that he opposed the tapping of phones of union leaders in any circumstances other than when they were in contact with an enemy power. Does the Home Secretary agree with that? It is not the criterion now operating.
The "Panorama" programme on 2 March 1981, which is still relevant, was called "The Right to Privacy—the Need to Know." It was about a woman who was on record falsely as having links with terrorist organisations. In that programme Mr. Harold Salisbury was interviewed. He was the former Chief Constable of the North and East Riding of Yorkshire. The record of the programme states:
Interviewer: Who lays down the policy for what the Special Branch had to do. Was that laid down by you as Chief Constable?
Salisbury: No, no, no, no. These chaps used to go to instructions sessions with the actual security services.
Interviewer: In London, with MI5?
Salisbury: Well, yes.
Interviewer: Which groups would be in the files here?
Salisbury: Obviously anyone who shows an affinity towards Communism—That's commonsense—the IRA, the PLO and I would say anyone who's decrying marriage, family life, trying to break that up, pushing drugs or advocating the acceptance of certain drugs, homosexuality, indiscipline in schools, weak penalties for anti-social crimes, pushing that sort of thing. Oh, a whole gamut of things like that that could be pecking away at the foundations of our society and weakening it.
Interviewer: And do you regard these people as subversives?
Salisbury: Well, in a word, yes.
That is what he said — "pecking away at the foundations." That is a disgraceful way to operate.
Yet that has great similarity with the definitions that currently operate in the security services. These definitions are important. They regulate the operations of the security service. In July 1984 I asked for a definition of "subversive". The definition that I was given was:
Those which threaten the safety or well-being of the State, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means."—[Official Report, 3 July 1984, Vol 63, c. 85.]
That definition was given 10 years ago by a junior Minister in a throw-away sentence during a long speech in the other place. It did not come to light until 10 years later when I asked for a definition. It led me to ask the Government what they meant and this is the Written Answer that the Secretary of State for the Home Department gave:
The word bears its ordinary meaning of injure, or wear out. secretly, insidiously or imperceptibly."— [Official Report, 26 June 1984; Vol. 62, c. 378.]
I thought that was what the Labour party was trying to do in order to get rid of the Tories at the next general election. That answer was immensely complacent, arrogant, or both, because I found that it came from The Shorter Oxford Dictionary and that that definition was first used in 1569. This definition of "subversion" replaced the definition of Lord Denning. His definition was not perfect, but it is better than the current definition. He said that subversives are those
who contemplate the overthrow of Government by unlawful means".
That means those who contravene the law, not those who the Government or the security services think might have contravened the law.
I raised this matter in a parliamentary question about lawful activity not being regarded as subversive and undermining the state. In his written answer the Secretary of State said:
Tactics which are not themselves unlawful could be used with the aim of subverting our democratic system of government." — [Official Report, 11 July 1984; Vol. 63 c. 481.]
That is a blank cheque that allows the state to act against any person who is acting legally. The definition cart be extended indefinitely to cover virtually anybody. But the position is worse than that. There is the "Police War Duties Manual", of 1965, marked "Restricted". It is still in force, although it has probably been updated. It states that the police can take
special measures to maintain internal security, with particular reference to the detention or restriction of movement of potentially subversive people.
That is an immensely wide definition. Who, I ask the Secretary of State, are to be defined as potentially subversive? It destroys the protestations of the Secretary of State in his speech that control is provided by means of these definitions. The Maxwell Fyfe definitions which govern the security service are not perfect and need to be tightened up, but I shall leave that point for Committee.
This definition is being applied not only to telephone but to computer interceptions. I asked a question recently about whether the Home Secretary can intercept computer data. First of all he appeared to say no, but on closer reading the answer revealed that his power covers any form of communications in the postal and public telecommunications system. Computers operate between each other by phone links. That, too, gives the Home Secretary a wide new area of operation. He can tap into computer data.
The Data Protection Act 1984 is no safeguard. It is full of holes. The security services are exempt from it under section 27. The registrar, the ombudsman for data protection, is unaware of secret service activity, according to a parliamentary answer. The Home Secretary does not know whether any of his Cabinet colleagues have signed exemption certificates. Once a certificate has been signed by a Minister, MI5 does not have to renew that certificate. There is no obligation on the Home Secretary to review the security, accuracy or relevance of the data that is stored on the systems.
MI5 has a massive computer system. In Computing of 5 March 1982, it was reported that:
A top secret computer system capable of carrying a detailed file on every adult in the country has been set up clandestinely by the MI5 security service. It has been installed since 1978 at a cost of £20 million and has been developed despite growing fears over data protection and privacy … The computers—dual ICL 2980s"—
they have probably been updated now—
were ordered under the counter and paid for without informing Parliament.
The article continued:
Investigations by Computing and the New Statesman have revealed that an MoD building in Mayfair's Mount Row is the centre of the system.
It is no wonder that the Lindop committee said that there is no assurance that there is any healthy or constructive criticism and debate which ensures that the security services do not stray beyond their allotted functions.
That is an understatement.
An immense range of new technology is available for the surveillance of individuals. The security services have two approaches to that. They can block it, like stopping patents. About 800 patents every year are referred to the Ministry of Defence and about one seventh of those are stopped or restricted. Or they can use it themselves. For example, BT is introducing its customised telephone bills, which will show the date of every call, who made it and who received it and the cost in terms of time used. Five hundred lines can be monitored for £3,250. What could MI5 monitor on an annual budget of £160 million and the security services as a whole with £1 billion? They are not properly accountable.
Against that, we have this puny ineffective Bill, forced on the Government by the European Court. The Home Secretary has made great play of the role of the tribunal, but there is a great danger that it will be composed of placemen, amenable to the Government of the day. The legal editor of The Guardian said:
The tribunal is there to ensure procedural correctness in certain forms of interception: it cannot judge the merits of the decision to target persons or organisations. It may inspect the Home Secretary's signature, but it cannot look over his shoulder.
It is beyond legal scrutiny. It is not permitted to give reasons for its decision and it has the power to grant compensation if the information which was gained by authorised methods is misused to the detriment of the person tapped. The tribunal will not be a watchdog, as the Secretary of State described it, but a toothless poodle. It will not be satisfactory to those who are denied their rights. They will be resentful because they will be without recourse to justice.
The security services must be properly reined in to stop unauthorised tapping and bugging. The New Statesman even reported that there would be a burglary department.

Politicians, especially Conservative ones, have abused the system, as we know, for example, with the vendetta of the Secretary of State for Defence against CND, for his own reasons. We must move towards a more independent review of the security services and accountability. We could start by asking more parliamentary questions and giving them a wider berth. A Select Committee has also a role to play.
More generally, the Government should be much more open. That should be recognised as being in the national interest. We should take steps to curtail the self-perpetuating ever-expanding spy industry. It should not be allowed. The Royal Commission on criminal procedure mentioned the German model, which also could be adopted.
The editor of The Guardian said of the Bill:
This curious measure purports to impose legal controls on mail and telephone interception, but its true purpose and effect will be to remove them entirely from any scrutiny by the courts. It is a law, in other words, to place State surveillance above the law.
That is said of a measure from a party which claims to be against the power of the state over individuals. The Bill further institutionalises the Government's hypocrisy in this matter.

Mr. Clive Soley: The Bill in its present form does nothing to re-establish the delicate balance between the needs of the security services and the democratic rights of the British people. If the debate has revealed anything, it is the Conservative party's lack of understanding of the democratic traditions and rights which have been jealously guarded in the House. It also shows how the Government underestimate the effect of their present way of handling the security services on the morale of those services. The Opposition believe that security services are necessary, but if they are to operate within the law and be given the support of Parliament they also need to operate within clear guidelines. The Bill, in its present form, does not provide those clear guidelines.
Under the Government we have seen persistent attempts to get their policies through regardless of the rights of minorities and the democratic traditions of the House. When we hear them turn arguments about normal political conflict into words of the "enemy within" or, more recently, according to Mr. Ian MacGregor, of "making people who have been insubordinate pay", we recognise that what in the past was regarded as normal political conflict has been turned into a form of internal subversion which is alien to the Government.
The Bill would have prevented the Malone case—many of my right hon. and hon. Friends have made that point—and must be amended. The Bill as it stands would have meant that Mr. Malone could not have gone to the Strasbourg court, which would not then have leaned on the British Government to introduce this legislation. The Bill sets up a toothless tribunal of lawyers, which will not allay the fears that have risen as a result of the "20:20 Vision" programme and from other factors.
I have a specific question for the Minister. My right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) asked for an independent inquiry into the allegations made by that programme and others. There are many reasons for wanting the inquiry, not least in justice to the relatives and friends of Mr. Harry Newton. Many


people have seen the complaints of his family and friends that after his death he was unfairly named by Miss Massiter in the television programme. If that is correct, we should be able to say so. It is wrong to leave this slur, if it is a slur, on that man's name after his death.
I understand that today Mr. Ken Gill, the general secretary of AUEW/TASS, was visited by two men from Scotland Yard, I am told on the instructions of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The senior officer was a Chief Superintendent Bates. Mr. Gill was questioned about the alleged break-in referred to in the "20:20 Vision" programme and was asked whether he had known about it. His response was to say that, if he had known about it, he would have reported it. I want to know from the Minister whether the Government are carrying out further inquiries into the allegations in the "20:20 Vision" programme. If not, what was the purpose of that visit to Mr. Gill? If they are carrying out inquiries, what sort of report will be presented to the House in due course?
The Home Secretary must answer another question, which he avoided earlier when it was asked by one of my hon. Friends. If people who tap telephones are to give evidence to the tribunal, will they be protected from prosecution under the Official Secrets Act? There should be a fairly clear and simple answer to that. The Secretary of State was wrong to say, as I thought he did this afternoon—I shall check Hansard to make sure—that the tribunal can examine the Home Secretary's reasons for authorising a warrant. Clause 2(2) provides:
The Secretary of State shall not issue a warrant under this section unless he considers that the warrant is necessary.
The words "unless he considers" give him the responsibility for judgment, and that matter is not covered effectively in the schedule. He will have to amend the Bill if he is to stick by the words that he used in opening the debate.
The Government have made a piecemeal approach to the problem, which does not relate only to the interception of mail and the tapping of telephones. As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon (Mr. McWilliam), who made a helpful speech, and my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), both of whom have detailed knowledge of the technology behind the methods that we are examining, we should be concerned about the much wider area of surreptitious surveillance. There are electronic telescopes and lasers that pick up vibrations. In addition, there is electronic eavesdropping. Only a few weeks ago on 14 February, the BBC's "Tomorrow's World" programme showed a way in which, with about £100 worth of equipment and relatively limited electronic knowledge, one could eavesdrop on a computer terminal several floors up in an office block from a vehicle outside. Technology has been moving fast for several years.
That brings me to another important point. It is no good relying only on the methods that we have used in the past. If we consider what other countries are doing, what we have learnt from our experiences of recent years, and changing technology, we should recognise that there is a need for change in the way that we control our security services and deal with telephone tapping, postal interceptions and surveillance generally. My right hon. Friend the Member for Gorton read out advertisements from Exchange and Mart for the sort of equipment that can be bought over the counter. I understand that in a shop in

Tottenham one can buy the equipment that is used by MI5. If the position is becoming so stupid, we must examine it in more detail than we have done for some time.
Opposition Members—some Conservative Members tried to deny it—have said that we recognise the need for surveillance. No one has said anything different, and I certainly did not during my time as Opposition spokesman for Northern Ireland. What is crucial is to keep such surveillance under the control of the democratic system and, as far as possible, to keep it within the confines of the law. One area where tapping, interception and surveillance are extremely important is terrorism. That has been mentioned several times during the debate. A year or two ago, in conversation with the senior police officer in west Germany who was responsible for capturing the Baader Meinhof group, I was told of the difficulties that the police had experienced in capturing that group and staying within the constitutional law which contains regulations on the rights of the privacy of the individual. The police tracked down the group to a café where it held its meetings and planned its bombings and killings. They then planted a bug in one table of the café and one of their men activated the bug at the appropriate time, but to do that, at one stage they went outside the law.
The Opposition say that such an activity is undesirable and above all that it is wholly unacceptable if it is not under the control of the democratic procedures of Parliament or some suitable organisation of a similar type.
From the recent tracking of the arms cache of the Provisional IRA in Buckinghamshire, we know of another example where surveillance was appropriate. It is also appropriate in certain crimes, of which drug trafficking is one. Another area is espionage. After that, it is hard to justify some of the areas that have been suggested as appropriate for surveillance.
I am dubious, as are a number of my hon. Friends, about such phrases as subversion, economic well-being, national security and serious crime. If we are to write these into the laws of the land, we had better be clear what we are writing in and give them careful consideration.
Subversion in particular worries me a great deal. While I appreciate that it is not included in the three areas referred to in the Bill, what worries me is that subversion has been used by a number of people on a number of occasions as a reason for surveillance. Subversion means to try to overthrow a Government, but there is nothing wrong with trying to overthrow a Government as long as one does it within the law.
This brings us to the important point of keeping within the law. Although I do not usually find myself in agreement with Lord Denning, I hope that in Committee we will be able to consider in much greater depth his interpretation that subversion should mean only attempts to overthrow the Government by illegal means—in other words, that a criminal offence must be planned or committed. If we do not do that, we will slip into the area of political crimes.
We have difficulty in legislation of this type, because we recognise that we are dealing with an area which is strictly neither within the remit of the criminal law nor within the remit of the political. It overlaps the two areas. That is one reason that some countries, which we should examine, have gone down the road of having both judicial and ministerial warrants. There may be a lot to be said for that. If one does not want to go down that road, there is a case for arguing whether one should have judicial


warrants or ministerial warrants. One recognises the legal aspect of the problem; the other recognises the political aspect.
It troubles me considerably when, together with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 we put on the statute book legislation which is answerable no longer to a court of law but to Ministers. It is a dangerous road to go down unless we consider the implications carefully. There need to be checks before the act of interception—that is the issue of warrants—and accountability, and checks after the act of interception.
That brings me to another point with which a number of my hon. Friends have dealt fully, the question of a Select Committee. I have felt for a long time that a Select Committee of the House to oversee the security services might be a useful way of considering the problem afresh, keeping it under permanent review, and not demoralising the security forces by the suggestions made by Conservative Members—that we pretend that nothing has happened and that serious allegations have not been made on television programmes. To try to push this under the carpet does no good to the morale of the security forces, and it certainly does no good to the concept of the democratic liberties of the House.
The Victorians of all people would have been ashamed of the Conservative party and the way in which it tries to avoid the question of civil liberties and democratic rights. They would not have ducked these issues. It is significant that it was under a Conservative Government in the last century that committees of inquiry were held in the House to investigate the police. They do not talk about doing that now; that would be disruptive. In many respects, the Victorians looked after our democratic traditions much better than the present Government have ever thought of doing.
In that way, the Conservatives have betrayed and undermined the traditions of Parliament and in the same way, if they are not careful, they will betray and undermine the security services, because without effective democratic control, those services will get out of control, and any security officer worth his salt in a democratic society will not want such a situation to develop.
We shall seek to make this a much better Bill in Committee. If we do not succeed there, when we return to government we shall put the security services under effective and proper democratic control.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. David Waddington): The House was fortunate indeed to hear today two former Home Secretaries, one of whom later became Prime Minister, speak on these important matters. How different was the tone of their speeches — they being people who had to carry responsibility for these issues — from the warlike offering of the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) and the effort of the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), who also did not have to carry the onerous responsibilities in this sphere.
The right hon. Member for Chesterfield seemed to suggest that there was some difficulty — at least, he found it difficult—in saying what was and what was not parliamentary democracy. I found that frightening. He was followed by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West

(Mr. Terlezki), who knows well what is and what is not parliamentary democracy, and the vast majority of hon. Members have no difficulty in knowing what it is.
The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) put matters into perspective when he said that the Bill was an improvement, but not a solution. Everything came back to the integrity of the Home Secretary, he said, and he thought that there was no reason to doubt that. The Bill would produce some element of safeguard, he added.
The right hon. Member for Gorton went wide of the Bill. We do not resent that, because many hon. Members did the same. He dealt with the "20:20 Vision" programme and with the conduct of the operations of MI5. One must contrast his treatment of the allegations in the film — "I am not making allegations," he said, but it sounded precious like it—with the speech of the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees), which was a masterpiece of moderation, and we recall what he said about allegations concerning a person named Tommy Roberts.

Mr. Michael Forsyth: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that the researcher for the "20:20 Vision" programme, Mr. Gerry Gable, was a Communist party candidate in 1962, that he has a criminal record for breaking and entering while impersonating a GPO officer, and that his counsel claimed in his defence that he was hoping to obtain material which might be useful to the special branch? Given that that man was responsible for the programme, does my hon. and learned Friend think that we can place any credibility in it?

Mr. Waddington: It is not my job tonight to say whether the allegations in the programme were correct — [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] I will come to that shortly, and there is an obvious reason for that. The House has heard what my hon. Friend said.

Mr. Corbett: Is the Minister aware that the smear allegations of the hon. Member for Stirling (Mr. Forsyth) are 20 years late and of course are lapsed under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act? Will he reflect on the point that perhaps what his hon. Friend is more concerned about is that that senior and experienced journalist was responsible for the programme "Maggie's Militant Tendency", which linked Tory party candidates and Members with the National Front?

Mr. Waddington: Really, I cannot get involved in these matters. The House has now heard a little more about the background of the Bill which it did not know before. As the debate has gone so wide, I must, as a matter of courtesy, deal with some of these matters outside the Bill as such.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw) asked about a new head of MI5. There is to be a new head and he is to be somebody from outside. It is not customary to name the director general of MI5 and I shall not breach that practice tonight. It is interesting that he was selected two months ago, so his appointment has nothing whatsoever to do with these matters which have causes so much excitement in the past few weeks.
The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth said that there ought to be somebody to which or some way in which an employee of MI5 can complain. The main thing surely is that the management should be effective


and that the Home Secretary and the director general should take a keen interest in the morale of the employees and ensure that it remains high. My right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary mentioned earlier this afternoon the keen interest he has in these matters and his determination to play his part in that regard.
The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) talked about a visit by the police to the home of Mr. Ken Gill. I did not quite understand what, if anything, the hon. Gentleman was complaining about. It would seem to me that the police were quite obviously carrying out an investigation to see whether a criminal offence had been committed, as alleged by other persons.
It is important to make absolutely clear what we are and what we are not doing in the Bill and how inappropriate—one might say cynical—is the Opposition amendment when it refers to vague and sweeping criteria and to
interception on an unacceptably wide basis".

Mr. Barron: It seemed earlier that the Minister would comment on many of the things that were said in the programme in which Mr. Ken Gill was mentioned. I should like the hon. and learned Gentleman to address himself to the question that I put to him during the debate and which I repeat now. Presumably, from what he says, what was said in the "20:20 Vision" programme was not true, so why does he not comment on it? Why does he not tell us what allegations were made against Mr. Ken Gill? Why does he not comment on the allegations that Christian CND, CND itself and many other organisations have been infiltrated? Many hon. Members on both sides of the House would agree that this would not be against the national interest.

Mr. Waddington: The hon. Gentleman will remember that I did not say that I would comment on the allegations in the film; I said that I would explain why I would not deal with them. I shall do that now out of courtesy to the hon. Gentleman and to the hon. Members for Birmingham Erdington (Mr. Corbett) and Hammersmith, all of whom mentioned this matter.
We would do well to remember that a Home Secretary has never said whether or not in a particular case interception ever took place — for obvious reasons. Home Secretaries and Prime Ministers have never answered questions about the operation of our security service. A moment of thought would tell all hon. Members why that is so. A cascade of questions about a variety of matters would eventually give clues about how, why and in what circumstances certain operations were carried out.
The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth said in 1978:
I shall adhere to the normal practice of not commenting on security matters."—[Official Report, 29 June 1978; Vol. 952, c. 631.]
He was right then, and I am right now, to say that that is the practice and will remain the practice.
Since 1979 we have not departed from the practices of previous Governments. We are not seeking new powers now. We are seeking to put in statute form the very powers that the Opposition operated when they were in power.
The complaint of the right hon. Member for Gorton is no more than that every word in the 1980 White Paper explaining why an application on behalf of the security service for a warrant is not spelt out. We have made clear that we have operated and shall continue to operate in line with the criteria laid down over the years. The powers in

the Bill are not new. What are new are the safeguards surrounding the use of the powers. What are new are the procedures whereby a person who has been the subject of interception, which has not been properly authorised, may obtain redress.
The Bill detracts not at all from the individual's existing rights. On the contrary, it extends those rights. The Opposition amendment says that the Bill provides
insufficient safeguards for those adversely affected by unlawful interception.
That is downright cheek coming from an Opposition who, when in government, did nothing about that. They certainly cannot say that the European court had not by then given its judgment, because that part of the Opposition amendment has nothing to do with authorised interception. They are saying that we are not putting in this Bill sufficient safeguards against unlawful interception. That is cheek from an Opposition who throughout the years that they had Government responsibilities did precisely nothing in that area.
Clause 1 makes unlawful interception a criminal offence. Unlike the Labour Government, we are strengthening the safeguards against unlawful interception. We are making it a serious criminal offence. No Government of which Opposition right hon. and hon. Members were members did that.
Everyone, apart from the hon. Member for Bow and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo), accepts the need for a power of interception to deal with those who prey on our society and who are out to destroy it. It would be ridiculous—

Mr. Mikardo: The Minister must not say that, I spent a substantial part of my speech saying that I accepted the need for interception to deal with enemies of the state and with criminals.

Mr. Waddington: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for intervening. I had to leave the Chamber while he was speaking, and I obviously misread the notes given to me. I would not have made that allegation if I had understood the way in which he put the matter. I shall read carefully in Hansard tomorrow what the hon. Gentleman said. [Interruption.] I do not know what Opposition Members are getting so steamed up about. I have been on the Front Bench since half past 3. I have had to leave from time to time. When I leave, I have friends who are kind enough to make notes of what has happened, and I do them the courtesy of reading what is said. Unfortunately, perhaps my glasses were not working as well as they used to, and I shall have to have another eye test.
So I can start again and, with due courtesy to the hon. Gentleman, say that everyone would concede the need for a power of interception—

Mr. Mikardo: I accept the Minister's apology.

Mr. Waddington: —to deal with those who would prey on our society and are out to destroy it. It would be quite ridiculous if serious criminals could use the phone to plot their crimes secure in the knowledge that no one could find out what they were up to. It is our job, therefore, to ensure that the powers to intercept are adequate to meet the need, but it is also our job to ensure that the system commands the confidence of the great mass of law-abiding citizens who want their privacy adequately safeguarded, but certainly do not want the security service and the police hobbled and hamstrung in their efforts to root out the few evildoers in our midst.
I therefore heartily agree with all that has been said by many hon. Members on both sides of the House about the need for a balanced approach. That is what we are out to achieve in the Bill. The people expect—and they will continue to get — a balanced approach. The need to safeguard the privacy of communications in the public system is balanced with the need to protect the interests of society as a whole.
I do not pretend that it is easy to get the balance right. I am sure that wise members of Opposition parties realise how easily we could, in our anxiety to be more open in these matters, do great damage to the country. While debating interception, and, indeed, the wider question of the operations of the security service, we would all do well to remember what my noble Friend Lord Home of the Hirsel, with all his wisdom and experience, said during the debate on the Telecommunications Bill in the House of Lords on 19 March 1984, which was referred to by several other hon. Members. He said:
I have in my time known two Governments virtually wreck their secret services by attempts at open government and we cannot afford anything like that in this country."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 19 March 1984; Vol 449, c. 1036.]
Therefore, we know that the operation that we are carrying out involves a delicate balance. It involves no undue intrusion into the privacy of individual citizens, but sufficient powers in the hands of our security services, the police and so on, so that they can carry out their duties properly.
Some hon. Members have expressed regret that we are not taking the opportunity to deal with the whole question of surveillance in the Bill. That was the theme of more than one hon. Member's speech, such as that of the hon. Member for Blaydon (Mr. McWilliam)—

Mr. Tom Clarke: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. This concerns the reference that the Minister made to a Member of another place. My understanding was that it is not in order to quote such a person unless he is a Minister. Is that the case, Mr. Speaker?

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that the Minister was quoting from the last Session, not from the current Session. That is in order.

Mr. Waddington: The hon. Member for Blaydon suggested that we should have dealt with the whole question of surveillance, but I remind the House that what he said was in marked contrast to what was said by the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South who thought that, although we should deal with the question of surveillance, that would be properly the subject of another Bill.
There is a special case for dealing with the interception of communications passing through public communications systems, because somebody has committed such a communication to a carrier over which he has no control and is entitled to believe that, except for good reason, his privacy will be safeguarded. Furthermore, legislation on surveillance would pose many far more difficult problems. I doubt very much whether there is yet a consensus in the House about how we should deal with those matters.

Mr. McWilliam: rose—

Mr. Waddington: I must get on.
The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) complained that we were not implementing the recommendation of the Royal Commission on criminal procedure to the effect that police surveillance should be regulated by statute. In my view, magistrates should not be expected to form judgments about what are essentially operational matters for the police, but that is not the important thing. Certainly my view is not important. It must not be forgotten that the Government have already taken some very important steps in surveillance outside the range of interception.
This Government first published the guidelines on police surveillance. This is relevant to the speech of the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Thomas). Those guidelines have now been strengthened. They contain more detailed and rigorous procedures than were in the 1977 guidelines. For instance, the chief constable's personal authority is required in more circumstances. Secondly, the House has heard today that the Law Commission's proposals on breach of confidence are to be implemented, which means that where a person acquires information about another by the use of a device for surreptitious surveillance and then divulges it the other person may have a right of action against that person. This seems a sensible approach—not control over the act of surveillance itself but regulation of the use of the product of surveillance. The hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Barron) cannot have been in the House when my right hon. and learned Friend announced his decision in that regard, so an important part of the hon. Member's speech was misconceived.
To deal briefly with some of the matters raised on clause 2, I was asked about the power to intercept in the interests of national security. I remind the House that that phrase has appeared in numerous statutes brought in by Governments of different political persuasions. It has never been further defined. Hon. Members can find all the guidance that they could possibly need in the White Paper and the other documents which have been referred to. There is power to issue a warrant for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime.
In answer to the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy, a "serious arrestable offence" as defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act can be less serious than a serious crime as defined in the White Paper. That is because section 116 defines as serious an offence which has led to
serious financial loss to any person.
If we substituted the definition that is in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act we would be weakening rather than strengthening the controls on tapping.
Then there is the power to intercept to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Once again there seems to have been a number of misconceptions among the Opposition. The right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South said that he had never excercised the power. I remind him that this part of the Bill is all about acts and intentions of people abroad, and I can assure him, as he would be assured by many of his right hon. Friends, that this power has been exercised for a long time.
I stress again, in view of what was said by the hon. Member for Rother Valley, that this power has nothing to do with Fred Harraway, wage bargaining and disputes that have taken place here, there and somewhere else. An economic well-being warrant can only be issued to acquire information relating to the acts or intentions of persons


outside the British Isles. The information sought must be about overseas matters, so an economic well-being warrant can be issued only to ascertain the intention of a person outside the country. The power cannot be used to obtain information about any sort of trivial money matter either, because the Secretary of State has to be satisfied that the phone tapping is necessary to safeguard our economic well-being. It must be necessary not just to check up on people but to protect our economy at the international level. The House will have noted that the phrase "economic well-being" is the phrase used in article 8 of the convention, but, as the House has seen, we have introduced a qualification that does not appear in the convention by limiting the use of the warrant to acquire information about acts or persons overseas.
The hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Cohen) said that the Government's object was to appoint to the tribunal policemen who are amenable to the Government of the day. That was outrageous. The hon. Member cannot have read the Bill, because the method of appointment to the tribunal is almost the same as the method of appointment of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. The tribunal will be entirely independent of Government. Its purpose is not just to check the paperwork. It will inquire whether the Home Secretary has properly authorised interception in a particular case.
In answer to the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery and the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan), I point out that the powers of the tribunal are analogous to those of the High Court hearing an application for judicial review. Has the Home Secretary exercised his administrative discretion reasonably, bearing in mind the criteria? He cannot have done so if he has not observed the criteria.
I was asked about compensation for those who were found to be the subject of phone tapping that had not been properly authorised. It was said that we had not dealt with article 13 of the convention, which demands that there should be redress when the convention is violated. We have met article 13 by providing for compensation. [Interruption.] I know that it is late for the right hon. Member for Gorton, who is yawning, but he has a great deal to learn. I hope that he does so before the Committee, or we shall have to waste many hours educating him, because he clearly does not yet understand the Bill.
One cannot have a person going to the tribunal to find out whether his phone is being tapped. One cannot have a crook, for example, going to the tribunal to ask whether his phone is being tapped, and therefore there must be special rules of procedure. Because we must have those special rules of procedure, there is a tribunal. Unfortunately, we cannot leave this matter to the ordinary courts.
I have been asked what would happen if a person were to go to the tribunal to complain of an irregularity. It has been suggested that, on the face of it, he would be guilty of an offence under the Official Secrets Act as a result of mentioning such matters to the tribunal. That is the most arrant nonsense. If that argument is right, the Member who talked the nonsense is saying that no person who is an employee of any of the relevant organisations should go to the police to complain about the fact that an offence has been committed because by doing so he will be guilty of an offence himself and will find himself in a lock-up instead of the chap against whom he is complaining.
This is a good Bill and I think that we shall have an interesting time in Committee trying to make it better. We shall have a job to make it better, because it is an extremely good Bill. We should remember the heavy responsibility that we are bearing. It is unpleasant for Ministers to have to tell hon. Members that we must adhere to the convention that allegations of tapping are not either confirmed or denied. It is not pleasant to have to refuse to answer questions about security matters. It is easy for irresponsible journalists to have a field day printing the invention or the truth, or the fact or the fabrication, which is fed to them without regard to the national interest. The majority of hon. Members know how vital to the national interest is the security service and how essential, although distasteful, is the interception power for security reasons and in the fight against crime.
The time has come when we should spell out in our law precisely what powers lie in the hands of the Secretary of State. The time has come when there should be an independent tribunal to which the citizen can complain and a statutory commissioner to carry on the work of the monitor and keep under continuing review the manner in which the Secretary of State exercises his powers. That is what the Bill is about. It preserves necessary powers which were exercised by the Labour Government not so long ago. It is a Bill which provides new safeguards for the individual, and I commend it to the House.

Question put, That the amendment be made:

The House divided: Ayes 175, Noes 278.

Division No. 156]
[11.57 pm


AYES


Adams, Allen (Paisley N)
Craigen, J. M.


Alton, David
Crowther, Stan


Anderson, Donald
Cunliffe, Lawrence


Ashdown, Paddy
Cunningham, Dr John


Ashton, Joe
Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)


Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)
Davis, Terry (B'ham, H'ge H'l)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Deakins, Eric


Barnett, Guy
Dewar, Donald


Barron, Kevin
Dixon, Donald


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Dobson, Frank


Beith, A. J.
Dubs, Alfred


Bell, Stuart
Duffy, A. E. P.


Benn, Tony
Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.


Bennett, A. (Dent'n amp; Red'sh)
Eadie, Alex


Bermingham, Gerald
Eastham, Ken


Blair, Anthony
Evans, John (St. Helens N)


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Ewing, Harry


Boyes, Roland
Fatchett, Derek


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Faulds, Andrew


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Fields, T. (L'pool Broad Gn)


Brown, N. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne E)
Fisher, Mark


Bruce, Malcolm
Flannery, Martin


Buchan, Norman
Foot, Rt Hon Michael


Caborn, Richard
Forrester, John


Callaghan, Jim (Heyw'd amp; M)
Foulkes, George


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Fraser, J, (Norwood)


Canavan, Dennis
Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald


Carlile, Alexander (Montg'y)
Freud, Clement


Cartwright, John
Garrett, W. E.


Clark, Dr David (S Shields)
George, Bruce


Clarke, Thomas
Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John


Clay, Robert
Godman, Dr Norman


Clwyd, Mrs Ann
Golding, John


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (Bristol S.)
Gould, Bryan


Cohen, Harry
Hamilton, James (M'well N)


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)


Conlan, Bernard
Hancock, Mr. Michael


Cook, Frank (Stockton North)
Hardy, Peter


Cook, Robin F. (Livingston)
Harman, Ms Harriet


Corbyn, Jeremy
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter


Cowans, Harry
Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith






Haynes, Frank
Patchett, Terry


Hogg, N. (C'nauld amp; Kilsyth)
Pendry, Tom


Holland, Stuart (Vauxhall)
Penhaligon, David


Home Robertson, John
Pike, Peter


Hoyle, Douglas
Prescott, John


Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Randall, Stuart


Hughes, Roy (Newport East)
Redmond, M.


Hughes, Sean (Knowsley S)
Rees, Rt Hon M. (Leeds S)


Hughes, Simon (Southwark)
Richardson, Ms Jo


Janner, Hon Greville
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


John, Brynmor
Roberts, Ernest (Hackney N)


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Robertson, George


Kennedy, Charles
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Rogers, Allan


Kirkwood, Archy
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Lamond, James
Rowlands, Ted


Leadbitter, Ted
Ryman, John


Leighton, Ronald
Sheerman, Barry


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


Lewis, Terence (Worsley)
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Litherland, Robert
Silkin, Rt Hon J.


Lloyd, Tony (Stretford)
Skinner, Dennis


Loyden, Edward
Smith, C.(Isl'ton S amp; F'bury)


McCartney, Hugh
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Snape, Peter


McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Soley, Clive


McKelvey, William
Spearing, Nigel


Mackenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Stott, Roger


Maclennan, Robert
Strang, Gavin


McNamara, Kevin
Straw, Jack


McTaggart, Robert
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Madden, Max
Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)


Marek, Dr John
Thorne, Stan (Preston)


Marshall, David (Shettleston)
Tinn, James


Martin, Michael
Torney, Tom


Maxton, John
Wardell, Gareth (Gower)


Maynard, Miss Joan
Wareing, Robert


Meacher, Michael
Welsh, Michael


Meadowcroft, Michael
Williams, Rt Hon A.


Michie, William
Wilson, Gordon


Mikardo, Ian
Winnick, David


Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Woodall, Alec


Mitchell, Austin (G't Grimsby)
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)
Young, David (Bolton SE)


Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)



Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon
Tellers for the Ayes:


O'Brien, William
Mr. John McWilliam and


O'Neill, Martin
Mr. Robin Corbett.


Parry, Robert



NOES


Aitken, Jonathan
Boscawen, Hon Robert


Alexander, Richard
Bottomley, Peter


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Bottomley, Mrs Virginia


Amery, Rt Hon Julian
Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)


Amess, David
Boyson, Dr Rhodes


Ancram, Michael
Braine, Rt Hon Sir Bernard


Arnold, Tom
Bright, Graham


Ashby, David
Brinton, Tim


Aspinwall, Jack
Brittan, Rt Hon Leon


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Brooke, Hon Peter


Atkins, Robert (South Ribble)
Brown, M. (Brigg amp; Cl'thpes)


Atkinson, David (B'm'th E)
Bruinvels, Peter


Baker, Rt Hon K. (Mole Vall'y)
Bryan, Sir Paul


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Buck, Sir Antony


Baldry, Tony
Budgen, Nick


Banks, Robert (Harrogate)
Bulmer, Esmond


Batiste, Spencer
Burt, Alistair


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Butler, Hon Adam


Bellingham, Henry
Butterfill, John


Bendall, Vivian
Carlisle, John (N Luton)


Benyon, William
Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)


Best, Keith
Cash, William


Bevan, David Gilroy
Chalker, Mrs Lynda


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Chope, Christopher


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Churchill, W. S.


Blackburn, John
Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th S'n)


Blaker, Rt Hon Sir Peter
Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)


Body, Richard
Clegg, Sir Walter


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Cockeram, Eric





Colvin, Michael
Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)


Coombs, Simon
Howell, Rt Hon D. (G'ldford)


Cope, John
Hubbard-Miles, Peter


Corrie, John
Hunt, David (Wirral)


Couchman, James
Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)


Cranborne, Viscount
Hunter, Andrew


Critchley, Julian
Irving, Charles


Crouch, David
Jackson, Robert


Currie, Mrs Edwina
Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick


Dickens, Geoffrey
Jessel, Toby


Dorrell, Stephen
Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Jones, Gwilym (Cardiff N)


Dover, Den
Jones, Robert (W Herts)


du Cann, Rt Hon Sir Edward
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine


Dunn, Robert
Kershaw, Sir Anthony


Durant, Tony
Key, Robert


Dykes, Hugh
King, Roger (B'ham N'field)


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)
King, Rt Hon Tom


Eggar, Tim
Knight, Gregory (Derby N)


Emery, Sir Peter
Knight, Mrs Jill (Edgbaston)


Evennett, David
Knowles, Michael


Eyre, Sir Reginald
Knox, David


Fallon, Michael
Lamont, Norman


Farr, Sir John
Lang, Ian


Favell, Anthony
Latham, Michael


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Lawler, Geoffrey


Fletcher, Alexander
Lawrence, Ivan


Fookes, Miss Janet
Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)


Forman, Nigel
Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark


Forsyth, Michael (Stirling)
Lester, Jim


Forth, Eric
Lilley, Peter


Fowler, Rt Hon Norman
Lloyd, Ian (Havant)


Franks, Cecil
Lyell, Nicholas


Fraser, Peter (Angus East)
McCurley, Mrs Anna


Freeman, Roger
Maclean, David John


Fry, Peter
Major, John


Gale, Roger
Malone, Gerald


Galley, Roy
Mates, Michael


Gardiner, George (Reigate)
Mather, Carol


Gardner, Sir Edward (Fylde)
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Glyn, Dr Alan
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Goodhart, Sir Philip
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Goodlad, Alastair
Miscampbell, Norman


Gorst, John
Mitchell, David (NW Hants)


Gow, Ian
Moate, Roger


Gower, Sir Raymond
Monro, Sir Hector


Greenway, Harry
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)


Gregory, Conal
Moynihan, Hon C.


Griffiths, E. (B'y St Edm'ds)
Murphy, Christopher


Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)
Needham, Richard


Grist, Ian
Neubert, Michael


Ground, Patrick
Newton, Tony


Grylls, Michael
Nicholls, Patrick


Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)
Onslow, Cranley


Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)
Parris, Matthew


Hampson, Dr Keith
Porter, Barry


Hanley, Jeremy
Portillo, Michael


Hannam, John
Powley, John


Hargreaves, Kenneth
Raison, Rt Hon Timothy


Harris, David
Rees, Rt Hon Peter (Dover)


Harvey, Robert
Rhodes James, Robert


Haselhurst, Alan
Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas


Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael
Roberts, Wyn (Conwy)


Hawkins, Sir Paul (SW N'folk)
Robinson, Mark (N'port W)


Hawksley, Warren
Roe, Mrs Marion


Hayes, J.
Rossi, Sir Hugh


Hayhoe, Barney
Rost, Peter


Hayward, Robert
Rowe, Andrew


Heathcoat-Amory, David
Rumbold, Mrs Angela


Heddle, John
Sackville, Hon Thomas


Henderson, Barry
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael
Sayeed, Jonathan


Hickmet, Richard
Scott, Nicholas


Hicks, Robert
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')


Hind, Kenneth
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


Hirst, Michael
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Shersby, Michael


Holland, Sir Philip (Gedling)
Silvester, Fred


Hordern, Peter
Sims, Roger






Skeet, T. H. H.
van Straubenzee, Sir W.


Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)
Vaughan, Sir Gerard


Speed, Keith
Viggers, Peter


Spence, John
Waddington, David


Spencer, Derek
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Spicer, Jim (W Dorset)
Waldegrave, Hon William


Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)
Walden, George


Squire, Robin
Walker, Bill (T'side N)


Stanley, John
Walker, Rt Hon P. (W'cester)


Steen, Anthony
Waller, Gary


Stern, Michael
Ward, John


Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)
Wardle, C. (Bexhill)


Stevens, Martin (Fulham)
Warren, Kenneth


Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)
Watson, John


Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)
Watts, John


Stradling Thomas, J.
Wells, Bowen (Hertford)


Sumberg, David
Wells, Sir John (Maidstone)


Taylor, John (Solihull)
Wheeler, John


Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)
Whitfield, John


Temple-Morris, Peter
Whitney, Raymond


Terlezki, Stefan
Wiggin, Jerry


Thomas, Rt Hon Peter
Winterton, Nicholas


Thompson, Donald (Calder V)
Wolfson, Mark


Thompson, Patrick (N'ich N)
Wood, Timothy


Thorne, Neil (Ilford S)
Woodcock, Michael


Thornton, Malcolm
Yeo, Tim


Thurnham, Peter
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Townend, John (Bridlington)
Younger, Rt Hon George


Townsend, Cyril D. (B'heath)



Tracey, Richard
Tellers for the Noes:


Trippier, David
Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones and


Twinn, Dr Ian
Mr. Peter Lloyd.

Question accordingly negatived.

Main Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 41 (Amendments on Second or Third Reading), and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second Time.

Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House. —[Mr. Archie Hamilton.]

Committee this day.

Orders of the Day — INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS BILL [MONEY]

Queen's Recommendation having been signified—

Resolved,
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Interception of Communications Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of—

(a) any sums required for the payment of compensation in pursuance of an order made under that Act;
(b) any sums required for the payment of allowances to the Commissioner appointed under that Act; and
(c) any sums required for the payment of remuneration and allowances to members of the Tribunal established under that Act and for defraying the expenses of that Tribunal.—[Mr. Archie Hamilton.]

Orders of the Day — Immobilisation of Vehicles

The Minister of State, Department of Transport (Mrs. Lynda Chalker): I beg to move,
That the draft Immobilisation of Vehicles illegally parked (London Boroughs of Westminster, and Kensington and Chelsea) (Continuation) Order 1985, which was laid before this House on 25th February, be approved.
The effect of the order will be to continue the use of wheel clamps by the Metropolitan police in central London for a further two years from this May. This extension is sought at the time when the whole question of parking in London and the metropolitan areas is under review. Powers for the police to wheel-clamp illegally parked vehicles in designated areas, initially on an experimental basis, were approved by the House in the Transport Act 1982. Parts of Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea were subsequently designated by order as the experimental area where the police could use clamps for a period of two years from May 1983. The aim was to deter illegal parking and imrove traffic flows in an area of central London suffering from severe problems of illegal parking. We made it clear that the results of the experiment would be carefully monitored. A report by the Transport and Road Research Laboratory evaluating the first six months' experience of clamping was published by the Department in October 1984. The report provides a comprehensive description of the effects of clamping, and I am grateful to the laboratory for its work.
The report shows that the main change in parking habits after clamping began was that vehicles were left on yellow lines for shorter periods. Although the actual number of illegal parking acts remained about the same, the number of vehicles parked on yellow lines at any one time fell by about 30 per cent. in the middle of the day, and the time they were parked at the kerbside was reduced by 40 per cent. The amount of illegal parking in residents' bays in the experimental area was reduced by about 30 per cent. There was little change in parking at meters.
Traffic speeds in the experimental area were higher in the period after clamping. Despite increases in the volume of traffic compared with control areas nearby. The reduction in journey times associated with reduced parking on the street was estimated at between 8 and 14 per cent., implying an annual saving in motorists' costs of between £9 million and £15 million at 1979 prices. There was also a saving of £2 million to £3 million on fuel and wear and tear on vehicles. The TRRL report concluded that in the first six months clamping improved compliance with existing parking regulations, probably because of the visual impact of the clamp and its consequent deterrent effect upon other drivers.
Following publication of the TRRL report, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State consulted widely on the findings. The response showed general support for the experiment and for continuing the scheme in central London for at least a further period—for example., to establish how long-lasting the effects will be. A total of 34 responses were received from official organisations, private firms and individuals. Of these, 26 were in favour of wheel clamps being continued, at least for a further period; five were against wheel clamps and three commented neutrally.
The main points made in favour of clamping in response to my right hon. Friend's consultations were the


welcome reduction in illegal parking; the improved traffic flow and safety; the easing of problems for delivery drivers; and the much improved conditions in residents' parking bays. The main points made against clamping by the five who were against it were that it was a deterrent to shoppers and damaged trade; that it impeded essential trades—for example, service engineers; that it continued obstructive parking, particularly when there were delays in declamping; that it would damage the relations between the police and the public; and that it over-penalised minor offences.

Mr. Jerry Wiggin: Is my hon. Friend aware that Westminster city council admits that in a great part of its area there is a substantial lack of residents' parking? When she has made the clamping scheme work, will she attend to the problems of providing off-street parking space and diverting some of the money from parking meters into providing it? It is about 25 years overdue.

Mrs. Chalker: My hon. Friend anticipates at least some of what I shall say. The problems of parking in central London are not restricted to Westminster. I hope that they will be tackled on an even wider basis, beyond the work already being done by Westminster city council.
The TRRL research could not cover the extent to which the successful results of the experiment would persist in the longer term. That was a point taken up by several of those who wrote in response to our consultations. The Automobile Association, for example, recognised the apparent benefits to traffic movement but considered that the period over which the benefits had been assessed was too short to be reasonably certain that they would be maintained.
Powers to clamp vehicles should not be sought lightly. When we have discussed this previously, I have told the House that we must be clear about what we are doing. That is why we entered into such a large amount of research.
We have concluded that a two-year extension of the present order would be justified to enable the effects of clamping in the present area to be further assessed. We shall use the extended period which the order affords to monitor the situation further, again with the help of the TRRL.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: Will my hon. Friend take special note of the diplomats who continue to abuse the parking system throughout Westminster, and whose cars, I understand are not clamped now, and will not be tomorrow.

Mrs. Chalker: My hon. Friend may remember that when clamping began we changed registrations for diplomats to X and D registrations. We reduced the number of those persons who, by virtue of their diplomatic status, could avoid clamping. The problem has not been cut out altogether, but it has been reduced. No doubt we shall do better as time continues. If the experiment were extended further, that would also help. We reduced by 16 per cent. the number of vehicles exempted from clamping. The vehicles that are receiving X registration plates are eligible for wheel clamping. In the last quarter of 1984, 40 such vehicles were clamped. Action has been taken. It may not satisfy hon. Members yet, but other plans in the revision of the Vienna convention may come into effect.
We also intend to use the two-year period to continue to review possible ways of improving mobility and parking arrangements in central London. My right hon. Friend and I are keen to try to improve conditions, not just for motorists, but to make London more accessible to all road users, residents and businesses. More generally, we want to see all our cities working efficiently. Traffic is their life blood and if their arteries become clogged, the cities do not function.
We need to devise better arrangements for the future — more positive arrangements than merely punishing those who flout the rules. We want to see the capital city thriving. Improved mobility and legal parking are essential to this. That takes up the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin).
The Select Committee recently reported on road safety. One of its recommendations was that central and local Government should consider more positive action to enable motorists to park legally. That is something we are keen to do. Indeed, as we said in our 1983 White Paper on Policy for Roads in England:
Improved enforcement must be accompanied by a sustained and imaginative examination of the scope for providing improved parking facilities to meet the needs of road users".
On-street parking is largely a matter for local authorities, while for off-street both the private sector and local authorities have a part to play.
When my right hon. Friend the Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell), the then Secretary of State for Transport, asked Parliament to approve the clamping powers in 1982, he asked the Greater London council to review the supply of parking in central London, and the GLC passed the request on to the inner London boroughs. Westminster city council responded by instigating a detailed street-by-street review of yellow lines in its area. As a result it has identified nearly 1,400 extra on-street spaces which can be created by converting yellow line to parking bays. Westminster council is now embarking on a further survey to establish the scope for increasing parking spaces still further by means of minor highway alterations or by converting parallel-to-the-kerb parking to diagonal parking where that can safely be done. A new 360-space car park has recently opened at Cambridge Circus, and Westminster council has plans to increase off-street parking further.
Not long ago I had discussions with the London local authority associations—the Association of Metropolitan Authorities, the GLC, the London Boroughs Association and the Association of Local Authorities. The meeting was at their request, to consider a range of parking and enforcement issues. I am to meet them again shortly to consider with them how best we can rationalise the use of road and pavement space. But all the associations urged that meanwhile the wheel clamps experiment should be continued since it has shown real benefits in reducing illegal parking and improving traffic flow. The fears expressed by some hon. Members during the passage of the clamping powers in 1982—for example, about likely damage to the relations between the police and the public—have, I am pleased to say, proved largely groundless. To a great extent, this reflects the careful and sensitive way in which the police have exercised their clamping powers.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mrs. Chalker: I shall give way in one second. Wheel clamping has on the whole been accepted. I know that


there are exceptions and that hon. Members have stories brought to them from time to time, but on the whole, the way in which the matter has been handled has not been as fearful as some hon. Members anticipated.

Mrs. Elaine Kellett-Bowman: Will my hon. Friend tell me why on earth, when she has given such an excellent report of how the experiment is working, objections to it are small, and it has undoubtedly helped in the area where we are during the week, she is continuing it only in time and not in space? Why does she not extend it to the rest of London?

Mrs. Chalker: I was extremely tempted to extend the scheme more widely. However, I have discovered that caution can sometimes be a good friend when deciding on fairly large changes in parking, as we are envisaging for London. I certainly wish to improve the position for motorists and all those who seek access. We have sought a further experiment. It is up to other local authorities to apply to the Secretary of State if they wish the area to be extended to include their areas. We would not be unwilling to do that. However, we are keen to ensure that the whole of parking for the future is examined thoroughly now, which is why we are extending the experiment for a further two years. It will not prevent us from taking other steps in the meantime, if local authorities wish those steps to be taken.

Sir Peter Emery: My hon. Friend mentioned the relationship with the police. Will she examine the gap that can arise between the time that a person has gone to the police pound and paid his fine and the time that the clamp is taken off? I have heard reports from my area of people having to wait for four hours to be declamped. That does nothing to help the police, and it does not remove the vehicle which should not be there. I believe that that area should be examined closely.

Mrs. Chalker: I am sure that my hon. Friend is right to say that there are what I would call exceptions. The period of four hours is certainly an exception. In general, I should be surprised if the majority of motorists had to wait for more than an hour. I have had reports of two-hour waits at very busy times. But in considering the entire parking problem in London, and the relationship between clamping vehicles that are illegally parked but not obstructing traffic and having to tow away vehicles that are obstructing traffic, the Home Office and my Department will be taking into account the way in which the teams are working and the manpower that they need to operate the system.

Mr. Simon Hughes: If I understand the law correctly, the Secretary of State can extend the area at the request of the authority concerned. Has the Department of Transport received such requests either from the Greater London council or from any other local authority?

Mrs. Chalker: There have been no formal requests to extend the area from any local authorities. There was some discussion at one of my many meetings about parking with a metropolitan area in the north, but that was not followed up with a formal request.
Many people had fears about clamping at the beginning, and I understood those fears. But what has happened is that central London residents—as my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mrs. Kellett-Bowman)

said—have been able, for the first time in several years, to park in the spaces set aside for residents in London. A private survey carried out after the first five months of the experiment showed that the majority of motorists in London believed that wheel clamps were not only desirable but a necessity. That finding shows the distance that we have come since the scheme started.

Dr. Alan Glyn: Are the fines sufficiently large to enable the police to speed up the removal of vehicles? The basis of the problem is the removal of the vehicle, not just the clamping of it.

Mrs. Chalker: I am well aware of my hon. Friend's anxiety. The police are considering ways of speeding both operations, as I told my hon. Friend the Member for Honiton (Sir P. Emery). We accept that clamping is a drastic measure — just as towing away is a drastic measure—and that once people have paid their fines, they want to get their cars back. But what has appeared from the first two years of the experiment is that the law-abiding motorist is helped to get about more easily, because the anti-social minority who flout parking regulations are deterred by this measure.
One thing that follows on what my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor and Maidenhead (Dr. Glyn) said is that the Government intend that clamping should pay for itself, as other things should pay for themselves. The present declamping fee of £19·50 is based on an estimate of costs that was made before the start of the experiment in 1983. We have reviewed the charge in the light of operational experience as well as the charge for vehicle removal. It is likely that the charge for clamping will have to be increased from 19·50 to £25 and the removal charge by a broadly proportional amount. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will be consulting on the new charges proposed. The fee to be charged is not part of the order, and will be covered by a subsequent order coming before the House.
If the House and the other place approve the order, the traffic authorities will be able to apply to my right hon. Friend for the use of the wheel clamps to be extended by order to other areas. As I said to the hon. Member for Southwark and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes), we have not received a formal request for the use of clamps outside London. Should any come to me, I shall consider such requests on their merits in the light of the traffic and the parking situation in the areas concerned.
The continuation of the powers for another two years will help us to assess the true value of wheel clamps. It will also enable us to try to find better methods of enforcement, better ways to help motorists and other road users to go where they need to and better ways to make sure that they pay for the space that they use when they get there.
In the meantime, we have to continue to give the police the tools to enforce the law. We have found that clamping is of assistance. I am sure that it will continue to be so, and I ask the House to approve the order.

Mr. Roger Stott: I shall not detain the House for long. Indeed, I reminded the Minister a little earner this evening that I was the author of the amendment on wheel clamps that she approved in 1982. The hon. Lady will remember that she and I were members of the Committee which considered the Transport Bill in 1982 and debated


the problems of illegal parking in the capital. It was clear that the fines being imposed were no deterrent at all to people who left their cars hanging round Chelsea, Westminster and elsewhere. Therefore, it was important that we considered alternative methods at that time.
I considered in some detail the experiences that were gained in the United States when the method of wheel clamping was first introduced. As a result of that, in 1982 I tabled an amendment to the Transport Bill in Committee. I asked the hon. Lady, who was the Minister in the Department of Transport at that time, whether she would consider favourably the possibility of an experiment on a limited basis over a limited geographic area of the capital for two years to wheel-clamp the cars of motorists who parked illegally. I am grateful to the Minister that she has taken that on board.
It was paradoxical that the two people who were pushing for the measure, apart from the residents of London in the affected areas, were Sir Kenneth Newman, the chief of the Metropolitan police, and my comrade, Mr. Dave Wetzel, chairman of the Greater London Council transportation committee. With a combination of forces like that, I suspect that the case is irresistible. Sir Kenneth Newman and Dave Wetzel pressed me to table the amendment in Committee for all the reasons that the Minister has enumerated. Both they and I felt that this would be one of the most effective deterrents to illegal parking in the centre of the capital.
I recall that the hon. Member for Portsmouth, North (Mr. Griffiths), who frequently tilts at conventional windmills, disapproved of the idea and voted against it. If he has an opportunity to speak in this debate, he may say that he intends to oppose it tonight. For my part, and that of my hon. Friends — [HON. MEMBERS: "Where are they?"]—who are elsewhere in the building, we shall not press the matter to a Division because the experiment has been successful in helping to deter illegal parking in the capital city.
The Minister pointed out that there had been a 30 per cent. reduction in illegal parking in the area covered by the order. The result, as she pointed out, had been a better running speed and flow of traffic through those areas. It was clear that fines alone were no deterrent to some people.
I am not sure whether, and if so how many, Conservative Members travel by tube. Those who do will be familiar with an LRT advertisement which depicts a tube train with a wheel clamp attached to it, with the slogan below, "That'll be the day." Of course, tube trains will not be clamped, but that advertisement gets the message across to people who park illegally, who do not consider the people who live in the areas where they leave their cars, and who are rich enough, having parked illegally, to pay the fines.
The clamping experiment has been successful and the Opposition will not oppose its reintroduction for a further two years. I hope that at the end of that period the Minister will evaluate the statistical evidence and make clamping a permanent feature of our capital city. Tonight we—the Government and the Opposition—are showing that we are determined to deal with those who flout the law and park illegally.
In two years from now, when the experiment has run for four years, Parliament should make this a permanent

feature of our means of handling illegal parking. At that time we may be in power and a Labour Minister of Transport will take that step.
It may also be possible to extend clamping to areas outside London. The Minister said that other authorities had not made such a proposal to her. However, if it became a permanent feature of our way of life in London, authorities outside the capital might wish to follow suit.
As I said, the experiment has proved successful and has done what it was intended to do. It has done what I intended my amendment to do. I am grateful that the Minister accepted my amendment on that occasion and that this legislation was enacted. I assure her of our total support tonight for its continuation.

Mr. Peter Griffiths: I did not like the idea of wheel clamping when the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Stott) first raised it some years ago. I did not like it when the Minister introduced the order two years ago and I have heard, read and seen absolutely nothing in the intervening period to make me change my mind.
I do not argue that wheel clamping is not effective. The same arguments used to be put forward for public hangings, which were very effective — not that I am saying that my hon. Friend is suggesting that for illegal parking — but the idea that if the punishment is draconian enough it will be effective cannot be sustained when one is looking for ways of enforcing the law as fairly as possible as between individuals, while at the same time impinging as little as possible on their normal activities. We should ensure that if they break the law they accept their punishment, but we should not make a disaster out of what is a misdemeanour.
We are talking about parking on a yellow line, staying a little too long on a parking meter or nipping into a shop to get a packet of cigarettes and leaving the car in a bay that is reserved for residents. I do not condone any of these things and I do not do any of them, although I keep my car in Chelsea. However, I understand that there may well be many occasions when a law-abiding motorist is kept longer than he expected waiting to pay for goods in a shop or to pick up a passenger at a station and does not get back to the meter before his time expires; or he may be driving round waiting to pick up his wife with all the shopping or to collect his children from school. I stay in Sloane Square right opposite a school which is a great source of parking problems. Should a man leave small children wandering about the school because he cannot wait on a double yellow line?
There are reasons for these misdemeanours. There is no criminal intent. They are caused by the normal everyday decisions that motorists have to take.
If the culprits were subject to an equal penalty, I would not be delaying the House tonight, but the penalty is not equal as between individuals. In the first place, the time it takes to get a car unclamped varies enormously, and it also varies greatly in its importance to the individual concerned. One person may simply have been doing some shopping and is going home, and it is inconvenient to have to wait. The Minister says it will be perhaps only two hours, not four, but two hours can cause great inconvenience. There are people who have urgent appointments, or have to meet other forms of transport, or


have business to do. For them this punishment is far more serious. It is the unfairness in this to which I strongly object.
There is also the problem of the cost. If one overstays one's time on a meter and a traffic warden discovers it and puts a sticker on the windscreen, the fixed penalty has to be paid within a certain time. There is time to ensure that sufficient funds are available. It is true that the cost of paying the fine and having the vehicle unclamped is not enormous by present-day standards, but many people are running motor cars on a shoestring, on a tight budget, because they need their cars for domestic or business purposes. The burden of the cost varies enormously as between individuals—the wealthy to whom it is just a nuisance and others who find it a grave burden.
I therefore suggest to my hon. Friend that she has introduced a system which is inherently unfair and will only be made more unfair if she increases the charges as she has suggested. If this scheme is so good and so popular, why has no other London authority suggested taking it up? The scheme is imposed from above. It has not been requested by local authorities. It has certainly not been requested by motorists. Motorists feel that they are a type of game for which there is no close season. They believe that the Department of Transport should ease the lot of those who are using all transport systems, including the motor car, for which they pay a great deal. Wheel clamping is no way to improve the system within acceptable cost limits.
If we vote tonight, I shall vote against the order. If we do not vote, I shall vote against the order when it comes before the House next time to express my disapproval.

Mr. Simon Hughes: I think that the hon. Member for Portsmouth, North (Mr. Griffiths) is in the minority — but we shall see. The reason why he is in the minority is that he starts from the wrong premise. There is a fairness in the system. It is that any motorist with a private motor vehicle who goes into the two boroughs in the heart of our capital city knows that he is at risk if he breaks the parking laws. He can be dealt with in a variety of ways. We are discussing one of those ways.
The hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Stott), who introduced an amendment in the last Session of Parliament, acted on the presumption that we needed a bigger deterrent. I share that view. I am sure that we need a bigger deterrent elsewhere, and not just in the two boroughs.
Before I came to the House I travelled on most days from Blackfriars bridge to the Temple where I worked. Almost every day a large car committed a parking offence and collected a ticket. It was there nearly every day, and nearly every day it was given a ticket. The driver collected ticket after ticket presumably because the driver could afford to pay for it.
The hon. Member for Portsmouth, North argues that the law is unfair because some can afford to pay and others cannot. The validity of the order is, with some exceptions, that it provides the only deterrent for those who can afford to pay. The risk of being caught committing some offence is great, as the hon. Member for Wigan said, but the time lag is such that an offender may never be brought to court.

A foreign registered car will never be prosecuted—I do not intend to discuss diplomatic cars. Nuisances must be dealt with. People with money can get away with it.
For people who live in rural areas a car is essential, particularly if they have to travel to London. But they know the rules. People can park outside tube stations and use the underground system. Public transport is no that bad in London. It has improved and it is not too expensive. There are many solutions. One does not have to bring a car into central London and risk having to overstay a parking period.
The law has four ways of dealing with parking motorists who clog up our capital city, causing a fundamental nuisance. The first is to put a ticket on their windscreen. That is often ineffectual and often ignored. The second is to tow the vehicle away. That is considerably more inconvenient, but it does not always work. I recollect being with a cousin of mine whose vehicle was towed away when it was parked on a yellow line, although the yellow line was covered in snow. She went to collect it from the Willow walk pound just down the road from where I live to find that somebody else had collected it and driven it away, so that that is not a flawless system.
There are two other ways of immobilising vehicles. The wheel clamp is one, and there is the way that we know slightly better in my borough south of the river, which is that one removes the tyres or wheels altogether. That certainly immobilises the vehicle, and it costs more than £19·50 or the proposed £25 to mobilise it again. It teaches people that they should not park in certain places there. However, that is not the authorised way. There is now an authorised way, and there is no evidence that it is being shown to be ineffectual. Indeed, the very nature of its threat and the inconvenience to busy business men and women or others who have plenty of money and fast cars, of having to wait three hours is probably the worst penalty that they can be expected to pay.
Earlier this evening I was at a meeting in Battersea town hall with the hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Dubs) on the subject of trunking. There was a mass audience representing people of all political views, and none, who had gathered together to protest against the Government's plans, if the Local Government Bill goes through, to trunk many of London's roads. They protest for the same reason that they would support the order. The increased growth of private traffic in the middle of London, not just in Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster boroughs, is a thorough nuisance to most people who are trying to go about their daily business. The range of people who are inconvenienced is enormous, but I should like to single out just one category. The old find parking in places where it is unauthorised and goes beyond the time limits, as well as parking on pavements, a blessed nuisance. Everything that can be done to make sure that the laws on parking are strictly enforced is worth while.
I have only two criticisms of the Government. The first is that after two years we should have more evidence than the six months' worth before the House. That is a bit inadequate given the resource and research facilities that are available. The second is that it is a bit of a lame step forward after a two-year experimental period in one area to be thinking only of continuing the same experiment in the same limited area. I have no doubt that if one took a


random opinion poll or sample of residents in many of the central London boroughs one would find them all to be in favour.
I am in favour. On behalf of the Liberal party, I say that my party is in favour. We should go on to extend the provisions in the continuation order. I hope that the Minister will ensure that her Department assesses effectively the advantages of extending it, in consultation with the local authorities and the police. If it can be seen to reduce the nuisance caused by private traffic, particularly in our capital city, an extension of the order will be a great blessing to many people.

Mr. Gary Waller: The hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Stott) hinted that he would like to see a rash of wheel clamps extending throughout the country. However, it is unlikely that most authorities outside London would wish to see them, because essentially the problem that wheel clamps are there to deal with is a London problem. The problem is not so much, as he suggested, one of the lack of deterrent posed by inadequate fines for parking tickets, as the fact that in London, in contrast with every other part of the country, half the fines that have been imposed for illegal parking have never been paid. It is easy to get away without paying for a parking ticket in Greater London.
Let us look at the rest of the country. The 1982 figures for Derbyshire show that of the 22,000 parking tickets that were issued, 19,000 were paid. In Devon and Cornwall, of the 50,000 issued, 39,000 were paid. Even in Greater Manchester, over two thirds of the total issued were paid. So it is essentially a Greater London problem, where there is massive flouting of the parking regulations, because people think that they will be able to get away with it.
As my hon. Friend the Minister of State said, it is a massive deterrent to see wheel clamps affixed to the wheels of offending vehicles. But the extent of that activity has been relatively small. When reporting on the experiment, the GLC pointed out that about 170 wheel clamps per day were affixed to vehicles by only seven teams using a stock of 300 clamps. In other words, one clamp was being affixed about every half hour, which does not seem to be enormously aggressive activity.
The chances of an illegal parker receiving a fixed penalty notice is about 1: 50. The chances of getting away with it are much greater. The chances of being towed away are about 1: 1,100 and the chances of actually being clamped are only 1: 1,800. I wonder how many people realise that. The fact that even a small number of vehicles is seen to be clamped is a great deterrent and has produced a considerable reduction in the length of time for which people park illegally.
There is the unsatisfactory aspect to which my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, North (Mr. Griffiths) referred, that the practice of clamping is totally haphazard. One may be unfortunate enough to have one's vehicle clamped, but one is more likely to get away with it. When the teams are in action they may clamp one vehicle in five in a street. That is what causes the breakdown in relations between the police and the public. The public see a small minority of cars, perhaps including their own, being

clamped, but they also see the vast majority getting away with illegal parking. There is a need to enforce the law fairly.
When I was a member of the Select Committee on Transport we conducted an inquiry into transport in London four years ago. Mr. Alan Greengross, who was then leader of the planning and communications policy committee of the GLC, pointed to the way in which clamps are used in the United States where they are attached to vehicles for which there are outstanding parking fines for five or perhaps even 10 occasions on which parking tickets have been ignored. We might consider that in this country.
Obviously there would be problems. There would have to be notification of parking tickets not having been paid either to the driver and vehicle licensing centre or to the Metropolitan police. With modern methods of communication and computerisation it should be possible for teams, when they see an illegally parked vehicle, to be able to have access to a central record to discover whether there were outstanding fines in respect of that vehicle. They should go specifically for the people we really want to get at, not the one-time offenders, but those who regularly and persistently ignore the law and then do not pay the fine. If only one driver in 1,800 is to have his vehicle clamped, it should happen to those who deserve it rather than to those who are just unfortunate.
I am glad to hear that my hon. Friend wishes to develop better arrangements for parking in Greater London because many people who park in the capital find the present system incomprehensible. Few know exactly what a single or a double yellow line means. In the evening the law is ignored completely. People park wherever they can. If they were to obey the law, the west end would be crammed with cars driving round with nowhere to park.
On the whole I agree that this is an experiment with which we should persist. We need to find out more, but it should be developed in such a way that it is fairer and meets the criticisms of my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, North, and also becomes more affective. If we were to use modern methods, we should be able to bring in much more money from fines, and pay for the increased costs that a more highly developed system would bring.

1 am

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: Continuation orders are not automatic, and I found it surprising that The Standard and The Times said that Parliament had agreed to a further two year extension of this order. That was ill-announced.
I accept that a large number of cars come into London every day, and that the residents in London, of whom I am not one, find it difficult to park at certain parts of the day. I am concerned that some of these cars that are illegally parked in residents' parking bays or on yellow lines may not be moved for many hours. The wheel clamp, or the Denver boot, as it is called more colloquially, merely creates an additional and more permanent obstruction. I accept that it is a deterrent in the long run, but in the short term, when a car has the yellow clamp on it, it is left there. I know that my hon. Friend the Minister is careful in all that she does in motoring matters. I would have thought that more police vehicles immediately towing away these vehicles to the pound was the quickest way to deal with the serious problem. I am not surprised that there is a shortage of clamps, because they are all being used.
I have an office just outside the House, near Westminster abbey, and I see the clamp unit vehicle leaving every morning; no doubt, when it comes back, it is empty. There is a time lag once the vehicle has the clamp fixed to it. I am afraid that my father has been subjected to the Denver clamp, and it took him four hours to get it off. He was going to Harley street for an urgent appointment with a surgeon, and he had to park quickly. When he came back, the boot was on. He accepts that he had parked in the wrong place, but four hours seems rather a long time, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will be speeding up operations through the radio-control system so that in all cases the declamper machine can be brought out as quickly as possible.
I welcome the use of the clamp to force payment of unpaid fines, which can remain outstanding for many months, and sometimes years. This is more of a deterrent than the use of the clamp in illegal parking.
My hon. Friend tried to answer me about the number of diplomats who are trying to claim immunity and therefore would not be subject to the Denver boot. I am reassured that those cars with an X on their registration will be clamped, but those with a D on will not. The Metropolitan police statistics for the number of parking fines in London is incredibly high, particularly for some embassies. It would be unfair for me to name them, but we know who the offenders are. If they park in the wrong place, they should expect to be prosecuted.
I am also concerned about the foreign registration cars that tend to park all over the place. As has already been said in this important debate, those cars are escaping the Denver boot because it does not seem worth while prosecuting them. If they have parked in the wrong place, I hope that they will now be prosecuted.
It is unfair that if I go into Fulham to park I shall not be liable to a clamp, whereas if I go into Kensington and Chelsea or Westminster, I shall. This seems to be the wrong discrimination. If clamping is good enough for one part of central London, it is good enough for any other.
I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will consider the alternative systems that are available to deter motorists from being antisocial and parking in the wrong area in the first place. Publicity should be given to the offenders and the Government should show through the deterrent that they mean business. Those who live in London, or many of them, pay for residents' parking in the area in which they reside and they should be allowed so to park. That means that we must support the order. However, as a person who believes in the freedom of the individual, I take that view with great reluctance. I see the order as yet another intrusion into our democratic rights. Notwithstanding those comments, the order needs the support of the House, as we want visitors to come to the city. I urge those who travel by motor car to London to park fairly and reasonably and to bear in mind that those who live in London have priority over those who come to the capital to shop, deal or conduct their business.

Mr. Roger Moate: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, North (Mr. Griffiths), I spoke against the implementation of wheel clamping two years ago. Like him also, I have seen nothing to change my views about the undesirability of the measure. There were

not enough of us at the Report stage on the previous occasion to make it worth while forcing a vote and I feel that the same situation applies this evening.
I feel still that there is something peculiarly offensive about the sight of a wheel clamp on a vehicle. It is a rather unpleasant sign of authoritarianism. Having seen the devices clamped on cars over the past two years, my heart goes out to the owners of the vehicles which have been clamped. They pay a disproportionate penalty for the offence that they have undoubtedly committed. The cost and inconvenience is far too great when set against the offence and disproportionate to the alternative penalty of a parking ticket.
My hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mr. Waller) spoke of a 1:1,800 chance of being clamped. Despite what the hon. Member for Southwark and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes) said, it is not just or fair that the chances of being clamped or ticketed are so varied. We are talking of a lottery. So much depends on the arbitrary decision, instinct or view of the clamping unit and not on the decision of the courts.

Mr. Simon Hughes: The hon. Gentleman must accept that everyone runs the same statistical risk of his car being clamped. That is the principle of fairness. Everyone knows that he is at risk and everyone runs the same risk. The fact that the decision is arbitrary does not change that premise.

Mr. Moate: I recall that the Romans had a system of encouraging their troops which involved killing one man in 10 to encourage the others. That might be the hon. Gentleman's system of justice but it is not mine.

Mr. Jeremy Hanley: Does my hon. Friend agree that if motorists park according to the parking regulations, or if they use public transport, the odds on them being clamped are nil? We do not want wheel clamping to take place.

Mr. Moate: I do not think that anyone is arguing against the proposition that those who disobey the parking regulations should be penalised.

Mr. Hanley: Who is my hon. Friend defending?

Mr. Moate: I think that I and a number of others are seeking to defend a large proportion of the population.

Mr. Hanley: Lawbreakers?

Mr. Moate: The problems of diplomats ignoring the parking laws, unpaid parking tickets and illegal parking are still with us and will not be resolved by the clamp. We have probably reached the limit of its effectiveness, as there is a limit to the manpower and resources that can be devoted to it, especially if its use is extended to other boroughs. We should not attach too much importance to it. If I am right, and it does not produce much more benefit, that strengthens my assertion that we have introduced an objectionable instrument that penalises motorists out of all proportion to the benefits.
I am not surprised that we are faced with the extension order. From the beginning, all the publicity and propaganda from the Ministry and the police suggested that the clamp was so beneficial that the order would have to be renewed. I am deeply sceptical of some of the statistics, and of the benefits that we are supposed to have gained. I am disappointed that this rather objectionable instrument is to continue as, I imagine, a permanent feature of the London scene. I accept that, but wish to record my regret.

Mrs. Chalker: With the leave of the House, I should like to reply to the debate.
I apologise to the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Stott). It was remiss of me not to remind the House that his encouragement on this issue three years ago made us consider this possible answer to the problem. I accepted his amendment. If he and I agree, let alone "Yours for Socialism, Dave" and the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, something must have happened. What happened was that parking conditions in central London had become intolerable, especially for residents.
My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, North (Mr. Griffiths) has not understood how vehicles are clamped if he believes that it results from staying a little too long on a parking meter. Motorists are allowed to stay on a parking meter for as long as they pay or for the unexpired time on arrival. Two hours must elapse after expiry of the meter time before clamping can take place. On a two-hour meter, parking can be up to four hours, and on a four-hour meter up to six hours, before clamping is permitted. That is not staying a little too long.
A delivery vehicle, or someone who has literally stopped for a couple of minutes and whose parking is commented on by the traffic warden standing by the vehicle, will not be clamped. Vehicles are clamped only when they stay on a yellow line for a long time, but not when they are causing an obstruction. If they are causing an obstruction, the police will tow them away for the safety of traffic and pedestrians. The clamp deters a more serious parking offence.
My hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mr. Waller) mentioned the operational aspects of clamping. In the past two years, some 77,000 vehicles have been clamped. That works out at about 700 a week. The rate of clamping depends partly on the number of staff deployed, the number of clamps available and how teams work. We have been at pains to ensure that clamping is used where it is effective. If there are obstructions, removal teams are employed.
In this modern day and age, when a great deal of new technology is coming into this area, some vehicles have such sophisticated locking and immobilisation systems that they cannot be towed or driven away by police—they can only be clamped for a continuing offence. Therefore, some vehicles — although not causing an obstruction, as everything possible will be done to remove them — simply cannot be moved without the owners releasing the immobilisation devices. So the only way in which these owners can be deterred is by the use of the clamp.
The matter of diplomats has been mentioned by my hon. Friends. Hon. Members know that the clamping of diplomatic vehicles initially ceased after a few weeks and we worked out a system with the X and D registrations. Few people have D plates on their private vehicles. The number has gone right down. That is why the X plates mean that a vehicle parking in the wrong place can be clamped. Some 900 diplomatic vehicles being eligible for clamping may have cheered some of the lesser mortals whose vehicles have been clamped. They felt that exemption for the diplomatic corps was unfair.
Following the events at the Libyan People's Bureau in St. James's Square last year, the Government instituted a full review of the Vienna convention, its operation and its

enforceability. That review will take parking matters into account, among other matters. It is hoped, as a result of the review, to tighten measures to deal with parking offences. I anticipate an outcome fairly shortly.
A number of hon. Members have mentioned fixed penalty notices. This might be a good opportunity to remind the House of legislation that this House and another place passed in 1982, which has not come fully into effect but will assist the parking problems from which many people in London suffer.
It is perfectly true that in 1982, in the Metropolitan police area, more than 2·75 million fixed penalty notices for parking were issued, of which about half were paid in the six months statutory period. Others were paid subsequently, but nothing like the 50 per cent. outstanding at the end of the six months. It is the substantial number of people who commit parking offences and then ignore the fixed penalty notices that annoy hon. Members. It is deplorable. That is why we legislated in 1982 for a change in the fixed penalty system. We have now done the necessary preparatory work, which is nearly completed, both with the police and the courts. I am sorry that it has taken some time, but it was necessary that we should be ready for the changes to be implemented in 1986. Under the new system, unpaid fixed penalties will be enforced as fines with a 50 per cent. surcharge. That will greatly assist enforcement, encouraging people to pay fixed penalty notices.
I believe that that, plus the steps we are trying to take with persistent offenders, will lead to an improved position beyond the clamping that we are discussing tonight. It is fair to say that many persistent offenders have had their vehicles clamped, but the police are continuing their efforts to find new ways of identifying those vehicles, including the use of microcomputers. I do not believe that it would be right for the police to concentrate exclusively on such motorists. Resources need to be deployed where traffic conditions are worst. Where clamping will be most beneficial it should be utilised. I take up the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, North, that in some places there is as yet no clamping because they are not covered by the order while in others the team may not arrive while somebody is having a very quite and wicked half hour on the yellow line. That, I am afraid, is the luck of the draw, in one sense, because the police must concentrate their efforts upon those areas that are most congested by the illegal use of space.
The police are seeking to identify the persistent offenders. They are aided by the much higher statistical probability that the persistent offender will be clamped. For example, when 127 vehicles were clamped on one day, 45 of those vehicles had five or more unpaid fixed penalties, while 18 had 20 or more unpaid fixed penalties. Therefore, we are getting not only to the persistent offender but also to the persistent non-payer. That is exactly what, year in, year out, the House has asked should be done about parking in London, and at long last we are beginning to do it.
I know that many people would like the declamping fee to be paid at the same time as the fixed penalty. The police encourage them to do so. When the Bill was going through Parliament in 1982 the hon. Member for Wigan fought very hard for motorists to have the right to a court hearing. My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, North has fought for it, too. That right is retained, which I believe


is correct, and the police cannot compel motorists to pay up. However, I assure hon. Members that the message is getting well and truly through.
It appears from all that has been said in this debate and from the comments of Londoners and those who are affected that my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) is not judging this experiment as many Londoners who are affected by the failure to act have judged it. Of course, the Government will use modern methods and whatever is at our disposal to deal with the irritating problem of either parking in the wrong place or overstaying time on a meter. I do not believe that the £25 penalty, if that is finally agreed to following the consultations which the Home Secretary will carry out, will be seen as a disproportionate penalty for those who put their vehicles in parking bays and outstay their right to be there or who put their vehicles into parking bays provided for residents and thus deny to those residents the ability to park their cars.
A whole range of measures is needed to improve the flow of traffic and the ability of motorists to get about London. That means that more off-street parking is required and also a more sensible use of road space. The Government are dedicated to getting the balance right. The extension of clamping for two more years is but one weapon in our armoury in the battle of trying to keep London on the move and giving people the opportunity to park legally at parking meters, which is all that motorists in general ask to do.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That the draft Immobilisation of Vehicles Illegally Parked (London Boroughs of Westminster, and Kensington and Chelsea) (Continuation) Order 1985, which was laid before this House on 25th February, be approved.

Orders of the Day — BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,
That at the sitting on Monday 18th March, notwithstanding the provisions of Standing Order No. 3 (Exempted business) and Standing Order No. 4 (Prayers against statutory instruments, amp;c. (negative procedure))—

(1) if proceedings on any Motion which may be tabled in the name of the Prime Minister relating to European Community Proposals for the 1985–86 Common Agricultural Policy Prices have not been previously disposed of, Mr. Speaker shall at Seven o'clock put the Question on any Amendment which may have been moved and shall then put forthwith the Main Question or the Main Question as amended; and
(2) any Motion in the name of Mr. Neil Kinnock or Mr. David Steel, relating to National Health Service or National Health Service (Scotland), may be proceeded with, though opposed, until Twelve o'clock, and, if proceedings on those Motions have not been previously disposed of, Mr. Speaker shall at that hour put forthwith any Questions already proposed from the Chair and on such of those Motions as may then be moved.—[Mr. Garel-Jones.]

Orders of the Day — Textile and Clothing Industry

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Garel-Jones.]

Sir John Farr: I want to raise tonight the subject of the future of the textile and clothing industry. It is a big subject and about half a million jobs are at stake. It is difficult to encompass it satisfactorily in a half hour's debate.
I have to raise four important points that concern members of the industry. Two of them relate to small irritations with the Government. The first is in relation to the British Overseas Trade Board grant scheme. As my hon. Friend will know, a consultation document was published in December 1984. All I am asking my hon. Friend in the limited time available is that he should look at the BOTB consultation document again. Already the pound has fallen markedly against the dollar since December last year. At its earlier level of a few months ago it was estimated that by 1987 there would be the equivalent of a 15·5 per cent. cut in the help to British exporters who participate in overseas trade fairs and exhibitions.
The second small irritation with the Government is in relation to the clothing and footwear equipment scheme—Cloft. It is a year now since the Cloft proposals were put forward by the Government. As my hon. Friend well knows, Cloft involves the provision by Her Majesty's Government of about £20 million to help modernise our textile and clothing industries. Unfortunately, that scheme has fallen foul of EEC rules and regulations. As a result, after 12 months, no progress has been made with Cloft. The industry is becoming disillusioned, particularly when it is well known by hon. Members that some of the continental countries, particularly France and Germany, have key schemes of undercover support which improperly channel many millions of pounds into the support of their home industries. Will my hon. Friend use his best offices to get Cloft off the ground? The sum of £20 million has already been earmarked for the essential re-equipment of some small firms, and so on. Please will he get a move on with that?
The main purpose of my debate tonight is the fear—I use that word advisedly—of the textile and clothing industry about the implications of the Silberston report. It is a real worry to the industry. It is worried lest the Government should seek to form any policy based on any part of the Silberston recommendations. They are frequently based on speculation rather than on firm evidence. Professor Silberston seems to be unaware of the consequences if some of his recommendations are adopted.
For instance, one of the failings of the report concerns prices, inasmuch as the report's assumptions are based on inadequate evidence and solely on the situation in Hong Kong which is a unique case in the textile and clothing trade. The report fails to take sufficient account of the large job loss that would result from a fall in our industry's profitability. The Silberston report mentions a figure of between 10,000 and 48,000 jobs lost if its recommendations are put into effect. Expert sources in the trade calculate that the loss could be as high as 150,000 jobs.
The report is based on the Cambridge model forecast which is produced by a model of an unconvincing nature,


and important technical questions remain unanswered. The significance of the barriers to United Kingdom exports is greatly underestimated. There is a genuine risk to our industries of diversion of trade if the European Community relaxes its MFA restraints and other countries retain theirs. That risk is much greater than Professor Silberston assumes.
The report gives insufficient importance to the significance of China and its ability enormously to increase its textile and clothing exports. It fails to recognise that the use of article 19 of GATT to deal with destructive imports, as is recommended, is unlikely to be effective and would have dangerous implications for the whole trading framework. It is also felt that, if the MFA were abandoned, the poorer developing countries would lose out to the benefit of the newly industrialised countries, especially to China. The report's sectoral analysis is too brief and generalised to justify any policy recommendation which can be associated with it.
Professor Silberston points out that there would be a large fall in the industry's profitability if the MFA were abandoned without recognising the devastating effect it would have on employment. The report's treatment of what would happen if the EC abandoned regulation of import growth, but the United States continued it, is trivial and frivolous in the extreme. For instance, it gives only a sketchy account of barriers to United Kingdom textile exports, despite that being one of its main remits from the Government. The report does not measure up to the complexities of the textile and clothing industries, and cannot possibly provide a basis for the formulation of responsible Government policies.
Hand in hand with that goes the renewal of the MFA. About the only conclusion of Silberston with which a sensible person can agree is the recommendation to renew the MFA in 1986, although it then erroneously suggests that the MFA should be phased out shortly after it is renewed. It is the opinion of employers and employees in the textile and clothing industry that there is a strong case for the renewal of a vigorous and effective MFA when the present one runs out.
The MFA has been criticised, but it has encouraged firms to continue to improve their competitiveness. It has not prevented losses in jobs and capacity, but has kept them to a more manageable scale. It has preserved order in world textile trade—without it there would be chaos—and it has helped the development process of some of the least development countries by putting limits on the access to the European market of more competitive countries, such as Hong Kong, Korea and China. Some of the industrialised countries most critical of the MFA themselves limit their textile and clothing imports far more severely than anything done by the EC, under the MFA.
Contrary to what people have said, the MFA has not been used by the EC as a piece of blind protectionism. It has allowed EC import volume from MFA countries to grow by 16 per cent. between 1977 and 1983 at a time when volume demand increased by only 2·5 per cent. It is essential that the MFA is renewed. Moreover, the Government must have a vigorous and firm attitude in negotiating on behalf of Britain and its EC partners.
The textile and clothing industry makes a major contribution to the United Kingdom economy. Its sales of more than £10 billion represent a value added of more than

£3·6 billion. That is larger than the value added of the motor vehicle industry, more than half as much again than that of the aerospace industry, and more than three times that of computers. That major contribution to the economy would be undermined by an unrestrained growth of imports from low-wage and state-trading companies, and would be socially intolerable. It would increase the existing pressures on employment in some exposed areas of the United Kingdom where textiles and clothing provide half a million direct jobs. Those vulnerable areas are the north-west, Yorkshire, Scotland, Northern Ireland and inner city areas apart from the midlands.
In conclusion, I shall mention briefly two documents that I received today. The first is from a small employer in Leicester, who applauds the fact that this debate is taking place, although it is late at night. He says that he hopes the Government recognise,
the thin line that now exists between survival and closure. Most employers try desperately hard, with little reward (pay below their own knitters!) to keep jobs going, but how can we compete with low-wage workers in the East?
That happens even with MFA 3.
The second document is a report from the Manpower Services Commission entitled "Labour Market Trends Midland Region 1985–1987", which states:
Low cost imports continue to be a problem and although the Multi Fibre Arrangement … controls the level of imports from third world countries, there is still an agreement that most countries can increase imports by a certain percentage each year. The MFA is due for re-negotiation in 1986 and unless our negotiators are very firm on imports from these countries the market could become inundated with imports at prices impossible to match in this country. In view of the tremendous efforts which have been made by our textile/clothing firms to modernise their production methods to become competitive, this would be a disaster. This sector, being labour-intensive, has been one of the success stories in terms of employment creation in 1984.
My hon. Friend the Minister has not seen that MSC report. Indeed, I had not seen it until a few moments ago. With those few words, I look forward to my hon. Friend's reply.

Mr. Frank Haynes: The hon. Member for Harborough (Sir J. Farr) kindly allowed me to have a couple of minutes in this debate to support him, in the hope that the Minister will reply in a way that will help the hosiery and knitwear industry of Great Britain, bearing in mind the terrific battering that it has taken for several years. Jobs have been lost by the thousand.
The Government must support a renewal of the multi-fibre arrangement, and we would welcome an improvement in the present circumstances of the MFA. I know that the Minister is especially interested in industry and jobs, with special reference to the knitwear and hosiery industry. It is important that the right thing should be said from the Treasury Bench so that we may know that the Government will fight all the way to retain the MFA agreement and improve upon it if possible. If we do not get what we are asking for, there will be massive dumping on our shores at the expense of this first-class industry and the first-class work people and management within it. We need the support of this Government so that information can be fed into and out of Parliament.
I hope that we shall have a good response from the Minister.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Trade and Industry (Mr. David Trippier): May I begin by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir J. Farr) on his initiative in raising this important subject. I should like to take this opportunity of thanking my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Haynes) for the kind things that they have said about me.
I want to assure my hon. Friend that the Government are well aware of the significant contribution that the textile, knitting and clothing industry makes to the national economy. Despite the problems that it has faced over the last few years, it is still very important. It employs 500,000 people, which is 2 per cent. of total employment in the United Kingdom economy, and more than 10 per cent. of the United Kingdom's manufacturing employment. If we take the clothing and knitting industry, it still supplies about 63 per cent. of the home market for garments despite the intense competition provided by developed and developing countries alike.

Mr. Peter Thurnham: Is my hon. Friend aware that there has been a takeover bid for Tootal, which is a large textile employer? It employs over 8,500 people in this country, including the Osman factory in my constituency. The takeover bid has come from an overseas firm, which has given no assurances as to the future job prospects of employees in this country. Is the Minister aware of this, and will he satisfy himself as to whether there are reasons for it being referred to the Office of Fair Trading?

Mr. Trippier: I am aware of the issue. The Director General of the Office of Fair Trading, I understand, has discussed the bid with both parties and will be advising my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State shortly. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, North-East (Mr. Thurnham) will understand that I am not able to anticipate the advice at this stage.
I can assure my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough that the Government expect these industries to which I have referred to continue to play an important part in the economy of the country. In saying this, however, I do not wish to minimise the difficulties that they have had to face during the recession. Many companies have had to make hard and sometimes painful decisions to rationalise and retrench in order to remain in business and to remain competitive. But there are encouraging trends, and profitability is improving. A survey of the nine biggest British companies in this sector shows that their combined profits have almost tripled since 1981, admittedly from a low base. In the clothing industry, after very sharp falls experienced in 1980 and 1981, production has grown steadily in each of the last three years. The turnround in textiles and knitting took place more recently, and increases in output since then have been rather more modest than for clothing.
Despite fierce international competition, the industry needs to try to maintain its position at home and to strengthen its position overseas. Its future lies first and foremost in its own hands. The Government can certainly assist, and are assisting, in such areas as advisory services for good design and helping to spread awareness of its importance. Marketing skills are also important. Similarly, the decisions on whether to invest in new

machinery and the extent to which firms carry out research and development must in the final analysis rest with the individual firms.
The Government can help, however, to ensure that the climate in which United Kingdom industry operates is as favourable as possible. I believe that our economic strategy is of central importance—the drop in inflation, the cut in the national insurance surcharge, and the growth in productivity have assisted the industry. During 1983–84, firms in the United Kingdom textile and clothing industry were paid or offered about £66 million under regional or general assistance schemes operated by my Department and the Northern Ireland Department of Economic Development.
Hon. Members referred to the multi-fibre arrangement. In recent months, the Government have been considering what regime should replace the present MFA when it expires in 1986. To assist us in reaching a decision, the Minister for Trade, the Minister for State, Department of Trade and Industry and I have been holding a series of consultative meetings with interested parties. We had a useful meeting with the three major organisations representing the textile and clothing industries — the British Textile Confederation, the British Clothing Industry Association and the Knitting Industries' Federation. We have also seen representatives of consumer organisations, trade unions, retailers and importers, and further meetings are still to be held.
My Department commissioned the report from Professor Silberston because, with the MFA expiring next year, we wanted an independent assessment of the way in which it has affected not merely the textile and clothing industries but the economy as a whole. We asked Professor Silberston to look at two aspects in particular. The first was to consider the effects on United Kingdom exports of textiles and clothing of trade barriers maintained in other world markets. The second was to consider the effects of restraining imports of low-cost textiles into the United Kingdom, including the effects of the industries themselves, on other industries, and on the consumer.
The report is, of course, Professor Silberston's responsibility. The Government do not need or intend to adopt or reject the report as a whole. We must make some judgments on the costs and benefits of the MFA, and the report is a useful input. It is clear that the industry and the trade unions have been critical of Professor Silberston's analysis, while others have questioned whether he goes far enough. We shall consider it in the light of all the views expressed, including those that have been expressed tonight.
Professor Silberston concluded that restrictions on imports of low-cost textiles and clothing raised their average prices to the British shopper by about 5 per cent. The textile and clothing industry has made it clear that it does not accept that figure. The consumers' organisations have stated that they regard it as too low, especially for children's clothes. Rightly or wrongly, however, Professor Silberston calculates that the MFA costs the British consumer about £450 million a year. Strikingly, he finds that much of the benefit from the highest prices accrues to foreign suppliers and estimates that at least half of the cost to British customers is lost abroad in this way, while the rest remains to benefit British producers. Those are only some of Professor Silberston's main conclusions and, as I said, we have received a number of comments and criticisms about them.
In considering what should succeed the current MFA, there are, therefore, many considerations for the Government to take into account. The world trading system based on GATT is extremely important to us as a nation depending so much on trade, and we are committed to its strengthening in the future. For that reason, we very much favour the proposal for a new GATT round to build on its successes and to take them further forward. We must also take into account the commitments made by this and other Governments to make all possible progress towards a worldwide open trading system. We attach great importance to those commitments.
I appreciate my hon. Friend's disappointment about the Cloft scheme, and I share that disappointment. I also understand his disappointment with the decision on the British Overseas Trade Board budget.
I should like to say a few words about the recent negative decision given by the European Commission to our proposed Cloft scheme for investment assistance to small firms in these industries.
The aim of the proposed scheme, which was announced by the Secretary of State during last year's Budget debate, was to encourage small firms in the clothing, footwear, knitting and textile industry to invest in the latest equipment. We considered that although modest in terms of its overall budget, which was £20 million over three to four years, the Cloft scheme, by providing grants of 20 per cent. towards the cost of high technology equipment, would in fact have provided a substantial incentive to firms to invest in such equipment, both in their own interest and to the benefit of the economy at large.
Unfortunately for us, the European Commission, which has the responsibility for enforcing those provisions of the treaty of Rome which governs state aids, has recently been taking an increasingly restrictive line on the provision of such aids in relation to the textile and clothing industries.
We none the less considered as a Government that the Cloft proposals were sufficiently tightly drawn and selective as to prove unobjectionable. In the event, as the House knows, this was not acceptable.
Basing themselves on the improvement in the industry's economic position throughout Europe, the Commission further tightened its attitude towards sectoral aid schemes. It rejected a Belgian scheme in September, and now it has rejected ours. The full text of the Commission's decision has become available to the Department of Trade and Industry only in the last few days. A copy was placed in the Library on 6 March. We are currently studying the detail and propose to have discussions very soon with representatives of the industries concerned to consider where we go from here.
Obviously, the industry is as dismayed as we are at the Commission's rejection of Cloft. It considers the Commission's decision to be particularly inequitable in view of the large amounts of sectoral aid given to the clothing and textile industry in other member states, and my hon. Friend referred to those. We share this view and, even in advance of receipt of the full text of the decision, we have conveyed these sentiments to the Commission in forceful terms and have equally forcefully expressed the hope that the Commission will in future apply its more stringent policy without exception. I am pleased to be able to report that the Commission has not only confirmed that this is its intention but has also indicated that it proposes to take an equally firm line with Spain and Portugal when they become members of the Community.
I should like to assure my hon. Friend that I have taken into account all that he has said. This has been a very useful debate on an important industry, and I am grateful to him for providing me with the opportunity to reply to it. I am very conscious of the importance attached by the industry to the question of the successor regime to the current multi-fibre arrangement. I have listened with great attention to the points made this evening by my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Ashfield, and I can assure the House that the interests of our textile and clothing industry will be taken fully into account in considering our policy in this very important area.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at seven minutes to Two o' clock.